Senn v. State

Decision Date26 April 2002
Docket NumberNo. 03A01-0110-PC-387.,03A01-0110-PC-387.
Citation766 N.E.2d 1190
PartiesFrancis A. SENN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Katharine C. Liell, Stacy R. Uliana, Liell & McNeil Attorneys PC, Bloomington, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Francis Senn (Senn), appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.1

ISSUES

Senn raises five issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by not giving him credit time for his time served in jail.

2. Whether the trial court erred by not crediting his sentence with time served on home detention.

3. Whether the trial court erred by not crediting his sentence with credit time and time served on work release.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 11, 1993, the State filed informations against Senn, charging him with Count I, criminal recklessness, a Class D felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-2-2; Count II, intimidation, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35-43-2-1; and Count III, public intoxication, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. § 7.1-5-1-3. On October 29, 1993, Senn plead guilty to Count II, intimidation, and was committed to the Indiana Department of Correction for a period of eight (8) years, with six (6) years suspended to be served on probation.

On February 10, 1995, while on probation and after Senn had served his time with the Indiana Department of Correction, the State filed a Petition to Revoke Probation. Senn admitted to violating the terms of his probation. On April 5, 1995, the trial court extended Senn's probation and placed him on probation for six (6) years beginning April 5, 1995. Further, the trial court ordered the first nine (9) months of probation to be served on work release and the next six (6) months to be served on home detention. The trial court noted that Senn "receives fifty-three (53) days credit." (Appellant's App. p. 72). According to Bartholomew County Community Corrections, Senn completed 217 days of work release, April 6, 1995November 8, 1995. Senn also completed seventy-nine (79) days of home detention, November 9, 1995January 26, 1996.

On January 14, 1999, the State filed another Petition to Revoke Probation. On May 3, 1999, the trial court ordered Senn to be held in the Bartholomew County Jail without bond until his initial hearing. On August 30, 1999, Senn filed a Motion for Release from Incarceration and for Placement on House Arrest Program. On November 18, 1999, Senn admitted to violating the terms of his probation. That same day, the trial court ordered Senn to be "released from the Bartholomew County Jail pending the disposition in this cause on the following conditions: 1. The defendant is placed on home detention through the Bartholomew County Community Corrections Office and follow[s] all rules of home detention." (Appellant's App. p. 141). According to the Bartholomew County Community Corrections, Senn completed 315 days of home detention, November 19, 1999September 28, 2000.

On March 15, 2001, the State filed a Petition to Revoke Probation/Community Corrections. On March 27, 2001, Senn admitted to violating the terms of his probation. That same day, the trial court ordered that Senn be "remanded to the custody of the Bartholomew County Sheriff pending the disposition in this cause." (Appellant's App. p. 163). On May 3, 2001, the trial court found that Senn violated the terms of his probation. The trial court ordered Senn's "probation revoked and he serve the balance of his sentence in the appropriate institution. The defendant receives 273 days credit toward his sentence." (Appellant's App. p. 175).

On June 15, 2001, Senn filed his Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence. In his motion, Senn stated:

As a result of probation violations, Senn served two hundred and seventy-three (273) days in the Bartholomew County Jail, two hundred and seventeen (217) days on work release as a condition of probation, seventy-nine (79) days on home detention as a condition of probation, and three hundred and fifteen days (315) on home detention as a condition of pretrial release.

(Appellant's App. p. 186). With this in mind, Senn argued that pursuant to I.C. § 35-50-6-3, he was owed 546 days of credit for the 273 days he served in the Bartholomew County Jail. He also argued that he was owed 79 days of credit for his time served on home detention as a condition of probation. Senn maintained that he was owed 315 days of credit for his time served on home detention as a condition of pretrial release. Further, he contended that he was owed 434 days of credit for the 217 days he served on work release as a condition of probation. Alternatively, Senn argued that he was, at least, entitled to 217 days of credit for his time served on work release as a condition of probation.

