Seubert v. Seubert, 98-324.

• Citation: 13 P.3d 365,301 Mont. 382,2000 MT 241
• Decision Date: 31 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-324.,98-324.
• Parties: Camille E. SEUBERT, Petitioner, v. Russell M. SEUBERT, Respondent, and Montana Ninth Judicial District Court, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

13 P.3d 365

2000 MT 241

301 Mont. 382

Camille E. SEUBERT, Petitioner, v. Russell M. SEUBERT, Respondent, and Montana Ninth Judicial District Court, Respondent.

No. 98-324.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued and Submitted July 8, 1999.

Decided August 31, 2000.

Order Clarifying Decision on Grant of Rehearing November 30, 2000.

Lonnie J. Olson, Child Support Enforcement Division, Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, Helena, Montana, For Appellant.

Hon. Marc G. Buyske, District Judge, Montana Ninth Judicial District, Shelby, Montana, For Respondent.

Barbara Bell, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana (Russell M. Seubert) Camille Seubert, Pro Se, Shelby, Montana, For Amici.

Justice TERRY N. TRIEWEILER delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Russell Seubert filed a petition for dissolution in the District Court for the Ninth Judicial District in Toole County. During that proceeding, the District Court issued a child support order which required that Russell pay child support. Camille Seubert subsequently requested a modification of the child support order from the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED). CSED filed a Notice of Registration with the District Court, notifying the District Court of the possibility that CSED would modify the support order. The District Court ordered CSED to cease and desist from further proceeding in the matter, and further ordered CSED to appear and show cause why CSED's authority to modify district court child support orders should not be permanently enjoined as a violation of the separation of powers provision of Montana's Constitution. Following a hearing to consider the issue, the District Court issued an order permanently enjoining CSED from modifying any child support order issued by a district court. CSED appeals the District Court's order. We affirm the order of the District Court.

¶ 2 The following issues are presented on appeal:

¶ 3 1. Does this case present a justiciable controversy?

¶ 4 2. Did the District Court have personal jurisdiction over CSED?

¶ 5 3. Do §§ 40-5-272 and -273, MCA (1997), to the extent that they authorize agency modification of a district court child support order, violate the separation of powers clause of the Montana Constitution?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 6 On October 31, 1994, Russell Seubert filed a petition for dissolution. On October 23, 1995, Russell and Camille reached a custody, support, and property settlement agreement which provided that Russell would pay $828 per month for support of the couple's four children. Subsequently, Camille requested that the District Court find the settlement agreement unconscionable based upon her assertion that Russell's actual income was substantially more than the amount represented to her at the time of settlement negotiations. On April 4, 1996, the District Court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, order and judgment dissolving the marriage. The District Court also concluded that the parties' settlement agreement was conscionable and adopted the provisions of the agreement which established Russell's child support obligations.

¶ 7 Camille appealed the District Court's determination that the settlement agreement was conscionable to this Court. On November 14, 1996, in a noncite opinion, In re Marriage of Seubert, [280 Mont. 500, 929 P.2d 252] we affirmed the District Court's determination that the agreement was conscionable. On May 12, 1997, Camille filed a motion with the District Court for modification of the child support order. Camille argued that because Russell's represented income, at the time the parties agreed to the amount of child support, was less than Russell's actual income, there were substantially changed circumstances which justified a modification of the child support order.

¶ 8 On October 1, 1997, following a hearing, the District Court denied Camille's motion to modify the child support order. The District Court concluded that because nothing in the record explained how the parties calculated the amount of child support agreed upon, the only way to determine if substantially changed circumstances exist would be to calculate, using the child support guidelines, the difference between the current child support and the amount that would be due based on the guidelines and Russell's current income. Because the difference was $242 per month, the District Court concluded that there was not a sufficient change in circumstance to support modification.

