Semmes v. Western Union Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 July 1890
• Parties: SEMMES ET AL. v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. SEMMES ET AL.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

20 A. 127

73 Md. 9

SEMMES ET AL. v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. SEMMES ET AL.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

July 1, 1890

Cross-appeals from superior court of Baltimore city.

Argued before ALVEY, C.J., and MILLER, ROBINSON, BRYAN, MCSHERRY FOWLER, and BRISCOE, JJ.

John N. Steele, John E. Semmes, and Francis K Carey, for plaintiffs.

C.J. M. Gwinn, John F. Dillon, Wager Swayne, and George H. Fearons, for defendants.

BRYAN J.

John E. Semmes and Frank P. Clark obtained a judgment in the superior court of Baltimore city against the Western Union Telegraph Company. Both parties have appealed to this court. We will state such of the facts as we deem material to the decision of the questions before us. In the year 1877, the Western Union Telegraph Company of Baltimore city filed a bill in equity against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. No proceeding was taken under this bill in behalf of the complainant. Afterwards the plaintiffs to this suit, who are attorneys at law, were employed by certain stockholders in the said telegraph company, who held a minority of the shares of stock, to represent them in the suit; and they were also employed by the defendant, who held a minority of the shares of stock. An amended bill of complaint was filed in 1885 by the Western Union Telegraph Company of Baltimore city, and the defendants were the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, the Western Union Telegraph Company, and other parties. The object of the amended bill, as stated on its face, was to establish the absolute right and title of the complainant to certain telegraph wires, poles, and all their appurtenances which had been erected on the line of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company; and also establish its rights to maintain said wires, poles, and their appurtenances as telegraph lines, and to use and operate them as such; and also to obtain an account from the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company of the sums of money which it had received for the transmission of messages over said telegraph lines. The prayers for relief were adapted to these ends. The defendant in this suit agreed to pay the plaintiffs, as a contingent compensation, one-sixth of the amount which should be recovered for it, as a holder of the stock of the Western Union Telegraph Company of Baltimore city. The suit of this last-mentioned corporation was prosecuted against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company and others until it was dismissed, with costs, without prejudice. With the consent and approval of the defendant in the present suit, an appeal was taken to this court; but, before the cause was reached for argument, it purchased from the railroad company all the property and interests which were in litigation. This transaction being made known to this court, inasmuch as no controversy any longer existed, an affirmance of the decree below was a necessity. 69 Md. 211, 14 A. 531. The plaintiffs contend that, inasmuch as they were ready and willing to prosecute the suit to a successful conclusion, and were prevented by the act of the defendant, they are entitled to the contingent compensation. It was not stated to the court in the appeal which we have just mentioned, but it appears from the evidence in this case, that, when the purchase was made from the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, it was agreed that the suit of the Western Union Telegraph Company of Baltimore city should be dismissed.

We do not regard the agreement as very material to any question here, as, with or without such a stipulation, the controversy was at an end. Undoubtedly this defendant had the right to settle its suit whenever it saw fit; it has not been contended that it was obliged to carry on the litigation for the benefit of its counsel. And yet it must fulfill all the responsibilities arising from its contract with them. Where there is a contract for building a house or doing other work and the plaintiff, being ready and willing to do the work, is wrongfully and improperly prevented by the defendant from completing it, he may certainly recover as damages the difference between the contract price and the cost of doing the work, when this cost can be definitely computed; and the circumstances of the case may sometimes authorize additional damages. This was the view of the supreme court of the United States in Railroad Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 344. But there is great difficulty in applying this principle to a contract for professional services, where the compensation is to be paid contingently on the successful prosecution of a suit. The law favors the settlement of litigation. We should be most reluctant to say that public policy would sustain a contract whereby a litigant should put it out of his power to compromise his suit according to his own wishes or interest. But in this case...