Sennett v. Shell Oil Company, Civ. A. No. 70-1624.

Decision Date25 February 1971
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 70-1624.
Citation325 F. Supp. 1
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
PartiesLibby Marie SENNETT, acting in her own behalf and as personal representative of the Estate of Albert L. Sennett, Plaintiff, v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, Defendant.

Harris M. Dulitz, John R. Martzell, Leo Unger, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.

Al J. Moore, New Orleans, La., for defendant.

RUBIN, District Judge:

A motion to dismiss or for summary judgment raises, apparently for the first time, the interpretation to be given the Oceanographic Research Vessels Law, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 441 et seq., adopted by Congress in 1965. The issue arises as a result of the death of Albert L. Sennett, an employee of Shell Oil Company, aboard Shell's vessel, the R/V NIOBE, off the Coast of Nova Scotia, on May 12, 1970. Mr. Sennett was working aboard the R/V NIOBE when, it is alleged, a defective seismic air gun fired improperly and blew off the right side of his head.

His widow and children filed suit against Shell under the provisions of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq., General Maritime Law and Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Shell contends that the sole remedy of the survivors is under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation law because the decedent was hired in Louisiana, and that all other remedies are foreclosed by the Oceanographic Research Law. It would be a strange result if one who labors on the high seas may recover against his employer only under state compensation laws for an industrial accident. So we examine the statute to determine whether this is the result that Congress ordained.

I. PURPOSE AND PROVISIONS OF THE LAW

Vessels engaged in oceanographic research are operated by a crew that performs the duties usually assigned to seamen. These vessels also carry a complement of scientific personnel who are engaged in research and have nothing to do with the navigation or maintenance of the vessel. However, prior to 1965, some scientific personnel might be considered members of the crew because they contributed to the mission of the vessel even though their duties were scientific in nature. Those scientific personnel who could not be considered crewmen were classified as passengers under the general laws relative to passenger vessels.

Congress found that these requirements hampered the operation of such research vessels. The purpose of the Oceanographic Research Law, as reflected in the Senate Committee Report The Report, was "to encourage and facilitate oceanographic research by removing certain impediments which have been hampering the operation of research vessels, and particularly the large, new, modern scientific ships which have been and are being made available under the expanded national oceanographic program." Senate Rep. No. 1276, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1.

The statute defines an "oceanographic research vessel" O.R.V. as a "vessel which the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating finds is being employed exclusively in instruction in oceanography or limnology, or both, or exclusively in oceanographic research, including, but not limited to, such studies pertaining to the sea as seismic, gravity meter and magnetic exploration and other marine geophysical or geological surveys, atmospheric research, and biological research." 46 U.S.C. Sec. 441. The Secretary of Transportation, the department in which the Coast Guard is now operating has found the law applicable to vessels meeting the description of the R/V NIOBE. 46 CFR § 188.05-1.

O.R.V. classification bestows unique legal characteristics on the ship:

(1) It is not considered a passenger vessel under the laws relative to the inspection and manning of merchant vessels by reason of the carriage of scientific personnel. 46 U.S.C. Sec. 442.
(2) It is not deemed to be engaged in trade or commerce. 46 U.S.C. Sec. 443.
(3) Scientific personnel aboard her "shall not be considered seamen under the provisions of title 53 of of the Revised Statutes and Act (sic) amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto."
(4) If the Secretary determines that application to it of any provision in Title 52 or Title 53 of the Revised Statutes, or Acts amendatory thereof, is not necessary in the performance of the mission of the vessel, he may by regulation exempt any such vessel from such provision, upon such terms and conditions as he may specify." 46 U.S.C. Sec. 445.

