Serrano v. Figueroa–Sancha

• Decision Date: 16 July 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 11–1427(DRD).
• Citation: 878 F.Supp.2d 301
• Parties: Luz Maria SERRANO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jose FIGUEROA–SANCHA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

878 F.Supp.2d 301

Luz Maria SERRANO, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Jose FIGUEROA–SANCHA, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 11–1427(DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

July 16, 2012.

Daliah Lugo–Auffant, Lugo Auffant Law Offices, Winter Park, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Idza Diaz–Rivera, P.R. Department of Justice, Federal Litigation, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Luz María Serrano, Hiram Martinez and Hiraniel Martinez Serrano (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jose Figueroa–Sancha, Officer Padilla, Officer Valls and Officer Roman in their individual capacities, and Emilio Diaz–Colon in his official capacity (collectively the “Defendants”). Defendants are all members of the Puerto Rico Police Department (“PRPD”).

Plaintiffs allege that they were illegally detained by Defendants, thereby violating their constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable use of excessive force. Plaintiffs bring additional claims arising under the laws of Puerto Rico which are attached to the instant case via the exercise of the Court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Plaintiff Luz Maria Serrano and Hiram Martinez are married and have seven (7) children; one of their children is co-plaintiff Hiraniel Martinez, who is of legal age.

At the time Plaintiffs commenced the instant action, Defendant Figueroa–Sancha was the Superintendent of the PRPD. Also, Defendants Officer Padilla and Officer Valls were sergeants in the PRPD at all relevant times, and Officer Roman is a police officer with the PRPD. Defendant Emilio Diaz–Colon is the current Superintendent of the PRPD.¹

II. FACTUAL HISTORY²

Plaintiffs allege that on December 14, 2009 in Camino Los Andinos, the Cupey Alto district of San Juan, police officers intervened with Plaintiffs after pursuing and arresting a fugitive in front of Plaintiffs' domicile. While arresting the fugitive, Officers Valls, Padilla and Roman allegedly pointed their firearms at Hiram Martinez and forced him to walk back into the house. The officers also purportedly threatened to shoot him and arrest his family if he did not hand over his weapons. (Docket No. 7, paragraph 3.7.). Plaintiffs aver that Officers Valls, Padilla and Roman forcefully broke the doors to their house, knocked over furniture, and deliberately ignored Plaintiff Martinez's inquiries regarding their authorization to search his property and why he was being detained. At no time was Martinez armed.

The police officers proceeded to arrest Martinez. Martinez's wife, Plaintiff Luz Serrano, accompanied by her daughter, then drove to the Cupey Alto Police station. At the police station, they were assisted by two officers who stated to have knowledge of the matter and indicated that the situation would be resolved. When Serrano returned to her home, Officers Roman, Padilla and Valls were still in her house conducting a search, alongside other unknown officers, also co-defendants (the, “Unknown Defendants”). None of these officers were wearing their badges. Plaintiff Hiraniel asked an officer to identify himself but he refused and threatened to arrest Hiraniel's mother, Plaintiff Serrano. The officers proceeded to remove Serrano from her vehicle, searched her and handcuffed her. Officer Valls witnessed her arrest and told Serrano “[t]hat's what you get for what your son did.” (Docket No. 7, paragraph 3.7). Officer Valls also threatened to contact social services in order to take away her children if she complained. Serrano was taken back to the Cupey Alto Police Station where she remained handcuffed for approximately three hours.

Plaintiff Martinez was also brought to the police station and remained in a cell where he could see his wife detained and being threatened. Martinez asked officers the reason for their arrest, and these officers indicated that they had found illegal fireworks at his home. Plaintiff Martinez later saw the police officers distributing the fireworks among themselves. Plaintiff Serrano was released between 3:45 am and 4:00 am, but she was given instructions to return to the police station at 9:00 am. Both Plaintiffs were not given any food or water during their confinement.

While waiting for her detained husband, Officer Roman proceeded to arrest and detain Serrano once again. Serrano became very anxious and suffered a nervous crisis, following her second arrest. Serrano's daughter requested assistance of paramedics. When the paramedics arrived, Serrano was hyperventilating and suffering from hypoglycemia. After being stabilized, Officer Padilla released her from custody. She was instructed to go home and would be later contacted to sign paperwork in order to release the police from responsibility. Plaintiff Martinez, still in custody, was transferred to a police station in Rio Piedras, where he was not released until later that evening. Neither Martinez nor Serrano were ever taken before a magistrate judge or charged with the commission of a crime while they were detained or afterwards.

