Serrano v. Serrano

• Decision Date: 21 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13685,13685
• Citation: Serrano v. Serrano, 213 Conn. 1, 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Edward SERRANO v. Nancy E. SERRANO.

Page 413

566 A.2d 413

213 Conn. 1

Edward SERRANO v. Nancy E. SERRANO.

No. 13685.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 4, 1989.

Decided Nov. 21, 1989.

Shirley Pripstein, for appellant (defendant).

Theodore Poulos, Plainville, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and CONVELLO, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the 1984 amendments to § 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 152(e), ¹ divested state courts of the authority to designate which party in actions for dissolution of marriage may claim the dependent child exemption for federal income tax purposes. After finding that the marriage between the plaintiff husband and the defendant wife had irretrievably broken down, the trial court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and establishing the custodial and financial responsibilities of the parties. ² The judgment provided that the sole child of the marriage, although committed to the joint custody of the parties, would reside with the defendant, subject to the plaintiff's visitation rights. The judgment also obligated the plaintiff to pay $95 per week in child support and one dollar per year in alimony, and ordered him to provide medical insurance for the child and to pay one half of any unreimbursed medical expenses. In return, the trial court allocated the federal income tax exemption for the child to the plaintiff. ³ It is this last provision of the judgment that the defendant challenges on appeal. We transferred this case here pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, and find no error.

The trial court implemented its decision to allocate the dependent child exemption to the plaintiff by ordering the defendant annually to execute a written declaration that she would not claim the exemption. ⁴ The function of this order was to enable the plaintiff to comply with § 152(e)(2), which requires that a noncustodial parent claiming the exemption attach to the income tax return such a waiver from the custodial parent.

The defendant attacks the validity of this order on two grounds. First, she argues that, as a matter of federal law, the allocation is invalid because Congress, by enacting the 1984 amendments to § 152(e), preempted state law from allocating the exemption to a noncustodial parent. Second, she argues that, as a matter of state law, the order requiring her to execute the documentation to enable the plaintiff to claim the exemption invoked an equitable remedy that was inappropriate because of the availability of a less intrusive remedy.

I

The defendant's first and central contention is that the 1984 amendments to § 152(e) divest state courts of the authority to allocate the dependent child exemption. In support of this position, she argues that the amendments manifest a congressional intent to confer a tax benefit upon custodial parents that can be transferred to noncustodial parents only upon the voluntary consent of a custodial parent. According to this analysis, the trial court's order allocating the exemption to the plaintiff is invalid since it is inconsistent with the objectives of § 152(e). We are not persuaded.

The question of preemption is one of federal law, arising under the supremacy clause of the United States constitution. U.S. Const., art. VI. ⁵ Determining whether Congress has exercised its power to preempt state law is a question of legislative intent. Northwest Central Pipeline Corporation v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1262, 1273, 103 L.Ed.2d 509 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has instructed us that, absent an explicit statement that Congress intends to preempt state law, courts should "infer such intent where Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947), or where the state law at issue conflicts with federal law, either because it is impossible to comply with both, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217-18, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 [reh. denied, 374 U.S. 858, 83 S.Ct. 1861, 10 L.Ed.2d 1082] (1963), or because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of congressional objectives, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)." Northwest Central Pipeline Corporation v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas, supra, 109 S.Ct. 1273; see also Times Mirror Co. v. Division of Public Utility Control, 192 Conn. 506, 510-12, 473 A.2d 768 (1984).

The defendant concedes that the sole element of the preemption analysis at issue in this case is whether the trial court's order stands as an obstacle to the objectives of the 1984 amendments to § 152(e). Congress has not expressly prohibited state courts from allocating the dependent child exemption, since neither the statute nor the legislative history of the 1984 amendments makes any reference whatsoever to the practice. Likewise, Congress has manifested no intent to occupy the field of domestic relations. Finally, the defendant has alleged no inconsistency between the trial court's order and the statute that would prevent the defendant from complying with both.

Our analysis of whether state law frustrates the purpose of § 152(e) must start from certain well established principles of federal law. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, because the field of domestic relations has traditionally been regulated by the states, the standard for demonstrating a preempting conflict between federal law and a state domestic relations provision is high: "On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment' that state law be preempted. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77, [25 S.Ct. 172, 175, 49 L.Ed. 390] (1904). A mere conflict in words is not sufficient. State family and family-property law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overridden. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352, [86 S.Ct. 500, 507, 15 L.Ed.2d 404] (1966)." Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581, 99 S.Ct. 802, 808, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979); see also Mansell v. Mansell, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 2027-28, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 2735, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981).

The question before us is whether, in light of these precedents, the 1984 amendments to § 152(e) manifest federal interests that would suffer "major damage" by enforcement of the trial court's order in this case. ⁶ The amendments eliminated two of the exceptions to the general rule that the custodial parent is entitled to the dependent child exemption and substituted in their place the current provision allowing the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption only if the custodial parent executes a declaration promising not to claim the exemption. The first exception formerly allowed the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption if a divorce decree or written agreement allocated the exemption to the noncustodial parent, provided that the noncustodial parent paid at least $600 per year in child support. The second exception formerly allocated the exemption to the noncustodial parent in cases where the noncustodial parent paid child support in an amount exceeding the amount contributed by the custodial parent and not less than $1200 per year. The amendments did not modify an existing exception for multiple support agreements, but did establish an additional exception for cases in which a divorce decree entered prior to January 1, 1985, had allocated the exemption to a noncustodial parent.

The defendant urges us to interpret these amendments as evidencing a federal purpose to confer a tax benefit upon custodial parents that can be transferred to a noncustodial parent only if the custodial parent waives the right to claim it. The principal argument in support of the defendant's position is that, since the 1984 amendments to § 152(e) explicitly defined certain exceptions to the general rule that custodial parents may claim the exemption, state courts may not allocate the exemption to noncustodial parents under circumstances in which none of the defined exceptions are applicable. A number of state courts that have examined the issue have found this argument persuasive. Holley v. Holley, 547 So.2d 192, 193 (Fla.App.1989); In re Marriage of Davidson, 540 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind.App.1989); Varga v. Varga, 173 Mich.App. 411, 417-19, 434 N.W.2d 152 (1988); Gerardy v. Gerardy, 406 N.W.2d 10, 13-14 (Minn.App.1987); Gleason v. Michlitsch, 82 Or.App. 688, 692-93, 728 P.2d 965 (1986); Josey v. Josey, 291 S.C. 26, 33, 351 S.E.2d 891 (1986); Brandriet v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 455, 459-60 (S.D.1989); Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (S.D.1989); Davis v. Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711, 717-18 (Tex.App.1986). This argument fails, however, to recognize the significance of the fact that state courts have been allocating the exemption for decades. Moreover, as the defendant concedes, state courts developed the practice long before the Internal Revenue Code made explicit reference to it by adopting the first version of § 152(e) in 1967. In light of the great deference accorded to state courts in the area of domestic relations, we are persuaded, as the courts in a significant number of jurisdictions have held; Lincoln v. Lincoln, 155 Ariz. 272, 275-76, 746 P.2d 13 (App.1987); In re Marriage of Einhorn, 178 Ill.App.3d 212, 127 Ill.Dec. 411, 418-419, 533 N.E.2d 29, 36-37 (1988); Hart v. Hart, 774 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Ky.App.1989); Wassif v. Wassif, 77 Md.App. 750, 759-61, 551 A.2d 935 (1989); Bailey v. Bailey, ...