Session v. Perry, CIV.A.2:03-CV-354.

Decision Date06 January 2004
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A.2:03-CV-354.,CIV.A.2:03-CV-354.
Citation298 F.Supp.2d 451
PartiesWalter SESSION, et al v. Rick PERRY, et al
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

Richard Scott Gladden, Law Office of Richard Gladden, Denton, TX, G. Michael Fjetland, International Legal Group, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Cassandra B. Robertson, David C. Mattox, Don R. Willett, Attorney General's Office, R. Ted Cruz, Office of the Attorney General, Robert M. Long, Houdyshell & Long LLP, Austin, TX, William Andrew Taylor, Andy Taylor & Associates PC, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, and WARD and ROSENTHAL, District Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Various voters, members of Congress, the City of Austin, Texas, the GI Forum, the League of United Latin American Citizens ("LULAC"), and voters of Cherokee County challenge congressional redistricting set forth in Plan 1374C, enacted into law by the Texas Legislature on October 12, 2003,1 and precleared by the Department of Justice on December 19, 2003. Plaintiffs2 allege that Plan 1374C is invalid because (1) Texas may not redistrict middecade; (2) the Plan unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of race; (3) the Plan is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander and (4) various districts in Plan 1374C dilute the voting strength of minorities in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

We hold that Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the State statute prescribing the lines for the thirty-two congressional seats in Texas violates the United States Constitution or fails to comply with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. We also reject Plaintiffs' argument that the Texas Legislature lacked authority to draw new districts after a federal court drew them following the 2000 census.

We decide only the legality of Plan 1374C, not its wisdom. Whether the Texas Legislature has acted in the best interest of Texas is a judgment that belongs to the people who elected the officials whose act is challenged in this case. Nor does the reality that this is a reprise of the act of the 1991 State Legislature weigh with the court's decision beyond its marker of the impact of the computer-drawn map. This extraordinary change in the ability to slice thin the lines brings welcome assistance, but comes with a high cost of creating much greater potential for abuse. Congress can assist by banning mid-decade redistricting, which it has the clear constitutional authority to do, as many states have done. In Texas, the phenomenon is new but already old. The larger lesson of 1991 and 2003 is that the only check upon these grasps of power lie with the voter. But, perversely, these seizures entail political moves that too often dance close to avoiding the recall of the disagreeing voter. We know it is rough and tumble politics, and we are ever mindful that the judiciary must call the fouls without participating in the game. We must nonetheless express concern that in the age of technology this is a very different game.

Part I presents the factual background of the case. Part II addresses whether Texas had the legislative authority to draw new district lines mid-decade. Part III addresses generic claims that challenge the map as a whole, namely, claims of racial discrimination and partisan gerrymandering asserted to be unconstitutionally extreme. Part IV lays out the legal principles governing our analysis of Plaintiffs' more specific claims. Part V addresses the § 2 vote dilution claims as directed toward the Dallas-Fort Worth area, as well as the other potential influence districts in East and Central Texas. Finally, Part VI addresses the § 2 vote dilution and Shaw claims directed at districts drawn in South and West Texas.

I

The U.S. Census Bureau released the 2000 decennial census in March 2001. As a result of its population growth, Texas was due two additional seats in the House of Representatives, bringing its total to thirty-two. Texas in turn had to draw thirty-two equipopulous districts to account for its additional representation and to meet the constitutional requirement of one man, one vote. Under Texas law, the Texas Legislature had the task of drawing the districts.3

Despite the imminency of state primary elections, the 77th State Legislature failed to adopt a redistricting plan. Lawsuits in state and federal court followed. Voters and others requested that the court draw a new map. The Balderas court deferred to state court efforts to adopt a state redistricting plan. When these state court efforts failed, we recognized that the State's existing congressional districts were unconstitutionally malapportioned and reluctantly accepted the duty to prepare a new, constitutional plan.

