Sevegny v. Coyne-Fague

• Decision Date: 21 December 2021
• Docket Number: C. A. 21-471-JJM-PAS
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
• Parties: BRYAN SEVEGNY, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA COYNE-FAGUE, Defendant.

BRYAN SEVEGNY, Plaintiff,
v.
PATRICIA COYNE-FAGUE, Defendant.

C. A. No. 21-471-JJM-PAS

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

December 21, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se^[1] prisoner Bryan Sevegny has filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Patricia Coyne-Fague, the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (“RIDOC”), in her individual and official capacities. In the pleading, Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to brutally murder a correctional officer and then spit on and threatened to “slice” another. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15-21. The focus of Plaintiff's complaint is on the discipline that RIDOC imposed as a result of this conduct - 365 days in solitary confinement for each of two bookings. Id. at ¶ 33. He alleges that these sanctions were imposed pursuant to procedures that do not conform to the Morris Rules referenced in Paiva v. Rhode Island Dep't of Corr., 498 F.Supp.3d 277, 287 (D.R.I. 2020); that these sanctions contravene holdings of the Rhode Island Superior Court that his mental health precludes him from being placed in extended solitary confinement; and that these sanctions violate his rights pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 34-38. For remedies, the complaint seeks the recovery of litigation costs and injunctive relief; specifically, Plaintiff asks the Court to order

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that RIDOC must conform to the Morris Rules and expunge from his disciplinary record the two bookings resulting from his conduct. Id. at ¶¶ 69-70.

Plaintiff accompanied his complaint with a request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 2. He subsequently filed a copy of his prisoner trust fund account statement, which is required by 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(2). ECF No. 3. Plaintiff's IFP request has been referred to me; based on this referral, I am also required to screen his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), 1915A.

Legal Standard

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A is identical to the standard used when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Diaz v. Rhode Island, C.A. No. 21-208-JJM, 2021 WL 2000478, at *1 (D.R.I. May 19, 2021). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “In making this determination, the Court must accept a plaintiff[']s well-pled factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to him.” Diaz, 2021 WL 2000478, at *1. “Section 1983 creates a remedy for violation of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law.” Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To maintain a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that he has a plausible entitlement to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “Section 1983 requires three elements for liability: deprivation of a right, a causal connection between the actor and the deprivation, and state action.” Sanchez, 590 F.3d at 41 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

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Analysis

Most of Plaintiff's pleading is focused on RIDOC's failure to comply with the Morris Rules in imposing discipline on him in August 2021. Plaintiff's claim based on the Morris Rules fails to state a viable claim for relief. As this Court held when Plaintiff made a similar claim in 2019, the Morris Rules cannot be enforced by an individual action “because inmates may not bring individual section 1983 actions for injunctive or declaratory relief which are based on consent decree violations.” Sevegny v. Coyne-Fague, 19-cv-498-MSM (Text Order of Sept. 11, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, although the Morris Rules were recently reinvigorated in Paiva, 498 F.Supp.3d at 287, that order was immediately stayed. Morris v. Travisano, 69-cv-4192-JJM, Stay Order of Feb. 7, 2020 (ECF No. 4). The stay of the Morris Rules remains in full force and effect. See Id. (Text Order of Sept. 3, 2020). And finally, “‘the First Circuit found no state created liberty interest in the Morris Rules and therefore no right to enforce them in a damages action under federal law.'” Tefft v. Coyne-Fague, C.A. No. 21-124-JJM, 2021 WL 5824331, at *2 (D.R.I. Dec. 8, 2021) (quoting Paiva, 498 F.Supp.3d at 282 n.9). As such, Plaintiff's complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to his allegations under the Morris Rules. See Tefft, 2021 WL 5824331, at *2.

Plaintiff's secondary claim is so vaguely pled that the Court is unable to ascertain whether it is intended to be asserted as a separate cause of action. In ¶¶ 37, 38 and 40 of his complaint, Plaintiff alludes to unspecified rulings of the “STATE'S SUPERIOR COURT, ” which he claims are known to Defendant in her official capacity, and which hold that he may not be held in long-term solitary confinement due to his mental illness. However, the complaint contains nothing from which this Court can ascertain whether Plaintiff alleges that these rulings give rise to a separate cause of action or whether Plaintiff included these references to support

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his claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. To the extent that these are intended as state law claims based on Defendant's defiance of state court orders, Plaintiff's pleading is subject to dismissal because it fails plausibly to articulate such claims. However, because it is possible that a pleading with more factual information might be viable, my recommendation is that he be afforded an opportunity to replead so that he can more clearly state what he intends to claim, if anything, based on these state court decisions.

Plaintiff's final set of claims are based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He alleges that the imposition of a total of more than seven hundred days of solitary confinement for two nearly contemporaneous incidents on an individual with mental illness, has resulted and will continue to result in his being held in isolation...