Serratos v. California

• Decision Date: 19 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2:18cv0077 MCE KJN P,2:18cv0077 MCE KJN P
• Parties: BENJAMIN SERRATOS III, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

BENJAMIN SERRATOS III, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.

No. 2:18cv0077 MCE KJN P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 19, 2021

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction¹

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding with counsel,² with an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2012 convictions for second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter, driving while intoxicated and causing injury, driving with a blood alcohol content greater than .08 percent and causing injury, and hitand run resulting in death or injury. Petitioner was sentenced to forty-eight years, four months in state prison. Petitioner claims as follows: (1) convictions were obtained with insufficient evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) convictions based "on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each and every element of the charged crime;" (3) trial counsel was ineffective for a failure to conduct reasonable pre-trial investigation regarding victim's cell phone; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue prior counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by agreeing to the release and destruction of the victim's vehicle; (5) trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate and prepare for trial "was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea;" (6) by improperly restricting the right to present evidence, the trial court denied petitioner a fair trial; (7) cumulative state court errors worked to deny petitioner a fair trial; (8) the conviction was obtained as a result of outrageous government conduct; (9) insufficient evidence regarding prior murder advisement in 2006 driving under the influence conviction; (10) petitioner was punished more than once for the same offense; and (11) the great bodily injury enhancements were "illegally imposed." (ECF No. 1 at 3-76.) After careful review of the record, this court concludes that the petition should be denied.

II. Procedural History

On March 2, 2012, a jury found petitioner guilty of second-degree murder (Cal. Pen. Code, § 187 [count 1]), vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with gross negligence (Cal. Pen. Code, § 191.5(a) [count 2]), driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Cal. Veh. Code, § 23153(a) [count 3]), driving with .08 percent blood alcohol causing injury (Cal. Veh. Code, § 23153(b) [count 4]), driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Cal. Veh. Code, § 23153(a) [count 5]), driving with .08 percent blood alcohol causing injury (Cal. Veh. Code, § 23153(b) [count 6], hit and run resulting in death or injury (Cal. Veh. Code, § 20001 [count 7]), and misdemeanor driving when privilege was suspended or revoked (Cal. Veh. Code, § 14601.2(a) [count 8]); numerous related findings concerning great bodily injury and multiple victims were also found true by the jury. (LD 3 at 244-53; LD 12 at 69-75.) On August 28, 2012, petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of thirty years to life for second degree murder (count 1), as well as a total determinate term of eighteen years, eight months for the other crimes(counts 2-8), resulting in a total of forty-eight years and eight months to life in state prison. (LD 4 at 189-92; LD 13 at 34-41.)

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. (LD 16-18.) On May 5, 2016, the Court of Appeal vacated petitioner's convictions as to counts 3 and 4, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (LD 19.)³

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on August 15, 2016. (LD 20.)

On November 13, 2017, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District; the petition was denied without prejudice to the filing in the superior court on November 21, 2017. (LD 23.)

On November 14, 2017, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court; the petition was denied February 14, 2018. (LD 24.)

On January 8, 2018, while his petition was pending in the state's highest court, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the San Joaquin County Superior Court; that court denied his petition on March 22, 2018. (LD 25.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition with this court on January 12, 2018. (ECF No. 1.)

Thereafter, on April 23, 2018, petitioner again filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Third District Court of Appeal; the petition was denied July 6, 2018. (LD 26.)

Then, on July 19, 2018, petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court; review was denied August 19, 2018. (LD 27.)

In this proceeding, respondent filed an answer on November 19, 2018. (ECF No. 33.) Petitioner, then represented by counsel, filed a traverse on May 8, 2019. (ECF No. 44.)

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III. Facts⁴

In its unpublished memorandum and opinion vacating in small part, but otherwise affirming petitioner's judgment of conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the following factual summary:

On the afternoon of June 12, 2010, defendant celebrated his daughter's fifth birthday with family and friends at a park in Lodi. Defendant brought a 20-pack of beer to the party and was seen drinking beer that afternoon. Later that evening, defendant, his common law wife, and their four daughters went to defendant's nephew's house where defendant continued to drink beer. At approximately 11:30 p.m., defendant left his nephew's house in his Honda. His wife left separately with their daughters because she and defendant had arrived in separate cars.

Defendant drove southbound on West Lane, exceeded the posted 55-mile-per-hour speed limit, and rear-ended an Oldsmobile. The impact sent the Oldsmobile spinning, and it slammed into a signal pole on the shoulder of the intersection, killing the driver Destanee Little and injuring her two passengers.

Pablo Sanchez, Jovito Garcia, Daniel Garcia, and Michael Nava were in oncoming traffic when they observed the collision. Sanchez approached the Honda. Defendant was still in the driver's seat and appeared dazed and confused. His eyes were glassy and red, and he smelled like alcohol. Defendant eventually got out of his car and began to walk away from the scene. He was later contacted by law enforcement officers as he was walking down the road away from the scene. He had a very strong odor of alcohol and his eyes were red, watery, and glassy looking.

Two hours after the collision, defendant's blood-alcohol content was 0.21 percent. An expert estimated defendant's blood-alcohol content at the time of the collision to have been 0.25 percent.

The California Highway Patrol Multidisciplinary Accident Investigation Team (MAIT) inspected the scene, both vehicles, and the physical evidence and determined that the Oldsmobile was travelling in the number two, slow, lane at an estimated 55 miles per hour when it was struck from behind by the Honda, which was also travelling in the slow lane but at an estimated 95.5 miles per hour. The estimated post-impact speed of the vehicles was approximately 75.7 miles per hour, indicating a change in speed of about 20 miles per hour for each vehicle. The speed limit on that section of West Lane is 55 miles per hour.

The Honda's supplemental restraint system (SRS) control unitindicated a change in speed of 33.8 miles per hour at the time of the collision, indicating a pre-impact speed of approximately 109 miles per hour for the Honda and approximately 40 miles per hour for the Oldsmobile. The Honda's SRS control unit also revealed that defendant attempted to start his vehicle 10 times after the collision.

Dr. Russell Darnell testified as an accident reconstruction expert for the defense. He opined that at the time of the collision, the Honda was travelling approximately 68 miles per hour, and the Oldsmobile was travelling approximately 50 miles per hour. He further opined that the initial point of impact occurred in the number one lane, and that the Honda did not enter the number two, slow, lane until after the initial impact.

Phone records for Little's cell phone showed that there was a text message sent at 11:42 p.m. and data usage consistent with a social networking connection at 11:51 p.m. on the night of the collision. It was not known who actually used the phone at those times.

In 2006, defendant pleaded no contest to driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b). As part of his plea agreement, defendant expressly acknowledged in writing that he understood "being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, impairs my ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. It is extremely dangerous to human life to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both. If I continue to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, and as a result of that driving, someone is killed, I can be charged with murder." As a result of his conviction, defendant's driver's license was suspended, and he was ordered to complete an alcohol education course. Defendant enrolled in a three-month program but attended just one class, and his driver's license was never reinstated as a result of his failure to complete the program and remained suspended at the time of the collision.

(LD 19 at 3-5; People v. Serratos, slip op. at *2.)

IV. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting...