Sennewald v. University of Minnesota, 87-5260

• Decision Date: 23 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-5260,87-5260
• Citation: 847 F.2d 472
• Parties: 46 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1528, 46 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,980, 46 Ed. Law Rep. 1143 Charlene SENNEWALD, Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA and the Regents of the University of Minnesota, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 472

847 F.2d 472

46 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1528,

46 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,980, 46 Ed. Law Rep. 1143

Charlene SENNEWALD, Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA and the Regents of the University of Minnesota, Appellees.

No. 87-5260.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 9, 1988.

Decided May 23, 1988.

James G. Ryan, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.

Stephen S. Dunham, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellees.

Before McMILLIAN, ARNOLD and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Charlene Sennewald appeals from a final judgment entered by the District Court ¹ for the District of Minnesota in favor of the University of Minnesota and the Regents of the University, denying her claim of sex discrimination under the provisions of the consent decree entered in Rajender v. University of Minnesota, No. 4-73-435 (D.Minn. Aug. 13, 1980) (Rajender ). For reversal, Sennewald argues that the district court erred in (1) ruling no violation of the consent decree because the court misconstrued the consent decree and (2) ruling no violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. For the reason discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

The facts are not in dispute. Since 1977 Sennewald has been a part-time assistant coach of women's softball at the University of Minnesota (University). ² In 1983 Sennewald requested an increase in her percent-time appointment from fifty percent to full time. The University denied her request as well as similar requests from assistant coaches in the women's tennis and women's track and field departments. At the same time these requests were denied, however, the University granted full-time appointment increases to the male assistant coach of women's gymnastics and to the female assistant coaches of women's volleyball and women's basketball. The assistant coaches were not competing against each other for the increase in time percentages. Sennewald argues that the University's decision to increase the male part-time assistant gymnastics coach to full-time status while denying her request was the result of sex discrimination. Sennewald does not complain of the increase in percent-time allotments to the women's basketball and women's volleyball assistant coaches. ³

Sennewald brought suit alleging the violation of the consent decree entered by the University in Rajender, a sexual discrimination class action suit. ⁴ Sennewald also alleged that the decision to deny her full-time status was a violation of Title VII. In 1986 Sennewald's suit was tried before special masters who issued a proposed judgment in favor of the University. The special masters found that the decision to deny Sennewald full-time status was not a violation of the Rajender consent decree or Title VII because the decision was based on the needs of the respective athletic department's programs rather than the sex or performance of either of the assistant coaches in question. The district court adopted the decision of the special masters in its entirety. This appeal followed.

Sennewald first argues that the district court erred in determining that the University's decision was neither a "salary" nor a "promotion" decision. Sennewald argues that because the University did not use written sex-neutral criteria in determining to deny Sennewald an increase in time percentage, the University violated the Rajender consent decree and Title VII. Sennewald argues that an increase in time percentage from part-time to full-time constitutes a promotion and a salary decision because the recipient of the increase receives greater responsibility and pay. We do not agree.

The applicable standard of review on appeal is the clearly erroneous standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1981) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). This court has held that a "finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if it evolves from an erroneous conception of the applicable law, or if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Danzl v. North St. Paul-Maplewood Oakdale Independent School District No. 622, 706 F.2d 813 (8th Cir.1983).

The district court found that the University's decision to deny Sennewald full-time status as an assistant coach was a programmatic and budgetary decision. The district court found that the University compared the needs and profit potential of the gymnastics and softball programs and concluded that the gymnastics program required more coaching, had greater spectator appeal, and was more profitable than the softball program. The district court further found that the consent decree was integrated in the University's existing personnel procedures. Under the University's personnel system, promotions and salary increases refer only to decisions based on individual evaluations of performance. The district court found that the decision at issue here did not concern individual evaluations, but rather concerned programmatic concerns, that is, the budgets of the women's softball and gymnastics programs. Therefore, the consent decree was not applicable and the University did not need to use written, sex-neutral criteria in making the kind of decision at issue. We hold that the district court's finding that the University's decision to deny Sennewald full-time status as an assistant coach as a programmatic and budgetary decision and not a promotion or salary decision is not clearly erroneous.

Sennewald next argues that the district court erred in finding that the University's reasons for the funding decisions were not pretextual. Sennewald argues the University's articulated reason was not the true reason for the funding decision because the decision was really a promotion and salary decision. Sennewald urges this court to hold that she met her burden of proving pretext under a traditional Title VII analysis. The University argues that Sennewald did not establish pretext.

The legal analysis of the evidence under Title VII is the three-part test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas ) and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (Burdine ). Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis, the plaintiff must establish a prima...