Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. Maybank Law Firm, LLC
| Decision Date | 05 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 5:15-cv-04984-JMC |
| Parties | Sentry Select Insurance Company, Plaintiff, v. Maybank Law Firm, LLC, and Roy P. Maybank, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Plaintiff Sentry Select Insurance Company filed this action seeking monetary damages for legal malpractice against Defendants Maybank Law Firm, LLC, and Roy P. Maybank (together "Defendants"). (ECF No. 63.)
This matter is before the court to consider the parties' cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate. (ECF Nos. 104, 108.) For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate.
Plaintiff retained Defendants to represent Plaintiff's insureds who were the defendants in a personal injury case entitled Wanda Rivers v. Herman Shaw, Wall Street Syss., Inc. and Madison Intermodal, LLC, Case No. 2012-CP-38-1073 (Orangeburg Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 7, 2012) (the "Underlying Action").1 (See ECF No. 104-2.) In the Underlying Action, Wanda Rivers suedPlaintiff's insureds seeking to recover damages for injuries resulting from a collision between her automobile and their tractor trailer. (Id. at 6 ¶ 6.) Most relevant in this action and during the litigation of the Underlying Action, Rivers served on Plaintiff's insureds the following requests to admit on January 25, 2013:
(ECF No. 104-5 at 2-3.) Defendants did not submit responses to the aforementioned requests to admit on behalf of Plaintiff's insureds within thirty (30) days, thereby rendering the facts referenced in the requests to admit conclusively established. See Rule 36, SCRCP ("The matter isadmitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow or as stipulated in writing by the parties pursuant to Rules 29 and 6(b), the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, . . . ."). Thereafter, on September 5, 2013, Defendants filed a motion for extension of time to respond to the requests to admit or, in the alternative, to withdraw their admissions. (ECF No. 104-6.) On September 25, 2013, the state trial court held a hearing on the motion for extension of time (see ECF No. 104-8) and conveyed to the parties that it would "get back to you all with what I'm going to do." (Id. at 26:4-5.)
On January 10, 2014, Rivers' counsel sent correspondence pursuant to Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.E. 346 (S.C. 1933), to Defendants requesting the limits of Plaintiff's insurance policy with its insureds.2 (ECF No. 108-3 at 3.) On January 28, 2014, Plaintiff asked attorney Bradish J. Waring to represent its insureds at a mediation between them and Rivers that was scheduled to occur on January 30, 2014. (ECF No. 108-5 at 6:4-22.) On January 30, 2014, Waring sent an e-mail to Plaintiff's representative in which Waring recommended that Plaintiff should settle Rivers' claim for $900,000.00 and pursue a malpractice claim against Defendants thereafter. (ECF No. 108-6 at 1.) Rivers agreed to accept $900,000.00 to settle her claims against Plaintiff's insureds.3 (ECF No. 108-7 at 7:8-14.)
On December 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants asserting claims sounding in legal malpractice for negligence/assignment of claim, breach of contract/intendedthird party beneficiary, negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. (ECF No. 1 at 8 ¶ 33-14 ¶ 66.) On January 25, 2016, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff, as a third-party non-client insurer, lacked standing to sue Defendants for legal malpractice. (ECF No. 6.) After hearing argument from the parties on April 20, 2016 (see ECF No. 16), the court denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with leave to re-file and certified the following two (2) questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court on June 21, 2016:
(ECF No. 17 at 9.) While the certified questions were pending in the South Carolina Supreme Court, the court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 23) on December 12, 2016, which Amended Complaint (ECF No. 35) added a sixth claim for equitable subrogation. (Id. at 14 ¶ 67-16 ¶ 77.) On March 6, 2019, the South Carolina Supreme Court answered "Yes" to certified question no. 1 and declined to answer certified question no. 2. (ECF No. 57 at 2.) Subsequently, on April 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint in which it only asserted a claim against Defendants for negligence/sentry liability. (ECF No. 63 at 9 ¶ 36-13 ¶ 58.) However, in the "wherefore clause," Plaintiff asked for "actual damages, punitive damages . . . costs . . . prejudgment interest . . . reimbursement of attorney's fees paid to Defendants as both actual damages and disgorgement of the fees; and such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper." (Id. at 13-14.)
On August 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Motion for Bifurcation of Issues. (ECF No. 104.) Thereafter, on August 21, 2020, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 108.) The parties oppose therespective Motions for Summary Judgment. (See ECF Nos. 109, 124.)
The court considers the merits of the parties' respective Motions below.
The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), based on Plaintiff's allegations that the action is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00.4 (See ECF No. 63 at 3 ¶ 11.) For jurisdictional purposes, Plaintiff alleges that it is "a citizen of and headquartered in a different state than that from all of the Defendants." (Id.) Moreover, after considering the Second Amended Complaint's allegations, the court is satisfied that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. (See id. ¶ 9.)
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, 650 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir. 2011). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). The non-moving partymay not oppose a motion for summary judgment with mere allegations or denial of the movant's pleading, but instead must "set forth specific facts" demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991). All that is required is that "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Plaintiff opposes Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (see ECF No. 124) and argues it is entitled to summary judgment on its claim(s) because "[i]t is undisputed that the Plaintiff hired the Defendants to represent its insured ....
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