On September 4, 2001, a hearing was held on Senn's Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence. Regarding Senn's argument that he was owed 546 days of credit for the 273 days he served in the Bartholomew County Jail, the following exchange took place between the trial court, the State and Senn's counsel:

JUDGE GUTHRIE:

Is it not true that if he's in jail for 273 days incarceration, he gets another day for each one of those, but will not the Department of Corrections [sic] make that calculation anyway?
MRS. BURNS [the State]:
That was going to be one of my arguments, your Honor. What the abstract of judgment calls for and always calls for is the number of days confined prior to sentencing, which is correctly reflected on the abstract is 273 days. The Department of Corrections [sic] will assess the good time during the service of the ... of the sentence.
JUDGE GUTHRIE:
If I put four hundred or five hundred and whatever, then he'll get four to one?
MRS. BURNS:
Yes. Yes.
MS. ULIANA [Senn's counsel]:
Hold on. Excuse me, you Honor. Oh, they automatically double that. But he hasn't ... he might not even make it to DOC though. I mean ...
JUDGE GUTHRIE:
Well, wherever he is, the jail or whatever, will ... since the order says he served 273, they'll give him 273 good time credit. They'll figure that. I don't... I don't ever figure that.
MS. ULIANA:
Your Honor, also ... why ...
JUDGE GUTHRIE:
So anyway ... that's my understanding and ... that's automatic.
MS. ULIANA:
Okay, then ... we agree with that.
MS. BURNS:
That's always been my understanding, yes.
MS. ULIANA:
Then we agree with that.

(Appellant's App. pp. 246-247). The trial court took the matter under advisement. On September 18, 2001, the trial court denied Senn's Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence.

Senn now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence

Senn argues that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence. In Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1243 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied, our supreme court held that "a motion to correct sentence is appropriate where the sentence is erroneous on its face and that facial error occurs when the sentence violates express statutory authority." Additionally, our supreme court held that a "trial court's ruling upon a motion to correct sentence is subject to appeal by normal appellate procedures. While this Court will defer to the trial court's factual finding, reviewing only for abuse of discretion, we will review a trial court's legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review." Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, this court held that a "sentencing error may be raised for the first time on appeal. Courts have a duty to correct an erroneously imposed sentence." Watkins v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1342, 1344 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992) (citation omitted).

II. Credit for Time Served and Credit Time

Senn argues that he was owed 546 days of credit for the 273 days he served in the Bartholomew County Jail. I.C. § 35-50-6-4(a) provides: "A person imprisoned for a crime or imprisoned awaiting trial or sentencing is initially assigned to Class I." Furthermore, I.C. § 35-50-6-3(a) provides: "A person assigned to Class I earns one (1) day of credit time for each day he is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing." Because presentence jail time credit is a matter of statutory right, a trial court generally does not have discretion in awarding or denying such credit. Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct.App.2001),reh'g denied.

The State agrees that a defendant is entitled to credit time2 for the days on which he was incarcerated awaiting trial or sentencing. Moreover, the State does not dispute that Senn should receive credit time, as well as credit for time served. However, the State argues that:

the trial court did not deny Defendant that credit time. The trial court agreed that Defendant was entitled to that credit time, but stated that the Department of Correction always doubles the number of days credited on the abstract of judgment to arrive at the actual amount of time credited against the sentence.

(Appellee's Brief p. 6). We recognize that the trial court stated that the Indiana Department of Correction calculates the number of days to which a defendant is entitled. We also recognize that Senn's counsel agreed with the trial court's interpretation of Senn's time served and credit time. Nonetheless, as stated above, this is not a discretionary matter. See Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 449

. Therefore, if a mistake in Senn's credit time or time served is apparent, it is our duty to correct that mistake. See Watkins, 588 N.E.2d at 1344.

On March 29, 2001, the Bartholomew County Court Services Department filed a sentencing recommendation to the trial court. In its recommendation, the Bartholomew County Court Services Department stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

Further the Court
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
34 cases
  • Sickels v. State , 20A03–1102–CR–66.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 13 Marzo 2012
    ...case. See, e.g., Bd. of Sch. Trs. v. Barnell by Duncan, 678 N.E.2d 799, 804 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1997); see also Senn v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1190, 1198–99 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (discussing Martin v. State, 748 N.E.2d 428 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. granted, while noting, “[a]lthough transfer has been g......
  • Robinson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 10 Marzo 2004
    ...pre-sentence imprisonment, some cases have granted relief. See, e.g., Crow v. State, 797 N.E.2d 319 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); Senn v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1190 (Ind.Ct. App.2002). But in Hatchett v. State, 794 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), while emphasizing that trial courts may not routinely di......
  • Martin v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 28 Agosto 2002
    ...July 1, 2001, the Court of Appeals has twice reached the same outcome as reached here, albeit on different grounds. In Senn v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1190 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), the defendant, who had been sentenced before the effective date of the amendments, filed a motion in the trial court seek......
  • Roberson v. State, 48A02-0108-CR-504.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 26 Abril 2002
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT