Servis v. State
Decision Date | 10 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 5D02-1474.,5D02-1474. |
Citation | 855 So.2d 1190 |
Parties | Dennis Wayne SERVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Dennis Wayne Servis appeals his conviction for DUI manslaughter.1 Because of the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's improper comments during closing arguments, we conclude that Servis was denied a fair trial and reverse.
Servis was charged with DUI manslaughter after he was involved in an automobile collision which resulted in the death of Anthony Foster. The case was originally tried on 31 August 2000, and Servis was convicted. The case was appealed to this court, and this court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. See Servis v. State, 802 So.2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
.
At the second trial, there was testimony that on the day of the accident, Servis ran a stop light in his truck, and that as a result of the ensuing collision, Servis's truck hit a motorcycle driven by Foster and a vehicle driven by Charles Kauffman. Upon impact, Kauffman's vehicle became airborne and overturned in the median. Foster was thrown from his motorcycle and landed in the road. Witnesses testified that Servis appeared distraught and concerned. An eyewitness to the accident, Jimmy Crabtree, testified that Servis's speech was not slurred and that he did not smell alcohol on Servis's breath.
Traffic homicide investigator Leroy Alfred testified that after an investigation of the accident, he concluded that Servis looked down for some papers as he approached the intersection and struck the passenger side of Kauffman's vehicle. At the same time, Foster's motorcycle struck the passenger side of Servis's vehicle. Alfred testified that there was no indication that Servis applied his brakes before the crash. After being advised of his Miranda2 rights by Alfred, Servis admitted that he drank beer during his lunch, and stated that he was sorry for killing Foster. Alfred testified that Servis's eyes were watery, glassy, and red, that Servis's speech was slurred, and that he smelled of alcohol. Alfred obtained a blood sample from Servis after Servis consented, but Servis was allowed to leave the scene of the accident without a field sobriety or breathalyzer test and was not arrested that day.
FDLE crime lab analyst Dennis Siewert testified that an analysis of Servis's blood sample indicated that Servis had a blood alcohol level of .119. Medical examiner Dr. Sarah Irrgang testified that a blood alcohol level of .119 would cause a decrease in coordination and would affect one's ability to drive.
Wayne Morris testified as an expert on behalf of Servis. Morris testified that his review of Siewart's FDLE file on Servis's blood analysis indicated that there was cross contamination among the various blood samples. Morris also testified that based on the food Servis ate, the amount he drank, and the times of consumption, Servis's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident would have been between zero and .038.
To rebut Morris's testimony, the state recalled Dennis Siewart who testified that he did not agree with Morris's testimony that the blood samples were contaminated because if one sample were contaminated, they all would have been contaminated.
On appeal, Servis argues that the state's closing arguments were improper and denied him a fair trial. We agree. Because Servis did not object to some of the comments about which he appeals, and because other objections were general, we must determine whether the comments were so prejudicial as to constitute fundamental error. Freeman v. State, 717 So.2d 105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Caraballo v. State, 762 So.2d 542, 548, n. 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). "Fundamental error in closing arguments occurs when the prejudicial conduct in its collective import is so extensive that its influence pervades the trial, gravely impairing a calm and dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the merits by the jury." Silva v. Nightingale, 619 So.2d 4, 5 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
In the instant case, the state disparaged the defense on several occasions:
(emphasis added).
The state continued its attack by stating several times "the defense wants you to believe ..." and concluding with the comment, "Well, I mean, I don't know what trial that we're listening to here." The state further commented on the defense and defense strategy:
(emphasis added).
A prosecutor may not ridicule a defendant or his theory of defense. See Riley v. State, 560 So.2d 279, 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
. It is improper for an attorney to give a personal opinion as to the justness of the cause, and in the instant case, the state's comments resulted in an impermissible attack on the defense theory and defense counsel. See D'Ambrosio v. State, 736 So.2d 44 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ( ).
Furthermore, while attacking the defense, the state told the jury that Kauffman and Foster had not been impaired or driving improperly, and that the reason Servis was not arrested the day of the incident was because it takes time to receive the blood results. These statements were improper because counsel is not permitted to suggest that evidence which was not presented at trial provides additional grounds for finding the defendant guilty. Ruiz v. State, 743 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1999).
Second, the state attempted to bolster the credibility of the medical examiner, Dr. Irrgang, by asserting:
[W]ell, in this case, who has more to gain or lose in this case? Dr. Irrgang? She's coming up and answering the questions. She has nothing to gain here. Everything she said here is from her background in pharmacology, about someone with a .119 here. And you have the defendant taking the stand.
Defense counsel's objection was overruled.
You have Dr. Irrgang who just explained her autopsy. Explained everything what somebody would have with a.119. They don't have any interest in how this case is decided. And I would submit to you that the only one who does have an interest in this case is the defendant. And just as the instructions would show, you need to follow that in weighing the evidence and give the proper amount of weight to that testimony based on the interest.
(emphasis added).
Except to the extent that an attorney bases his or her opinion on the evidence of the case, an attorney may not express a personal opinion on the merits of the case or the credibility of witnesses. Ruiz, 743 So.2d at 1; see also Caraballo, 762 So.2d at 546
. In the instant case, the state sought to bolster its witnesses stating that they had no interest in the case.
Third, the state sought to bolster the credibility of the police officers:
Let's talk about, we have law enforcement here that came in and testified and left. That's their job is to investigate an accident, and they came in here and told you what happened. They have no interest in how it's decided.
This attempt to bolster the officers' testimony was impermissible. Landry v. State, 620 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); see also Clark v. State, 632 So.2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
(, overruled on other grounds, )T.B. v. State, 669 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
Fourth, the state misstated the law by implying to the jury that they could find Servis guilty as long as his blood alcohol level was .08 at some point during the night rather than that his blood alcohol level was .08 at the time he was driving:3
And, the Judge is going to instruct you that the only thing the State has to prove is that the defendant was driving an automobile, that he caused the death of Anthony Foster, and either his normal faculties were impaired by alcohol or he had a blood...
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