Sevin v. Parish of Jefferson, Civil Action No. 08-802.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Louisiana)
Citation632 F.Supp.2d 586
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 08-802.
PartiesBarry SEVIN, et al. v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON, et al.
Decision Date16 December 2008

Joseph R. McMahon, III, Anthony Scott Maska, Joseph R. McMahon, III, PLC, Metairie, LA, for Barry Sevin.

Guice Anthony Giambrone, III, Craig R. Watson, Blue Williams, LLP, Metairie, LA, Stephen M. Pizzo, Blue Williams, LLP (Mandeville), Mandeville, LA, for Parish Of Jefferson, et al.

Douglas R. Holmes, Douglas L. Grundmeyer, George Wogan Bernard, Walter

Francis Becker, Jr., Chaffe McCall LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.

ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH S. VANCE, District Judge.

Before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and, in the alternative, motions for summary judgment. (R. Docs. 16, 20.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motions in part and DENIES them in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In June of 2007, Jefferson Parish enacted Chapter 36, Article XI of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances, known as the Automated Traffic Signal Enforcement ("ATSE") ordinance. The ATSE authorizes the installation of camera systems at traffic intersections and the assessment of fines to individuals whose vehicles are photographed driving through a steady red signal. (See R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 4, 6.) Plaintiffs Barry Sevin and Edwin Bernard were allegedly photographed by an ATSE-authorized camera system and were issued a notice of violation for running a red light in Jefferson Parish. On January 31, 2008, they filed an action against Jefferson Parish, the Jefferson Parish Council, and the private operator of the cameras, Redflex Traffic Systems, alleging deprivations of their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.)

According to the complaint, the defendants began enforcing the ATSE in October of 2007. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Redflex installed the red light traffic cameras in parts of Jefferson Parish and is also responsible for administering "civil" tickets on behalf of the Parish. (Id. at ¶ 5.) After a vehicle is photographed violating a red light traffic signal, defendants send a Photo Red Light Enforcement Program Notice of Violation ("Notice of Violation") to the owner of the photographed vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 7.) After receiving a notice of violation, an owner has thirty days either to pay the fine or to contest the fine. If the vehicle owner does neither, she or he will be assessed an additional $25.00 late payment penalty. If the owner still does not respond, the violations will be sent to the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office for review. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of automobile owners who received notices of violation pursuant to the ATSE ordinance. The complaint has been amended three times since it was originally filed (see R. Docs. 3, 24, 35), but the present motions to dismiss were filed before the second and third amendments and do not address the later-added parties and claims. The Court will therefore focus on the parties and claims in the original and first amended complaints.1 The plaintiffs have pleaded a broad-ranging case under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their civil rights under color of state law. They seek federal relief under section 1983 for alleged violations of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution and for alleged violations of the Louisiana state constitution and statutes. (See R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 13-15; R. Doc. 3 at ¶¶ 4-10.)

On March 31, 2008, defendants filed two motions to dismiss the claims brought by plaintiffs Barry Sevin and Edwin Bernard who were the only plaintiffs in the putative class action at the time the motion was filed.2 Defendants contend that Mr. Sevin is collaterally estopped from bringing suit and that Mr. Bernard lacks standing to sue the defendants. The defendants have also urged the court to abstain from hearing the case on federalism grounds and to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims. The Court addresses these arguments as follows.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

Defendants seek dismissal of the instant action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), or alternatively Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal if the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim. Motions submitted under Rule 12(b)(1) allow a party to challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction based upon the allegations on the face of the complaint. Lopez v. City of Dallas, Tex., 2006 WL 1450520, *2 (N.D.Tex.2006). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court may rely on (1) the complaint alone, presuming the allegations to be true, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts and by the court's resolution of disputed facts. Id.; see also Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1996). Furthermore, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981). When examining a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction that does not implicate the merits of plaintiff's cause of action, the district court has substantial authority "to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir.1997); see also Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir.1986). Accordingly, the Court may consider matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits. See Garcia, 104 F.3d at 1261. A court's dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits, and the dismissal does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing the claim in another forum. See Hitt, 561 F.2d at 608.

B. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

In considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir.1996). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007) (recognizing a change in the standard of review). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants challenge the plaintiffs' claims on several grounds. First, they ask the Court to abstain from hearing the case on federalism grounds. Second, they urge the Court not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims. Third, they argue that individuals like Mr. Sevin who have paid the traffic fines have admitted their liability and are collaterally estopped from challenging that determination in a later proceeding. Finally, they argue that individuals like Mr. Bernard, who have neither paid a fine nor challenged their citation at a hearing, lack standing to attack the constitutionality of the procedures.

A. Pullman Abstention

The defendants first argue that the Court should abstain from hearing this case pursuant to the doctrine announced in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). (See R. Doc. 47 at 5.) Under Pullman, a district court may abstain from hearing a case "when state law is uncertain and a state court's clarification of state law might make a federal court's constitutional ruling unnecessary." Gomez v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir.2005) (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 763 (4th ed.2003)). Although federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given them," Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), they may "decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise exceptional circumstances, where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest," Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). For Pullman abstention, that countervailing interest is rooted in federalism: "federal courts, exercising a wise discretion, restrain their authority because of scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary." Pullman Co., 312 U.S. at 500, 61 S.Ct. 643 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (noting that Pullman abstention is "[d]esigned to avoid federal-court error in deciding state-law questions antecedent to federal constitutional issues").

In order for Pullman abstention to be appropriate, the case must present:

(1) a federal constitutional challenge to state action and

(2) an unclear issue of state law that, if resolved, would make it unnecessary for [the court] to rule on the federal constitutional question.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, 283 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir.2002). If these requirements are met, the court must then "assess the totality of the circumstances presented by a particular case, considering the rights at stake and the costs of delay pending state court adjudication." Baran v. Port of Beaumont Nav. Dist. of Jefferson County...

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