The purpose, then, of this statute is to classify scientific personnel aboard O.R.V.'s as nonpassengers to remove O.R.V.'s from some of the existing statutory regulations pertaining to passenger vessels; to classify scientific personnel —but scientific personnel only— aboard O.R.V.'s as non-seamen so as to relieve O.R.V.'s of the obligation of complying with certain statutory regulations pertaining to seamen; and to give the Secretary of Transportation authority to exempt the vessel from existing statutes and adopt new regulations more appropriate to an O.R.V. The statute does not remove O.R.V.'s from classification as vessels. It does not, with respect to either their traditional maritime crew or their scientific personnel, change the provisions of general maritime law. It does not provide any compensation scheme with respect to industrial accidents to scientific personnel although Congress clearly had power to do so. And it neither says nor implies that scientific personnel shall have the protection of the statutes of each of the fifty states depending on the happenstance of where each made his contract of employment.

It must be concluded then that the statute does not by alchemy transmute vessels into non-vessels, nor does it convert scientific personnel into a new category of workers at sea to whom the vessel owes no duty. With respect to all other matters than those dealt with by the statute, O.R.V.'s remain vessels; general maritime law applies to them and to all aboard them, including scientific personnel; and the owner, the master, and the crew of the vessel are not relieved of all obligation to those scientific personnel whose tasks furnish the sole raison d'etre for the O.R.V.

II. APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW TO THE R/V NIOBE

It is suggested that the bill was designed to apply only to vessels operated in the public interest, but an early draft containing such a provision was amended to delete this limitation, in order "to encourage industry as well as academic participation in the oceanographic effort." The Report at p. 2.

This purpose is further evidenced by House Report No. 599, 1965 U.S.Code Cong. and Ad. News, page 2385, which states:

"However, the Coast Guard witness testified that the term `public interest' would be construed as limiting the oceanographic research vessel definition to vessels being operated by scientific institutions, the Government, or under contract with the Government. Inasmuch as industry is becoming increasingly engaged in scientific research in connection with the ultimate exploitation of ocean resources, your committee felt that it was inconsistent and unreasonable to so limit the oceanographic research exemption. Accordingly, it was determined that the definition should be amended so as to clearly indicate the intention of Congress to treat all vessels engaged in oceanographic research on the same basis."

The statute itself indicates that commercial vessels are included in its coverage, else it would not be necessary for it to state that classified vessels are not deemed to be engaged in trade or commerce. 46 U.S.C. § 443. In addition the Regulations, Table 7, 46 CFR § 188.05-1 classify all vessels engaged in oceanographic research as subject to the law without limiting its application to noncommercial vessels.

The R/V NIOBE was owned by Shell Oil Company and was engaged in an effort to find oil and gas. While this was for Shell's profit, the vessel was engaged solely in oceanographic research. Hence it is subject to the provisions of the law.

III. WAS SENNETT A SEAMAN?

The classification of a maritime worker as a seaman has two consequences. It makes him eligible for the benefits granted seamen by general maritime law, principally maintenance and cure in the event of disability in the service of his vessel and the warranty of seaworthiness of the vessel on which he is engaged. In addition, a seaman has the protection of the Jones Act with the right to claim damages for injury or death resulting from the negligence of his employer; for this purpose he may demand a trial by jury or he may elect to pursue the claim in admiralty without a jury trial. The remedies at general maritime law and under the Jones Act are separate, and they may be sought in separate suits or joined in a single action.

Shell contends that the O.R.V. law prevents Sennett from being considered a seaman under either the Jones Act or general maritime law. The plaintiffs contend he was a seaman for purposes of both.

Before determining the legal consequences of his classification as a seaman, we look first to the legal requirements for seaman's status and apply them to Sennett's duties to determine whether Shell is entitled to a summary judgment on the question of his status. To establish that a maritime worker was a seaman, it must be shown that he was employed aboard a vessel in navigation, that he had a more or less permanent connection with the vessel, and that he was aboard primarily to aid in navigation. Bodden v. Coordinated Caribbean Transport, Inc., 5 Cir. 1966, 369 F.2d 273, 274.1 Only the third requirement is at issue here.

It was long ago established that seaman's status is not limited to the traditional blue water sailor. It is "not confined to those who `hand, reef and steer' but is applicable `to all whose duties contribute to the operation and welfare of the vessel'". Offshore Co. v. Robison, 5 Cir. 1959, 266 F.2d 769, 775.

In Robison the court discussed at some length the cases...

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