On December 16, 2009, Serrano filed an administrative complaint at PRPD's headquarters. That same day, Defendants Padilla, Roman and Valls contacted Martinez and Serrano, interrogated them as to whether or not they intended to pursue the complaint further. Later that day, two unknown police officers knocked Plaintiff Hiraniel off his motorcycle, beat him and fled. Hiraniel was not armed and did not represent a threat to the officers or anyone else at the time.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed a similar cause of action on October 28, 2010 (10–cv–2050 (CCC), the “First Action”); the Court dismissed this First Action without prejudice on February 28, 2011 for lack of service of process. (10–cv–2050, Docket No. 4). The instant action was filed on May 9, 2011 and amended on September 6, 2011 to include Emilio Diaz Colon, in his official capacity as a Defendant (hereinafter, “Second Action”).

On November 7, 2011, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to show good cause for their untimely service. (Docket No. 12). Plaintiffs responded to the Order to Show Cause on November 13, 2011 (Docket No. 13) arguing that Defendants evasion of service constituted “good cause” for lack of service. In its discretion, the Court found good cause and awarded Plaintiffs sixty (60) days to effectuate proper service on the remaining unserved Defendants. (Docket No. 17).

On January 10, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 20). Therein, Defendants aver that co-defendant Figueroa–Sancha has not been served adequately given that the summons was delivered to his office when he had already resigned as the superintendent of the PRPD and was not physically present in the building at the time of service.

Defendants also moved for dismissal on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to properly serve the remaining Defendants within 120 days of commencing the instant suit as required by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants furthermore argue the dismissal of all Unknown Defendants and co-defendant Diaz Colon in his official capacity is warranted because Plaintiffs' claims against these Defendants are time barred. Defendants assert that the failure to identify the Unknown Defendants in the First Action did not toll the statute of limitations as to these Defendants and Diaz Colon with the dismissal of the First Action. Finally, Defendants assert that Diaz Colon is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in his official capacity, and therefore, Plaintiffs' claims against him, in his official capacity, should be dismissed.

After multiple attempts, Plaintiffs have successfully executed process on co-defendant Diaz Colon, Officer Padilla and Officer Roman. Diaz Colon was served with process on December 15, 2011 (Docket No. 28). Officer Padilla was served with process on January 12, 2012 (Docket No. 29) and Officer Roman was served with process on February 16, 2012 by delivering the summons and complaint to his contact agent. (Docket No. 47).

Service of process as to Defendant Roman was achieved after multiple unsuccessful visits to the Caimito precinct and PRPD headquarters. During the attempts, Plaintiffs were informed that Defendant Roman had been transferred from the Caimito precinct, but information on Roman's current location was not provided. After various attempts to complete service, all to no avail, Plaintiffs moved the Court for leave to serve Defendant Roman by publication (Docket No. 33). The Court denied Plaintiffs' request, but instead issued an order demanding the representative of the PRPD Legal Department to coordinate with Plaintiffs' counsel to receive service of process on behalf of Roman (Docket No. 37). Despite the Court's order, the representative PRPD Legal Department refused to accept service of process on behalf of Roman, and instead directed the process server to the San Juan Drug Division where Roman was supposedly located at the moment. At the precinct, an officer that claimed to be Roman's contact agent accepted process on his behalf. (Docket No. 38).

On January 30, 2012, Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 30). Therein, Plaintiffs clarified their intention to prosecute their claims and that any delay in the proceedings is solely due to their precarious financial situation and the complicity of members of the PRPD in helping Defendants avoid service process. Plaintiffs also do not challenge Diaz Colon's entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity for monetary damages; however, Plaintiffs argue that the PRPD is liable for monetary damages under state tort law.

On February 26, 2012, Plaintiffs supplemented their opposition (Docket No. 43), challenging Defendant Figueroa–Sancha's allegations on the absence of service due to Figueroa–Sancha's awareness of the suit and affirmative actions.

IV. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Federal...