Serino v. Prudential Ins. Co. Of Am., Case No. 3:09-CV-0466.

• Decision Date: 18 September 2009
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:09-CV-0466.
• Parties: Albert J. SERINO, Plaintiff,v.PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

706 F.Supp.2d 584

Albert J. SERINO, Plaintiff,v.PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant.

Case No. 3:09-CV-0466.

United States District Court M.D. Pennsylvania.

Sept. 18, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael I. Butera, Pittston, PA, for Plaintiff.

Richard McMonigle, Jr., Steven Schildt, Post & Shell, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Michael I. Butera, Pittston, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

EDWIN M. KOSIK, District Judge.

Presently before us is Defendant Prudential Insurance Company of America's (“Prudential”) Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 17, 2009. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff Albert J. Serino (“Serino”) alleges that Prudential breached its contract with him by not paying him disability insurance benefits to which he was entitled and that this breach was in bad faith. (Doc. 2 at 9-10.) We have subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), as the parties are diverse and the amount-in-controversy is met.¹

Procedural History

On January 30, 2009, Serino filed the Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, alleging that Prudential breached its contract by refusing to pay Serino certain disability insurance benefits and acted in bad faith. (Doc. 2, Ex. A at 9-10.) On March 21, 2009, Prudential removed this case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Doc. 1) and filed a memorandum in support of the removal (Doc. 2). Prudential filed its Answer to Serino's Complaint on March 23, 2009, raising a number of counterclaims and requesting a declaratory judgment against Serino disaffirming his right to benefits under the insurance contract. (Doc. 3 at 2-8.) Serino filed his Answer to Prudential's counterclaims on April 3, 2009. (Doc. 6.)

Pursuant to an April 2009 case management conference, the parties agreed that discovery would run until August 29, 2009. (Doc. 7.) Prudential filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) (Doc. 8), a Brief in Support of its Motion (Doc. 9), and a Statement of Materials Facts pursuant to Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 56.1 (Doc. 10) on September 17, 2009.

On September 25, 2009, Serino filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Cross Motion”) (Doc. 11), as well as a brief (Doc. 12) and exhibits (Doc. 15) in support of the Cross Motion, and a Statement of Facts (Doc. 14). These filings were untimely. ( See Standing Order, Doc. 4.)

On October 9, 2009, Prudential filed (1) an Answer to Statement of Facts of Plaintiff and Counter-Statement of Material Facts Opposing Plaintiff's Motion and in Further Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Answer to Statement of Facts”) (Doc. 16) ² and (2) a Brief in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Response Brief”) (Doc. 17). In its Response Brief, Prudential notes that Serino's Cross Motion is untimely and requests that it be denied. (Doc. 17 at 18.)

As a preliminary matter, we concur with Prudential's assessment that Serino's Cross Motion is untimely. Based on the timeline outlined in the Standing Order (Doc. 4) and the April agreement between the parties (Doc. 7), discovery ended August 29, 2009. At that point, the twenty-day time limit we set for the filing of dispositive motions began to run. September 18, 2009 marked the deadline for filing; Serino filed his Cross Motion on September 25, 2009. We will therefore strike Serino's Cross Motion (Doc. 11) and its accompanying documentation (Docs. 12-15).³ Additionally, insofar as they are in response to Serino's Cross Motion, improper under our local rules, and/or duplicative, we will strike Prudential's Answer to Statement of Facts (Doc. 16) and Response Brief (Doc. 17).

Factual Background

The present dispute involves the language of a disability insurance contract, specifically, whether Serino, the insured, is entitled to disability benefits from Prudential for his entire life or only until age sixty-five.

The parties agree that Serino purchased a disability insurance policy (the “Policy”) from Prudential in 1980. (Doc. 2 at 8, ¶ 3; Doc. 3 at 1, ¶ 3.) Prudential issued the Policy in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ⁴ (Doc. 1 at 4), and both parties have appended copies of the Policy to their filings ( see Docs. 2 at 13-17 & 10 at 9-16).

