Sentinel Colorado v. Rodriguez

• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JUSTICE HART
• Citation: 577 P.3d 48
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 24SC51
• Decision Date: 07 October 2025
• Parties: The SENTINEL COLORADO, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. Kadee RODRIGUEZ, City Clerk, in her official capacity as Records Custodian for the City of Aurora., Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

577 P.3d 48

The SENTINEL COLORADO, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,

v.Kadee RODRIGUEZ, City Clerk, in her official capacity as Records Custodian for the City of Aurora., Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

Supreme Court Case No. 24SC51

Supreme Court of Colorado.

October 7, 2025

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 22CA1934

Attorneys for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent: Rachael Johnson, Denver, Colorado, Zansberg Beylkin LLC, Steven D. Zansberg, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner: Hoffmann, Parker, Wilson & Carberry, P.C., Corey Y. Hoffmann, Katharine J. Vera, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Freedom of Information Coalition: Ballard Spahr LLP, Ashley I. Kissinger, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Municipal League: Robert D. Sheesley, Rachel Bender, Denver, Colorado

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Special District Association of Colorado: Ann Terry, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 A Colorado “citizen” who proves a violation of Colorado’s Open Meetings Law (“COML”) may recoup attorney fees from the local public body that violated the law. § 24-6-402(9)(b), C.R.S. (2025) (“subsection (9)(b)”). One of the questions we confront here is whether The Sentinel Colorado (“The Sentinel”) newspaper, as a corporation, is a “citizen” entitled to recover fees under the COML after its successful challenge to an improperly convened executive session of the Aurora City Council (“the Council”). We also consider whether a public letter disclosing the fact that a stipulated agreement was discussed during a Council executive session waives the attorney-client privilege protecting communications made during that executive session.

¶2 Considering the statutory scheme of the COML as a whole, we hold that the word “citizen” includes corporations in section 24-6-402(9). Accordingly, we conclude that The Sentinel may recover attorney fees under the COML if it is the prevailing party in litigation. Further, we conclude that the letter in question did not waive the attorney-client privilege because it did not detail the communications between the Council and its attorney but instead only recounted unprivileged facts. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 In January 2022, The Sentinel, a newspaper owned and operated in Aurora, Colorado, reported that Aurora City Council member Danielle Jurinsky had appeared on a talk radio show where she stated that the Aurora Police Department chief and deputy police chief were “trash” and called for their removal from office. In response to Jurinsky’s conduct, another member of the Council initiated proceedings to censure her for allegedly violating the Council’s governing rules.

¶4 On March 14, 2022, the Council held and recorded an executive session to, among other things, receive legal advice about the censure proposal. The public agenda for that session included, as relevant here, that the Council would meet regarding:

• “Negotiations,” for an estimated time of forty-five minutes, citing section 24-6-402(4)(e);

• “Personnel Matters,” for an estimated time of thirty minutes, citing section 24-6-402(4)(f);

• “Legal Advice,” for an estimated time of one hour, citing section 24-6-402(4)(b); and

• “Legal Advice,” for an estimated time of forty-five minutes, citing section 24-6-402(4)(b).

¶5 Four days later, a reporter for The Sentinel filed a records request seeking access to the recording of the March 14 executive session. Kadee Rodriguez, the official records custodian, denied this request, asserting that the record was both subject to the attorney-client privilege and exempt from disclosure under the COML.

¶6 The Sentinel petitioned the district court for access to the recording, the minutes from the March 14 executive session, and, if necessary, an in camera review to assess any need for redactions. The Sentinel alleged in its application that the Council had violated the COML when it omitted any description of “legal advice” on the executive session agenda and when it engaged in “formal action” by taking a roll call vote to end the investigation into Jurinsky. In response, the records custodian reasserted the attorney-client privilege. The district court granted an in camera review.

¶7 In the meantime, on March 28, the Council held a regular public meeting. The agenda included an item described as: “Motion to Approve the Stipulation and a Request for Payment of Attorney Fees” and Council staff attached a packet of information to the agenda. In the packet, a document entitled “Council Agenda Commentary” stated that special counsel “representing the City ha[d] reached an agreement for a stipulation to resolve the [censure] issue,” and that the “stipulation [was] included in the backup for this item.” The packet also included a letter to the Council members from the special counsel, explaining what Jurinsky had been charged with; the fact that special counsel had been appointed; that at the March 14 meeting the Council directed special counsel to enter a stipulation; and the terms of the stipulation.

