Sessoms v. State

• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Before MURPHY; PER CURIAM
• Citation: Sessoms v. State, 239 A.2d 118, 3 Md.App. 293 (Md. App. 1968)
• Decision Date: 29 February 1968
• Docket Number: No. 176,176
• Parties: Roosevelt SESSOMS v. STATE of Maryland.

Page 293

3 Md.App. 293

239 A.2d 118

Roosevelt SESSOMS v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 176.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 29, 1968.

Harry Sadoff, Cambridge, for appellant.

William B. Whiteford, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and William B. Yates, II, State's Atty. for Dorchester County, Cambridge, on brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON and ORTH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was found guilty generally of storehouse breaking with intent to steal goods of the value of $100 and upwards and related counts by a jury in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County. He was given a general sentence of imprisonment for a term of 8 years.

On appeal he contends that the search warrant was invalid because probable cause was not shown in the application for its issuance. The basis of the contention is that the facts set forth in the application were on information from an informant and thus hearsay. We believe that the contention is fully answered in Scott v. State, 1 Md.App. 481, 231 A.2d 728 in which we reviewed the effect of the 1958 amendment of Md.Code (1967 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 551 and the purport of judicial decisions in this State relating to the matter. We found that the rule of law in this State is not more stringent and demanding than the rule announced by the Supreme Court in search warrant cases. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684. We concluded that the rule in this State authorizes '* * * hearsay information from a reliable source to be utilized in the determination of 'probable cause' if the issuing court is informed of some underlying circumstances within the personal knowledge of the affiant reasonably justifying a belief in the reliability of the information received from a known informant'. 1 Md.App. at 490, 231 A.2d at 734.

The application for the warrant in the instant case set forth that the affiant, an officer of the City of Cambridge Police Department, was advised by the Department that the crime of grand larceny had been committed; that an informant advised him that a revolver and a double edged knife with rubber case, answering the description of two of the articles stolen, were located in 'the third floor left rear room (facing the front of said building) of a three story dwelling house situated at 505 Cedar Street, Cambridge, Dorchester County, Maryland' occupied by Roosevelt Sessoms; and that the affiant had been a police officer for approximately three and one-half years. The application further stated:

'That the informant is unknown to your affiant, but that your affiant was advised by the following persons that the informant was a reliable person whose word could be relied upon:

(a) David F. Schroeder, a merchant, who has known the informant for a period of three years.

(b) John W. Gordy, Jr., Personnel Manager for the informant's employer, who has known the informant for a period of two years.

(c) John Meredith, the informant's landlord, who has known the informant for a period of two years'.

The affiant averred on the basis of these facts and circumstances that 'there is probable cause to believe, and he does believe, that the aforesaid room occupied by Roosevelt Sessoms contains evidence concerning said grand larceny' and prayed for the issuance of a Search and Seizure Warrant. We think that the hearsay information set forth in the warrant was shown to be from a reliable source, and as other underlying circumstances stated in the application, within personal knowledge of the affiant, reasonably justified a belief in the reliability of the information received from the informant, the hearsay information could be properly utilized in the determination of probable cause. Utilizing this information, probable cause was shown for the issuance of the warrant.

The appellant attempts to distinguish Scott by urging that '* * * much more information, especially personal knowledge of the Sheriff (the affiant) was presented in the application for the search warrant' in Scott than in the instant case. Even assuming this to be correct, we have found the application here sufficient to show probable cause and that the application in Scott may have contained more information is not material. He also argues that the victim should have made an affidavit 'as to the crime committed against him in detail' as part of the application. He cites no authority for this proposition and we deem it to be without merit. We think it apparent from the application that the affiant...