Serra Chevrolet, Inc. v. EDWARDS CHEVROLET

• Decision Date: 13 September 2002
• Citation: 850 So.2d 259
• Parties: SERRA CHEVROLET, INC. v. EDWARDS CHEVROLET, INC. General Motors Corporation v. Serra Chevrolet, Inc.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

850 So.2d 259

SERRA CHEVROLET, INC. v. EDWARDS CHEVROLET, INC.

General Motors Corporation v. Serra Chevrolet, Inc.

1041.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

September 13, 2002.

Rehearing Denied December 20, 2002.

Thomas E. Baddley and Jeffrey P. Mauro of Baddley & Mauro, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellant/cross-appellee Serra Chevrolet, Inc.

Warren B. Lightfoot, Jere F. White, and Ivan B. Cooper of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham; Charles L. Robinson of Johnston, Barton, Proctor & Powell, L.L.P., Birmingham; and Eileen Penner of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, Washington, D.C., for appellant General Motors Corporation.

John Martin Galese and Jeffrey L. Ingram of Galese & Ingram, P.C., Birmingham; and Jack E. Held and Anthony R. Smith of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee Edwards Chevrolet, Inc.

HARWOOD, Justice.

In these consolidated appeals, Serra Chevrolet, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Serra"), appeals from a summary judgment in favor of Edwards Chevrolet, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Edwards"); General Motors Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "GM") appeals from the trial court's denial of its motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial following the trial court's entry of judgment on a $9,096,000 jury verdict and the trial court's award of $2,830,000 in attorney fees and expenses to Serra. We affirm as to Serra's appeal, and we reverse and remand as to GM's appeal.

On April 6, 1998, Serra sued Edwards, claiming that Edwards had tortiously interfered with its business relationship with GM.¹ On April 17, 1998, Edwards filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for a more definite statement. On May 26, 1998, Edwards filed an answer to Serra's complaint. On June 4, 1998, Serra filed an amended complaint that set forth an additional claim that Edwards had acted in concert with other named defendants in violation of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (hereinafter referred to as "the MVFA"), § 8-20-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, "by engaging in a course of conduct which intentionally, willfully and maliciously attempted to harm [Serra] by denying it a full service dealership, and restricting the distribution of new motor vehicles to [Serra]." Serra's amended complaint also sought to name two GM "representatives," within the meaning of the MVFA, as defendants. On October 30, 1998, GM filed a motion to intervene as a defendant and filed an answer to Serra's complaint that also contained a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment.² On December 4, 1998, Serra filed materials in opposition to GM's motion to intervene and a motion to strike GM's answer. On December 8, 1998, the trial court granted GM's motion to intervene. On December 14, 1998, Serra amended its complaint to add GM as a defendant, claiming that GM had acted in concert with other named defendants in violation of the MVFA, and to state additional claims against GM alleging fraud, negligence, willfulness and wantonness, and negligent and wanton supervision. On May 3, 1999, GM filed an answer to Serra's amended complaint. On January 20, 2000, Edwards amended its answer to assert defenses of justification and competitor's privilege. On January 27, 2000, Serra filed a motion to strike Edwards's amended answer. The record contains no ruling on Serra's motion to strike.

On February 7, 2000, GM and Edwards filed separate motions for a summary judgment, with attached exhibits, as to all claims that Serra had asserted against them, respectively. On February 16, 2000, Serra filed oppositions to GM's and Edwards's motions for a summary judgment, with attached exhibits; Serra filed a supplement to its oppositions, with attached exhibits, on March 3, 2000. On May 25, 2000, GM filed a reply, with attached exhibits, to Serra's supplement. On June 7, 2000, the trial court entered an order on its case action summary; that order stated, in pertinent part:

"(4) All claims against General Motors, except for violation of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act are due to be dismissed on Motion for Summary Judgment by defendant, General Motors, there being no genuine issue of material fact as to those claims and said defendant being entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, all claims except for violation of the Alabama Motor Vehicle Franchise Act as against defendant, General Motors, are hereby dismissed."

(Emphasis original.)

