Senate Republican Campaign Committee v. Public Disclosure Com'n of State of Wash., 64346-6
| Decision Date | 25 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 64346-6,64346-6 |
| Citation | 943 P.2d 1358,133 Wn.2d 229 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | SENATE REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE, Appellant, v. The PUBLIC DISCLOSURE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent. |
Davis, Wright & Tremaine, Daniel Ritter, Seattle, Joseph Vance, Bellevue, for appellant.
Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Thomas G. Holcomb, Jr., John M. Gerberding, Assistants, Olympia, for respondent.
The central issue presented by this appeal is whether RCW 42.17.710, a statute which prohibits state legislators or persons acting on their behalf from soliciting or accepting campaign contributions during a so-called "legislative session freeze period," prohibited the Senate Republican Campaign Committee (SRCC) from seeking and accepting contributions to a fund to be used later for the benefit of then unknown individuals who will, in the future, seek election as Republicans to State Senate positions not held by incumbent Republican senators. We hold that the statute does not prohibit such activity because the beneficiaries of the fundraising do not fall within the statutory definition of "candidate." We hold, however, that a material fact question exists as to whether the funds solicited by the SRCC were also intended to inure to the benefit of persons who fall within the statutory definition of the term candidate. Consequently, we reverse the superior court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC) and remand for trial.
In 1972, the voters of this state passed Initiative 276 (Laws of 1973, ch. 1, § 1), which, among other things, regulated the financing of political campaigns. The measure, later codified as RCW 42.17, established the PDC and denominated it as the agency to enforce the various requirements of the Campaign Financing Act (Act). RCW 42.17.350; .360. Specifically, the PDC was given authority to investigate alleged violations of the Act and to report any such alleged violations to appropriate law enforcement authorities. RCW 42.17.360(5). By later amendment, the PDC was given additional authority to determine whether the Act had been violated and to issue orders requiring violators to cease and desist from the activities constituting a violation or, alternatively, to impose other remedies, including civil penalties. RCW 42.17.395.
In 1992, Washington's voters approved Initiative 134, commonly referred to as the Fair Campaign Practices Act. Laws of 1993, ch. 2, §§ 1-36. This had the effect of amending RCW 42.17 in several places. One of the amendments prohibited state legislators and persons employed by or acting on their behalf from soliciting or accepting contributions "to a public office fund, to a candidate or authorized committee, or to retire a campaign debt" during a period "beginning on the thirtieth day before the date a regular legislative session convenes and continuing thirty days past the date of final adjournment...." RCW 42.17.710.
During the 1995 regular legislative session, the SRCC prepared and mailed two letters to potential campaign donors, asking for contributions to the SRCC. The SRCC is a political committee duly registered with the PDC and subject to the direction and control of the Senate Republican Caucus. The Senate Republican Caucus is comprised entirely of incumbent Republican State Senators. The SRCC's solicitation letters were both signed by State Senator Dan McDonald, the Republican Leader of the Washington State Senate and chair of the SRCC. In the first letter, dated February 1995, Senator McDonald stated, in pertinent part:
I need your help to win a majority in the Senate.
....
Your support is essential, if we are to continue.
....
Your contribution of $100, $75, $39--or whatever you can afford--will make a tremendous difference. Every dollar goes directly to support Republican candidates for the State Senate.
....
Your 1995 membership of at least $39 will be used to defend Republican seats in 1995 and secure a Republican majority by 1996!
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 181-82. Two months later, Senator McDonald signed a second letter which was almost identical to his earlier letter.
Another letter, which was written on the letterhead of Senate Republican Leadership Council 1 and signed by its chair, W.H. Meadowcroft, was also sent to potential donors. Although the Council is an organization separate from the SRCC, the SRCC concedes that it "sponsored" this letter. The letter, dated January 31, 1995, stated in pertinent part:
Our opportunities to win the Majority in the State Senate in 1996 are outstanding. The Democrats have several seats up for election that are traditionally Republican Districts. This is our opportunity to win back these vulnerable districts and regain the Majority in the State Senate.
