Sendick v. Matvey

• Decision Date: 22 November 1957
• Citation: 391 Pa. 286,138 A.2d 92
• Parties: Louis SENDICK, Jr., Executor of the Estate of Susie Sendick, Deceased, v. Agnes MATVEY, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 92

138 A.2d 92

391 Pa. 286

Louis SENDICK, Jr., Executor of the Estate of Susie Sendick, Deceased, v. Agnes MATVEY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 22, 1957.

Joseph I. Lewis, Cooper, Hunter & Lewis, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Patrick J. Corr, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, CHIDSEY, ARNOLD, BENJAMIN R. JONES and COHEN, JJ.

BENJAMIN R. JONES, Justice.

Appellant, the youngest daughter of Susie Sendick, deceased, appeals from a decree in equity entered by a divided court en banc, affirming a chancellor's findings and ordering appellant to reconvey certain real estate located in Pittsburgh to the decedent's estate. Decedent instituted this equity action on November 16, 1953; upon her death, on April 4, 1954, her son and executor, Louis Sendick, Jr., was substituted as plaintiff.

The complaint in equity alleges, in substance, that the appellant fraudulently induced the decedent to execute a deed to the property in question to the appellant when the decedent's intention was only to make a will. The eighth paragraph of the complaint states: 'At the time the alleged Deed was signed, the Plaintiff was in her sixty-ninth (69) year, weak in body and confined to her bed, and weak in mind, easily influenced by the Plaintiff [sic] who stood in a confidential relationship to her, and not possessed of such mental capacity to comprehend the true meaning of said instrument or to understand the effect of her act, and was told the instrument was only a Will which she could revoke any time. The plaintiff by reason of her illiteracy could not read the instrument that was signed by her; and since the same was not read to her in her native tongue, she trusted representations made to her that it was a Will and signed the same.' It was further alleged that the appellant promised to move into the decedent's home, pay the taxes, maintain the property and care for the decedent and that the appellant had failed to do any of these things. In substance, the prayer of the complaint was that the appellant be compelled to reconvey the property allegedly obtained by her fraudulent acts and undue influence.

Trial was held before the chancellor on October 4 and 5, 1954. The appellee offered eight witnesses, five of whom were ruled incompetent to testify under the Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, Section 5(e), 28 P.S. § 322. No exceptions having been taken to this ruling, the question of their competency is not before this Court. The three witnesses who were permitted to testify for the appellee were Mrs. Rose Parks, decedent's eldest daughter, Mrs. Parks' husband and the doctor who cared for the decedent during the period in question. The chancellor properly ruled that because Mrs. Parks did not stand to benefit under decedent's will she was a disinterested witness and consequently competent to testify under the Act of 1887, supra. Appellant called only two witnesses, Michael W. Huron, a member of the Allegheny County Bar and Mrs. Esther Huron, his wife and secretary, who was a notary public.

On July 11, 1955 the chancellor filed his Adjudication, Findings of Fact, Discussion, Conclusions of Law and Decree Nisi.

The chancellor made the following findings of fact, inter alia: that the decedent had, on August 15, 1951, executed a deed to the property in question, reserving a life estate while conveying the remainder interest to the appellant; that the appellant, on August 29, 1951, had executed a written agreement which recited that in consideration for the conveyance to her of the remainder interest in decedent's property, the appellant agreed to pay decedent's funeral expenses not to exceed $800 and a lien against the property held by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Public Assistance; that there was also an oral agreement under which the appellant undertook to care for the decedent during her lifetime in further consideration for the conveyance; that the decedent was enfeebled in both mind and body by her illness; that the appellant did not move into decedent's home until January, 1952, five months after the conveyance was made; that the appellant never resided with the decedent until after the deed was executed, and before that time she only called upon the decedent occasionally when accompanied by her family; that the appellant failed to pay the funeral expenses or the Department of Public Assistance lien as she promised and that she had breached her agreement of August 29, 1951.

In his discussion the chancellor stated: 'The facts and circumstances in this case cast more than a slight suspicion upon the [appellant], the relationship of the parties, the difference in their ages, physical and mental condition, and the [appellant] was required to prove there was no fraud or undue influence in this transaction, and in this respect [appellant] failed.' The chancellor's decree nisi directed the appellant to reconvey the property to the appellee and to make an accounting to the court-appointed receiver.

