Seven-Up Company v. Bubble Up Corporation, Patent Appeal No. 6881.
Decision Date | 20 March 1963 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 6881. |
Citation | 50 CCPA 1012,312 F.2d 472 |
Parties | The SEVEN-UP COMPANY, Appellant, v. BUBBLE UP CORPORATION, by Change of Name from O-So Grape Co., Assignee of Leroy O. Schneeberger and the Sweet Valley Products Co., Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Lewis S. Garner, Helen W. Nies, Washington, D. C., Woodson, Pattishall & Garner, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
Charles F. Meroni, Carlton Hill, Hill, Sherman, Meroni, Gross & Simpson, Chicago, Ill. (Miller, Westervelt & Johnson, Peoria, Ill., of counsel), for appellee.
Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges.
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, applying res judicata, granted respondent's (appellee's) renewed motion to dismiss the petition brought by appellant under Section 14 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. § 1064) to cancel respondent's principal register registrations Nos. 141,244 and 354,840 for the trademark BUBBLE UP, owned by it as successor to the O-So-Grape Company. Petitioner-appellant, The Seven-Up Company, is the owner of a number of registered trademarks for SEVEN-UP and also 7 UP. The marks of the respective parties are used on soft drink beverages.
The Petition for Cancellation avers certain facts and concludes with a prayer for relief which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the said Registrations Nos. 141,244 and 354,840 be cancelled under Sec. 18 of the Trademark Act of 1946 on the grounds set forth above, for the reason that the date of first continuous use alleged in the registrations is false and misleading, and is used by the registrant to deceive and mislead, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1120 ( ) and the said material error in the said registrations has been, is, and will be damaging to petitioner."
The Petition for Cancellation was filed March 17, 1959, three days prior to the filing of a Bill of Complaint by petitioner-appellant as plaintiff against respondent-appellee as defendant in the District Court, S. D. Illinois, N. Div. Since the appealed decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board is based on a holding of res judicata predicated upon the decision in this later filed suit, it is necessary to here review this action in some detail.
The complaint in the Illinois action seeks a recovery for Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition and Trademark Dilution, and prays for specific relief on each of these causes of action. In addition, the complaint prays:
"That plaintiff have such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable."
The complaint, insofar as it is pertinent to the issues raised in the present cancellation proceedings, contains the following averments:
The answer filed by appellee denied the foregoing allegations of the complaint and as an affirmative defense, averred that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief by reason of laches. One averment which is of interest in the present proceeding is as follows:
A motion was made by appellee (defendant) for a separate trial under Rule 42(b), F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C., on its pleaded affirmative relief based on laches. The court heard oral argument and granted the motion. (D.C., 177 F.Supp. 91). Appellant (Plaintiff), Seven-Up, under Rule 68, F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C., offered judgment on the separate issue of laches, which offer was accepted by Appellee, Bubble Up. The district court then granted Bubble Up's motion to dismiss the complaint but denied Bubble Up's request for an injunction against further prosecution based upon the two marks involved.
Seven-Up appealed from the order dismissing its complaint and Bubble Up appealed from the denial of its request for injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint and also its denial of Bubble Up's request for injunctive relief (283 F.2d 103).
The essential facts which emerge from this somewhat involved situation are that while two additional parties defendant were named in the Illinois action, the two parties who are here involved were involved in the prior action and are bound by it. The prior action involved several issues which are not here before us. The question here is whether the issue of cancellation of Bubble Up's trademark registrations was in issue in the prior action.
It is...
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