CP at 178. According to the PDC, the SRCC received over $70,000 in contributions in response to the aforementioned letters and its other fundraising activities conducted during the legislative session freeze period. 2
On March 10, 1995, the PDC began an investigation to determine whether the SRCC's solicitation of funds during the 1995 legislative session constituted a violation of RCW 42.17.710. The SRCC responded by filing a declaratory judgment action in Thurston County Superior Court, asking that court to declare the PDC's investigation unlawful. It also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the PDC from "commencing enforcement action or administrative hearings regarding the applicability of RCW 42.17.710." CP at 26. The PDC then issued an "enforcement hearing notice" to the SRCC, its executive director, Sandy Olsen, and its chairperson, Senator Dan McDonald. CP at 150.
The superior court denied the SRCC's motion for preliminary injunction. Consequently, the PDC proceeded with the scheduled enforcement hearing, at the conclusion of which it determined that the SRCC had violated RCW 42.17.710 by soliciting contributions during the legislative session freeze period. The PDC then moved to sequester all funds that had been and would be received in response to the allegedly illegal fundraising. The superior court granted its motion.
Thereafter, the SRCC moved for summary judgment. In support of that motion, the SRCC filed a declaration of Sandy Olsen. In it, she asserted that the monies collected by the SRCC from the letter writing effort and other fundraising activities were to be used for three purposes: (1) to "defray the costs of fund-raising itself"; (2) for "office administration"; and (3) "for ultimate use by new senatorial candidates, that is, individuals who will in the future become candidates for senatorial seats not held by incumbent Republican senators." CP at 650-51. She also stated:
It is true that all funds raised as a result of that letter, net of expenses, were intended for ultimate use by new senatorial candidates, that is, individuals who will in the future become candidates for senatorial seats not held by incumbent Republican senators. We did not know then--we still do not know--who those candidates will be. Since we were trying to build a fund for future campaigns and were not soliciting on behalf of any actual, present, identified candidate....
CP at 650-51. In a later filed declaration, Olsen stated that contributions to the SRCC do not and cannot influence any sitting Republican senator because "none of them directly benefit from the monies obtained." CP at 587.
The PDC responded by filing a counterclaim for "penalty and equitable relief." CP at 170. It also moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim and for dismissal of the SRCC's declaratory judgment action. After a hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment, the superior court concluded that "during the 1995 legislative freeze period, the SRCC accepted contributions in violation of RCW 42.17.710." Consequently, it entered an order dismissing the SRCC's declaratory judgment action and granting partial summary judgment to the PDC on its counterclaim. The superior court also ordered the SRCC to "cease and desist from soliciting and accepting contributions in violation of 42.17.710." CP at 758. It deferred consideration of sanctions "until final determination of whether a violation of RCW 42.17.710 has occurred." CP at 758. 3
Following denial of its motion for reconsideration, the SRCC appealed to Division Two of the Court of Appeals. That court certified the appeal to this court. We granted review.
We are called upon to determine whether the superior court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the PDC. A summary judgment motion should be granted if the submissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the material evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party, in this case the SRCC. Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash.2d 255, 256, 616 P.2d 644 (1980); see also Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). The construction of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Health Ins. Pool v. Health Care Auth., 129 Wash.2d 504, 507, 919 P.2d 62 (1996).
To resolve the issue before us, it is necessary to examine RCW 42.17.710, the statute that establishes the legislative session freeze period--a period of time before, during and after a legislative session in which certain political fundraising is proscribed. It provides:
During the period beginning on the thirtieth day before the date a regular legislative session convenes and continuing thirty days past the date of final adjournment, and during the period beginning on the date a special legislative session convenes and continuing through the date that session adjourns, no state official or a person employed by or...
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