¶ 9 On February 18, 1998, CSED filed with the District Court its Notice of Registration for Modification of Support Order, regarding the Seuberts' child support order. On March 2, 1998, the District Court temporarily ordered CSED to cease and desist from modifying the District Court's child support order, and further ordered CSED to appear and show cause why it should not be permanently ordered to cease and desist from reviewing and modifying any district court child support order. On March 17, 1998, CSED filed a motion to dismiss the District Court's orders to show cause and to cease and desist for failure of the District Court to have personal jurisdiction over CSED. On March 25, 1998, the District Court caused the order to show cause and to cease and desist to be personally served upon the Attorney General and the Administrator of CSED. The District Court held a hearing to consider its order to show cause and to cease and desist at which CSED appeared and argued while still reserving its challenge to the District Court's personal jurisdiction.

¶ 10 On May 1, 1998, the District Court entered its final Order enjoining CSED from modifying any child support orders issued by a Montana district court. The District Court concluded that CSED's action of modifying a district court's child support order "is a usurpation of the authority vested in Montana district courts and the Montana Supreme Court, and therefore, constitutes a violation of Article III, Section 1, Separation of Powers, 1972 Montana Constitution."

¶ 11 On May 29, 1998, CSED filed its notice of appeal. On June 3, 1998, the District Court ordered the execution of its final order stayed for 30 days, pursuant to Rule 7(a) of the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure. On June 23, 1998, we ordered the District Court's order and injunction stayed pending appeal and further order of this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12 Our standard of review of a trial court's conclusions of law is whether the lower court's interpretation of the law is correct. Francetich v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund (1992), 252 Mont. 215, 218, 827 P.2d 1279, 1281. When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we begin with the presumption that the statute is constitutional, and the party attacking it has the burden of proving it unconstitutional. Francetich, 252 Mont. at 218-19, 827 P.2d at 1282.

DISCUSSION

ISSUE 1

¶ 13 Does this case present a justiciable controversy?

¶ 14 CSED contends that this case does not present a justiciable controversy within the meaning of Article VII, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution and therefore the District Court was without subject matter jurisdiction to decide this issue. CSED asserts that there is no justiciable controversy in this case, primarily because neither Russell nor Camille have challenged the constitutionality of the statutes in question. Additionally, CSED argues that "the determination of the constitutional question is not necessary to protect the rights of an actual claimant."

¶ 15 The District Court contends that a justiciable controversy was created when CSED filed with the District Court its Notice of Registration advising the District Court of the possibility it would modify the District Court's order. The District Court argues that because the relevant statutory scheme gave CSED the authority to modify the District Court's child support order, and because the District Court retained continuing equitable jurisdiction over this matter, a case in controversy was created and the District Court had inherent authority to react sua sponte.

¶ 16 Article VII, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution provides, in relevant part:

The district court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to felony and all civil matters and cases at law and in equity.

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 17 The constitutional provision in Article VII, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution which extends original jurisdiction of a district court to "cases at law and in equity," has been interpreted as embodying the same limitations as those imposed on federal courts by the Article 3, "case or controversy" provision of the United States Constitution. See Olson v. Department of Revenue (1986), 223 Mont. 464, 470, 726 P.2d 1162, 1166

.

¶ 18 In Chovanak v. Matthews (1948), 120 Mont. 520, 525-26, 188 P.2d 582, 584-85, we stated:

By "cases" and "controversies" within the judicial power to determine, is meant real controversies and not abstract differences of opinion or moot questions. Neither [the] federal nor [our] state Constitution has granted such power.

The United States Supreme Court has in many cases held that a "controversy," in the constitutional sense, must be "one that is appropriate for judicial determination", be definite and concrete, touching legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, and a real and substantial controversy, admitting of specific relief through decree of conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts, or upon an abstract proposition.

(Citations omitted.)

¶ 19 In Marbut v. Secretary of State (1988), 231 Mont. 131, 135, 752 P.2d 148, 150, we further defined the boundaries of a justiciable controversy:

The courts have no jurisdiction to determine matters purely speculative, enter anticipatory judgments, declare social status, deal with theoretical problems, give advisory opinions, answer moot questions, adjudicate academic

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