Without a baseline state plan in place, the court invited the parties to submit redistricting recommendations. Following a bench trial, the panel applied neutral districting factors and adopted Plan 1151C to govern the State's 2002 elections. The panel refused suggestions not required by law and rejected policy choices better left to legislative consideration.

Balderas ultimately ordered that Plan 1151C would govern the 2002 congressional elections.4 Certain plaintiffs representing Hispanic voters appealed the decision, arguing that the panel erred by not drawing an additional Hispanic district in the Southwest region of the state. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed.5 As a result of the 2002 elections, the Texas congressional delegation included seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans. However, with their newly drawn state districts, legislative Republicans gained control over both houses of the Texas State Legislature, as well as control over all prominent Executive Branch positions.

The Texas Legislature revisited redistricting in 2003. The Legislature was unable to adopt a new plan during the 2003 regular session, in part because Democratic House members, by absenting themselves, denied a quorum. Governor Perry called the Legislature into special session. During the first special session, the House approved a new congressional map, but the Senate failed to do so because its "two-thirds" supermajority rule permitted the Democrats to block a vote. To break the impasse, Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst announced that he would suspend operation of the two-thirds rule in any future special session considering congressional redistricting legislation. Although Democratic legislators again attempted to prevent formation of a quorum, the 78th Legislature ultimately was able to accomplish during its third special session what the 77th Legislature could not: pass a congressional redistricting plan, Plan 1374C.

II

Plaintiffs argue that Texas lacks the power, under either the Constitution or the election statutes, to redraw congressional districts in the middle of the decade. Some Plaintiffs find this limitation implicit in the text of the Elections Clause, while others urge that Congress has affirmatively limited state authority to redistrict by § 2c of Title II.6 A third strain of arguments focuses on the Balderas judgment and asserts either that the judgment collaterally estops the State from enacting a new plan or that the judgment exhausted the State's authority to redistrict.

Although there are compelling arguments why it would be good policy for states to abstain from drawing district lines mid-decade, Plaintiffs ultimately fail to provide any authority—constitutional, statutory, or judicial—demonstrating that mid-decade redistricting is forbidden in Texas. In fact, what meager authority we have found seems to allow the states to redraw lines mid-decade, at least where a court drew the existing lines within the decade. As we will explain, the Elections Clause of the Constitution grants states broad power to regulate the "time, place, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives."7 Congress has the power to override state regulations or to impose rules of its own, but it has not chosen to limit redistricting to the period immediately following the release of the decennial census. Judicial decisions, both by the Supreme Court and by district courts throughout the country, have allowed and even invited states to redraw district lines following a court's action.

Against this backdrop of authority, we cannot agree that either the Constitution or the voting statutes restricts the states to once-a-decade redistricting. We therefore reject the argument that the Texas Legislature had no authority to draw the lines of congressional districts and deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

A

The Constitution of the United States delegates to states the power to develop procedures governing congressional elections by the Elections Clause. It provides:

The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.8

This provision delegates to state legislatures both the power and responsibility to redraw congressional voting districts.9 States do not possess this authority as an incident of their sovereignty. Rather, the Elections Clause delegates power to the states in broad terms. While states may only enact "time, places and manner" regulations, the text does not define or otherwise limit the states' discretion. Nonetheless, Congress may, if it chooses, make regulations governing the "times, places and manner" of holding elections or alter regulations enacted by state legislatures. This reservation to Congress, however, is not a direct limitation on the scope of the states' authority; rather, it allows Congress to override state election decisions or to enact regulations of its own. Unless and until Congress chooses to act, the states' power to redistrict...

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    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
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    ...a § 2 violation under the totality of the circumstances. LULAC , 548 U.S. at 439–40, 442, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (quoting Session v. Perry , 298 F.Supp.2d 451, 473 (E.D. Tex. 2004) and Gingles , 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. 2752 ). Texas in general and Pasadena in particular have a long history of dis......
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5 books & journal articles
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    • Georgia State University College of Law Georgia State Law Reviews No. 35-2, December 2018
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