The court en banc (one judge dissenting), on January 24, 1957, affirmed the chancellor, dismissing the appellant's 49 exceptions to the Adjudication, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree Nisi, and entering a final decree.

Our scope of review in an appeal of this type was recently discussed by this Court in Commonwealth Trust Company v. Szabo, Pa., 138 A.2d 85, wherein we said: 'In passing upon the questions raised on this appeal we must adhere to the well-established rule that a chancellor's findings of fact, approved by a court en banc, have all the force and effect of a jury's verdict if they are supported by adequate evidence and ordinarily will not be disturbed on appeal: Gagnon v. Speback, 389 Pa. 17, 20, 131 A.2d 619; Mann v. Mann, 387 Pa. 230, 233, 127 A.2d 666; Eways v. Reading Parking Authority, 385 Pa. 592, 601, 124 A.2d 92; Brightbill v. Boeshore, 385 Pa. 69, 79, 122 A.2d 38. However, the chancellor's 'conclusions whether of law or ultimate fact are no more than his reasoning from the underlying facts and are reviewable', especially 'where the underlying facts themselves are not in esse but are matters of inference and deductions': Kelly v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 465, 115 A.2d 238, 241; Eways v. Reading Parking Authority, supra, 385 Pa. at page 601, 124 A.2d at page 96; Peters v. Machikas, 378 Pa. 52, 56, 105 A.2d 708. Furthermore, a chancellor's findings of fact, even though approved by a court en banc, need not be accepted as conclusive if there is no evidence to support them or if they are based on an inference erroneously taken (Essick v. Shillam, 347 Pa. 373, 32 A.2d 416, 146 A.L.R. 1399; Potter v. Brown, 328 Pa. 554, 563, 195 A. 901, 118 A.L.R. 1415), or where the evidence, in order to prevail, must be clear, precise and indubitable or must meet some other prescribed standard (Stafford v. Reed, 363 Pa. 405, 407, 70 A.2d 345).'

From the uncontradicted and undisputed evidence appearing on this record, a clear narrative of the events surrounding this transaction emerges. Governed as we are by the principles reiterated above, we must determine whether the chancellor's findings and conclusions are based upon adequate evidence and whether his inferences therefrom were properly drawn.

At the time of the conveyance, and for some time prior thereto, the decedent was bedridden, suffering from high blood pressure, arteriosclerosis and a heart condition; she showed signs of senile changes or degeneration of the brain, having, at times, lapses of memory. However, the evidence is clear that she discussed her business affairs lucidly and, as Mrs, Parks, appellee's own witness, stated upon direct examination, intelligently. At the time of the conveyance, appellant did not reside with the decedent but did visit with her regularly on the week-ends. The decedent's two sons, together with their wives, lived with the decedent.

During the several months prior to the conveyance the decedent held several conversations with the appellant, Mrs. Parks and another daughter during the course of which she expressed her desire to 'leave' her property to the appellant if the appellant would reside with her and provide her with medical and personal care. Mrs. Parks, appellee's witness, stated that she attempted to influence the decedent to carry out this desire. While these conversations took place in the latter part of 1950 and the early part of 1951, the testimony is not at all clear as to when the last conversation occurred.

It is clear, however, that in July, 1951, Michael W. Huron, an attorney, was consulted by the decedent and instructed by her to prepare a deed conveying the property, in fee simple, to the appellant. Mr. Huron was not certain who contacted him on the decedent's behalf but was under the impression that it was Mrs. Parks. Prior to this consultation, the attorney was unacquainted with either the appellant or the decedent but had known Mrs. Parks for some time.

Mr. Huron informed the decedent that in his opinion 'it was bad policy for old people to convey property to their children during their lifetime' and the decedent, on the strength of this argument, then agreed that he should prepare a will instead of a deed. Before the will was drawn, however, Mr. Huron was again contacted by telephone (by whom he does not know) and again instructed to prepare a deed. After receiving this call, and without actually drawing the deed, Mr. Huron returned to the decedent's home and again attempted to persuade her to make a will. The decedent was adamant in her insistence upon a deed but Mr. Huron did succeed in securing her assent to a provision reserving a life estate in the property for herself. In addition, Mr. Huron suggested, and the decedent consented, that a supplemental written agreement should be drawn providing that in consideration for the conveyance the appellant would agree to satisfy a lien against the property held by the...