Serra Chevrolet, Inc. v. Reylander
Decision Date | 15 June 2007 |
Docket Number | 1050278. |
Parties | SERRA CHEVROLET, INC. v. Theresa REYLANDER. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (CV-05-2538); Tennant M. Smallwood, Jr., Judge.
Cecil H. Macoy, Jr., and Susan E. McPherson of Wallace, Jordan, Ratliff & Brandt, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
Submitted on appellant's brief only.
This Court affirms without an opinion the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration filed by Serra Chevrolet, Inc., the defendant below. I respectfully dissent.
On May 15, 2003, Theresa Reylander and her boyfriend visited an automobile dealership operated by Serra Chevrolet to purchase a used automobile for Reylander. Aaron Hardy, one of Serra Chevrolet's salespersons, offered them assistance. Reylander and her boyfriend returned the next day to buy one of the cars they had looked at the previous day, on the condition that Serra Chevrolet would repair the radio antenna, touch up some scratches in the paint, and repair the rear spoiler. That evening, Reylander signed a purchase agreement, which contained an arbitration provision; that provision stated, in pertinent part:
Reylander alleges in her complaint that "[w]hile completing the paperwork, [Hardy] engaged a coworker in an inappropriate conversation of a sexual nature in front of [Reylander] and her boyfriend."
Reylander returned to Serra Chevrolet on May 19 and May 20, 2003, to have the repairs to the automobile she had purchased completed. Reylander rode with Hardy to Roebuck Honda to have the radio fixed and to the body shop to have the scratches in the paint fixed. While they were in the car together, Hardy allegedly made a number of unwanted comments of a sexual nature to Reylander and repeatedly touched Reylander in a sexual manner. Reylander sued Hardy, alleging assault and battery, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. She also named Serra Chevrolet as a defendant, alleging the negligent hiring and supervision of Hardy and vicarious liability for Hardy's actions. Serra Chevrolet moved to compel arbitration of the claims pursuant to the arbitration provision in the purchase agreement Reylander had signed. The trial court denied Serra Chevrolet's motion, stating that "intentional torts of this nature as a matter of public policy should not be subject to the arbitration clause in this case."
This case is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ("the FAA"). Section 2 of the FAA provides:
"A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
9 U.S.C. § 2. "The FAA `provides for "the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause."'" Wolff Motor Co. v. White, 869 So.2d 1129, 1132 (Ala.2003) ( ). In finding a nexus with interstate commerce, we look to the transaction, not the specific action that is the basis of the claim. In Potts v. Baptist Health System, Inc., 853 So.2d 194, 202 (Ala.2002), Caroline Potts, a nurse, sued her employers, Baptist Health System, Inc., and Walker Regional Medical Center ("Walker"), and others, alleging various intentional torts, including "defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and wrongful termination." 853 So.2d at 195. Potts had entered into an arbitration agreement with Walker. This Court held that "the FAA applie[d]" to the arbitration agreement between Potts and Walker, not because the defendants established a nexus between Potts's intentional-tort claims and interstate commerce, but because of the relationship between the underlying transaction — her continued employment — and interstate commerce. 853 So.2d at 202.
"It is well established that Congress can regulate three broad categories of activity pursuant to its commerce power: (1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) those general activities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce."
Wolff Motor Co., 869 So.2d at 1132. United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 550 (9th Cir.1995)). "[T]he purchase of a used automobile from an automobile dealer [is] a transaction that involve[s] interstate commerce." Dan Wachtel Ford, Lincoln, Mercury, Inc. v. Modas, 891 So.2d 287, 292 (Ala.2004). The arbitration provision in the purchase agreement between Reylander and Serra Chevrolet covers the sale of a used automobile.
Green Tree Fin. Corp. of Alabama v. Vintson, 753 So.2d 497, 505 (Ala.1999).
The arbitration provision in the agreement between Reylander and Serra Chevrolet makes no exception for negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or claims asserting vicarious liability for intentional torts — this last being the basis upon which the trial court denied Serra Chevrolet's motion to compel arbitration of all three claims against it. Moreover, "`[t]he federal policy favoring arbitration is so strong that, as a matter of law, "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration...."'" Parkway Dodge, Inc. v. Hawkins, 854 So.2d 1129, 1132 (Ala.2003) (quoting Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Bentley, 851 So.2d 458, 463 (Ala.2002), quoting in turn Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). Thus, Reylander's claims fall squarely within the purview of this "broadly worded agreement." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kilgore, 751 So.2d 8, 11 (Ala.1999).
753 So.2d at 505. Similarly, in this case, Reylander's claims against Serra Chevrolet alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision and seeking to hold Serra Chevrolet vicariously liable for Hardy's actions relate to the purchase agreement. In Green Tree Financial the Vintsons conceded that their action was related to the transaction as to which they had signed the arbitration clause; similarly, Reylander asserts in her complaint that Serra Chevrolet "owed a duty to its employees and customers to ensure that its employees, agents and servants were...
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