Serv., Respondent.R.G. Letourneau, Inc. v. Adm'r of Gen., Docket No. 907–R.
| Citation | 22 T.C. 490 |
| Decision Date | 07 June 1954 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 907–R. |
| Parties | SERVICES, RESPONDENT.R. G. LETOURNEAU, INC., PETITIONER, v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL |
| Court | U.S. Tax Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Petitioner's excessive profits for years 1942, 1943, and 1944 were settled by bilateral agreements. Subsequently petitioner filed claims for renegotiation rebates for such years which were allowed by respondent in amounts less than claimed. The petition alleges error by respondent in such action, and asks that this Court redetermine the excessive profits of and net renegotiation rebates due to the petitioner. Held, on respondent's motion to dismiss that this Court has no jurisdiction of the action. M. O. Gard, Esq., and T. W. Swain, Esq., for the petitioner.
James II. Prentice, esq., for the respondent.
This case is before us on respondent's motion to dismiss this proceeding for lack of jurisdiction.
The petition is predicated on notices from respondent determining net renegotiation rebates for 1942, 1943, and 1944, and asks that we ‘redetermine the excessive profits of and Net Renegotiation Rebates due the petitioner’ for 1942, 1943, and 1944. Petitioner's excessive profits for these years were settled by duly executed bilateral agreements between petitioner and the Government, and we do not understand petitioner to be seeking any determination of the amounts there agreed upon except as the renegotiation rebates may be considered as affecting such excessive profits. The errors alleged in the petition relate only to the determination of such renegotiation rebates.
The bilateral agreements for the years 1943 and 1944, respectively, provide in paragraph 10 as follows:
10. Renegotiation Rebate. Nothing contained in this agreement shall prejudice any right which the Contractor may have to recover a renegotiation rebate pursuant to subsection (a)(4)(D) of the Renegotiation Act.
Petitioner contends that these contract provisions and the law itself establish an exception to the statutory provision for the conclusiveness of bilateral agreements of settlement of the amounts of excessive profits.
The statute, section 403(a)(4)(C) of the Renegotiation Act of 1943, defers the allowance, as an item of cost, of an amortization deduction of an emergency facility until after a recomputation of it has been made under the Internal Revenue Code for the purpose of determining taxes; section 403(a)(4)(D) provides that in the case of a renegotiation which is made prior to such recomputation the United States shall repay to the contractor, after such recomputation, the amount of the net renegotiation rebate computed as described in that subsection1 and that this will be done notwithstanding any of the provisions of section 403(c)(4), which provides as follows:
(4) For the purposes of this section the Board may make final or other agreements with a contractor or subcontractor for the elimination of excessive profits and for the discharge of any liability for excessive profits under this section. Such agreements may contain such terms and conditions as the Board deems advisable. Any such agreement shall be conclusive according to its terms; and except upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance or a willful misrepresentation of a material fact, (A) such agreement shall not for the purposes of this section be reopened as to the matters agreed upon, and shall not be modified by any officer, employee, or agent of the United States, and (B) such agreement and any determination made in accordance therewith shall not be annulled, modified, set aside, or disregarded in any suit, action, or proceeding.
Petitioner argues that the amortization rebate reflects a cost factor in the determination of the amount of the excessive profits; in other words, that the delayed renegotiation rebate, in effect, will serve to diminish the amount by which a contractor's profits were found to be excessive. In this respect, it can be said to be related as a practical matter to the ultimate ascertainment of the amount of excessive profits realized by the contractor. This, however, does not of itself give the Tax Court jurisdiction of any controversy which may arise concerning such a rebate. Our jurisdiction is limited by the statutory provision (section 403(e)(1) and (2)) to situations of a contractor's being ‘aggrieved by an order of the Board determining the amount of excessive profits received or accrued.’ We have no such order here. What petitioner regards as such an order reads for 1943, for example, follows:
In accordance with the provisions of subsection (a)(4)(D) of the Renegotiation Act, the amount of your net renegotiation rebate for the subject fiscal year has been determined as follows:
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
¦Gross Renegotiation Rebate ¦$146,195.15¦
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+-----------¦
¦Less: Federal Tax Benefit (computed and determined by the Bureau ¦58,478.10 ¦
¦of Internal Revenue) ¦...To continue reading
Request your trial
-
R.G. Letourneau, Inc. v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., Docket No. 907-R.
...of the Renegotiation Act a renegotiation rebate is to be handled as an administrative matter over which this Court has no jurisdiction. 22 T.C. 490. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed our decision, held that the Tax Court has jurisdiction, an......