On May 1, 1997, Serino alleges that he “became totally disabled and began collecting benefits pursuant to the [P]olicy at [sic] the amount of $2,000.00 per month.” (Doc. 2 at 9, ¶ 4.) Serino was fifty-four years old when he began to receive benefits (Doc. 10 at 5, ¶¶ 14-16) and had been paying premiums on the Policy for nearly seventeen years (Doc. 2 at 9, ¶ 4). Serino alleges that Prudential wrongfully terminated his disability benefits on September 18, 2007, by claiming that the Policy's benefits terminated when Serino reached age sixty-five. (Doc. 2 at 9, ¶ 5.) Prudential alleges it terminated Serino's benefits because Serino had failed to satisfy the conditions of coverage. (Doc. 3 at 3-4.) Specifically, Prudential alleges that Serino's age at the time he became totally disabled precluded him from receiving continuing benefits under the Policy.⁵ (Doc. 10 at 5-6, ¶¶ 14-20.)

The pertinent language in the Policy provides:

Part 1. Monthly Income Benefit for Total Disability: If a period of total disability due to sickness or injury commences while this policy is in force and such sickness or injury requires the regular care of a licensed physician, Prudential will periodically pay the applicable Monthly Benefit Amount specified for this Part 1 in the Schedule of Benefits for each month ... In no event, however, shall payment be made for any day of the period of total disability if the day occurs on or after the Insured's 65th birthday and benefits have become payable for 12 or more months with respect to such period prior to such day of total disability.

...

Part 6. Lifetime Extension of Monthly Income Benefit for Total Disability: (Applicable unless the words “Not Included” appear in the Schedule of Benefits.) If benefits under Part 1 with respect to a period of total disability which commenced before the Insured's 50th birthday cease to be payable because the maximum limit for the payment of such benefits had been reached, Prudential will commencing on the day immediately following the last day for which benefits are payable under Part 1, periodically pay the applicable Monthly Benefits Amount specified for this Part 6 in the Schedule of Benefits for each month[.]

(Doc. 10 at 12-13, Ex. A (emphasis added).)

Prudential claims that the language of the Policy provides for the termination of Serino's benefits upon his sixty-fifth birthday. (Doc. 10 at 6, ¶ 20.) Prudential rejects Serino's argument that Part 6 of the Policy applies to his claims because Serino was fifty-four years old when his disability commenced, while Part 6 applies only to individuals who became disabled prior to attaining the age of fifty. (Doc. 10 at 31, Ex. D, Letter from Prudential Attorney Thomas Pinho to Michael Butera, Attorney for Serino, dated 2/23/2007.)

In contrast, Serino alleges that the Policy “clearly states that [he] purchased a lifetime extension of monthly income benefits for total disability” (Doc. 2 at 9, ¶ 6), and that “Defendant expressly orally warranted that Plaintiff was purchasing a lifetime extension of monthly income benefit[s] for total disability at the time of the purchase of the policy and for sometime thereafter” (Doc. 2 at 9, ¶ 10). Specifically, Serino avers that Louis Capone (“Capone”), Serino's brother-in-law and an alleged agent of Prudential, made representations of this nature to Serino. (Doc. 10 at 24, Ex. B, Defendant's Interrogatories Directed to Plaintiff.) In answer to Prudential's interrogatories, Serino states that Capone informed him “that I was purchasing a lifetime disability insurance policy and ... showed me a Declaration Sheet indicating that I was purchasing a lifetime disability insurance policy and that I would receive insurance benefits for the rest of my life if I became disabled.” ⁶ ( Id.)

In his Complaint, Serino requests that we award him past and ongoing disability benefits from the date that Prudential stopped making benefit payments to Serino. (Doc. 2 at 10.) Serino also requests that we order Prudential to pay attorney fees and costs relating to his lawsuit, as well as punitive damages for its bad faith treatment of Serino. (Doc. 2 at 10.) In its Statement of Material Facts, Prudential alleges that Serino has since declared that he will not pursue a bad faith claim against Prudential. ( See Doc. 10 at 25, ¶¶ 17-20.)

Discussion

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A disputed fact is material when it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and make all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir.2005).

Initially, the moving party must show the absence of a genuine issue concerning any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the non-moving party “must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “While the evidence that the non-moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a preponderance, the...