Thereafter, sequentially, Serra filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's summary judgment for GM; Serra filed a memorandum in support of its motion, with attached exhibits; GM filed a response to Serra's postjudgment motion; Edwards filed a supplemental motion for a summary judgment with attached exhibits; Serra filed an opposition to Edwards's supplemental motion; and Edwards filed a response, with attached exhibits. While the trial court's June 7, 2000, order appeared to enter a summary judgment for GM as to all issues except Serra's claims that GM had violated the MVFA, the trial court entered another order on October 20, 2000, stating, in pertinent part:

"3. The Court further finds there is no genuine issue of material fact as to fraud claims stated by Plaintiff and against General Motors and that General Motors is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on those claims.

Accordingly, judgment is due to and is hereby rendered in favor of Defendant, General Motors, as to all fraud claims."

The trial court certified the October 20, 2000, order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.

On March 12, 2001, GM filed a motion for a final summary judgment on Serra's MVFA claims. GM's motion stated, in pertinent part:

"Serra's expert on the distribution issues has unequivocally testified that the problems he opines occurred with respect to Serra's vehicle distribution occurred in 1991 and Kevin Serra said he knew of his claimed distribution as far back as 1992. Serra's distribution claims are thus clearly barred by the four year statute of limitations contained in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (Ala. Code (1975) § 8-20-12) since this complaint was not filed against GM until December 10, 1998."

(Emphasis in original.) On that same day, Edwards filed a supplemental and renewed motion for a summary judgment. On March 20, 2001, Serra filed separate oppositions to GM's and Edwards's motions for a summary judgment. On March 21, 2001, GM filed a motion to dismiss Serra's MVFA claims "based upon Serra's spoilation [sic] of all of its distribution records." On that same day, GM filed an evidentiary supplement to its March 12, 2001, motion for a final summary judgment. On March 23, 2001, the trial court entered an order on the case action summary that stated, in pertinent part:

"(2) Summary Judgment is due to be and is hereby granted in favor of defendant, Edwards Chevrolet, and against plaintiff[;] accordingly, said defendant is hereby dismissed from this action.

"(3) General Motors' Motion for Summary Judgment is overruled as to damages and events occurring after December of 1994. Said motion is kept under advisement until trial as to pre-December of 1994 damages in the face of plaintiff's claim of discovery within the statute of limitations.

"(4) The question of attorneys' fees, expenses and costs by agreement is reserved, to be determined by the Court after trial in the event of a verdict in favor of plaintiff.

"(5) All other claims, cross claims, and third party claims except those previously dealt with, specifically dealt with herein, or set for trial, are hereby dismissed."

(Emphasis original.)

A jury trial on Serra's MVFA claims against GM began on April 2, 2001. On April 11, 2001, at the close of Serra's case-in-chief, GM filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, which the trial court denied. On April 13, 2001, the jury returned a verdict; that verdict stated:

"We, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiff, Serra Chevrolet, Inc., and against the defendant, General Motors Corporation, and assess damages in an amount of Nine Million, Ninety-Six Thousand Dollars ($9,096,000.00)."

The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict on April 16, 2001. On May 11, 2001, Serra filed a petition seeking payment of attorney fees and expenses, with attached exhibits. On May 15, 2001, GM filed a renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial or a motion for a remittitur. On May 30, 2001, GM filed an answer to Serra's petition for attorney fees and expenses, to which Serra filed a response on May 31, 2001. On June 14, 2001, GM filed a brief in support of its renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for new trial.³ On June 20, 2001, the trial court awarded Serra $2,500,000 in attorney fees and $330,000 in expenses.

On July 17, 2001, Edwards filed a motion seeking to have the summary judgment for it made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. On July 18, 2001, Serra filed an opposition to GM's renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial, to which GM filed a reply brief on August 1, 2001. Serra filed a response to GM's reply brief on August 3, 2001. On August 6, 2001, Serra and GM agreed to extend to September 12, 2001, the time in which the trial court could rule on all postjudgment motions. On August 21, 2001, Serra filed a motion for relief, grounded solely on Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("Clerical Mistakes"), stating that the parties had not received notice of the trial court's March 23, 2001, order dismissing Edwards as a defendant and that they were unaware of it until August 2, 2001, and suggesting that the order "constitutes a clerical mistake which must be corrected." No attempt was made in the motion to reference or state any ground cognizable under Rule 60(b). On September 6, 2001, Serra and GM again agreed to extend the time in which the trial court could rule on all...