¶8 In July, the district court issued an order based on its in camera review of the executive session. It found that (1) “the subject of the [e]xecutive [s]ession was to receive information from legal counsel on the process to be followed in addressing a censure complaint”; (2) “[t]he Council did not ‘vote’ on ending the censure action as alleged in [T]he Sentinel’s complaint[;] however, there was a roll-call taken on what direction to give to legal counsel on how to proceed”; and (3) “the announcement of the [executive [s]ession does not appear to comply with the requirements of the applicable statutes.” Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez, No. 22CV30927, at *2 (Dist. Ct., Arapahoe Cnty., July 26, 2022). The district court concluded that the Council had violated the COML and ordered that the executive session recording be released to The Sentinel. Id. at *3.

¶9 The court did, however, stay its ruling to allow the records custodian time to argue why release would violate the attorney-client privilege. Id. The records custodian promptly did so by filing a motion for reconsideration. In the motion, the records custodian also argued that the Council had cured its COML violations by providing public notice of the executive session in the agenda and agenda packet for its regular meeting. The Sentinel opposed this motion.

¶10 The district court granted the motion for reconsideration and ordered that the recording not be released. Specifically, it found that the regular meeting identified what took place at the executive session and therefore cured any COML violation. The district court did not reach a conclusion as to whether the attorney-client privilege applied.

¶11 The Sentinel appealed and argued, as relevant here, that the Council (1) violated the COML when it voted to terminate the investigation and enter a stipulation with Jurinsky; (2) waived any attorney-client privilege covering the executive session through the regular meeting agenda and agenda packet; and (3) did not cure its COML violations. The Sentinel also requested attorney fees as the prevailing “citizen” under the COML. See § 24-6-402(9)(b).

¶12 A division of the court of appeals largely agreed with The Sentinel. Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez, 2023 COA 118, ¶¶ 46-48, 544 P.3d 1278, 1285-86. The division held that the Council had violated the COML by taking “formal action” in an executive session when it took a “roll call” vote to end the investigation into Jurinsky and enter a stipulation. Id. at ¶¶ 30-32, 544 P.3d at 1283-84. Further, it concluded that the Council had waived the attorney-client privilege when it published the letter from special counsel in the regular meeting agenda packet because that letter “describe[d] everything that occurred” during the executive session. Id. at ¶ 40, 544 P.3d at 1285. Finally, the division concluded that the Council did not cure its COML violations because the curing doctrine does not apply outside of situations where a party seeks to invalidate an action taken in an improper executive session. Id. at ¶ 41, 544 P.3d at 1285.

¶13 The division, however, disagreed with The Sentinel that it was entitled to attorney fees. Id. at ¶ 49, 544 P.3d at 1286. It recognized that the COML authorizes fees for “the citizen prevailing,” id. at ¶ 50, 544 P.3d at 1286 (quoting § 24-6-402(9)(b)), but reasoned, based on the definition of “citizen” in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, that The Sentinel was not covered by that provision of the statute because it is not a person who owes allegiance to a government or receives governmental protection. Id. at ¶ 51, 544 P.3d at 1286.

¶14 The Sentinel petitioned this court for certiorari review, and Rodriguez, in her official capacity as the records custodian for the City of Aurora, cross-petitioned.¹ We granted both petitions.²

II. Analysis

¶15 We begin by addressing the core principles of statutory interpretation and the COML. Then, after analyzing the COML, we hold that the word “citizen” in section 24-6-402(9)(b) is used interchangeably with “person” and that each word logically encompasses any party with standing to pursue litigation under the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that The Sentinel is entitled to its attorney fees under subsection (9)(b) of the COML.

¶16 We then turn to the City’s contention that the Council did not waive the attorneyclient privilege by publishing the letter from special counsel recounting the factual details underlying its stipulation agreement with Jurinsky. We agree with the City and conclude—because the letter did not contain privileged communications between the Council...