Sevin v. Parish of Jefferson

• Decision Date: 14 May 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 08-802.
• Citation: 621 F.Supp.2d 372
• Parties: Barry SEVIN, et al. v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

621 F.Supp.2d 372

Barry SEVIN, et al. v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON, et al.

Civil Action No.: 08-802.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

May 14, 2009.

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Joseph R. McMahon, III, Anthony Scott Maska, Joseph R. McMahon, III, PLC, Metairie, LA, for Plaintiffs.

Guice Anthony Giambrone, III, Craig R. Watson, Blue Williams, LLP, Metairie, LA, Stephen M. Pizzo, Blue Williams, LLP, Mandeville, LA, Douglas R. Holmes, Douglas L. Grundmeyer, George Wogan Bernard, Walter Francis Becker, Jr., Chaffe McCall LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants.

ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH S. VANCE, District Judge.

Before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, motions for summary judgment. R. Doc. 90, 96. Also before the Court is plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. R. Doc. 101. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendants' motions and DENIES the plaintiffs' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 20, 2007, the Jefferson Parish Council enacted Ordinance Number 23083, known as the Automated Traffic Signal Enforcement Ordinance (ATSE). The ATSE authorizes the installation of camera systems at traffic intersections and the assessment of fines to the owners of vehicles that are photographed passing through a steady red signal. The plaintiffs in this case were allegedly photographed by an ATSE-authorized camera system and were issued a notice of violation for running a red light in Jefferson Parish. On January 31, 2008, they filed an action against Jefferson Parish, the Jefferson Parish Council, and the private operator of the cameras, Redflex Traffic Systems, alleging deprivations of their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

According to the complaint, the defendants began enforcing the ATSE in October of 2007. The ATSE sets forth certain procedures that must be followed when an authorized camera gathers evidence of a traffic violation. When a vehicle is photographed violating a red traffic signal, the owner of the camera equipment (Redflex) must send a Notice of Violation to the owner of the vehicle. JEFFERSON PARISH CODE OF ORDINANCES § 36-311. The owner then has thirty days within which to pay a fine or to contest the fine. Id. § 36-308. The authorized fine cannot exceed $175 per violation, and the imposition of liability does not result in notification of the Louisiana Department of Motor Vehicles or the vehicle owner's insurance company. Id. § 36-309, -313.

If the vehicle owner does not pay or contest the fine within thirty days, he will be assessed an additional $25 late payment penalty. Id. § 36-308. If the owner does not respond after receiving a second notification, the violation will be sent to the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office "to be handled in a manner consistent with that of a parking violation." Id. The ATSE provides that there "shall be a rebuttable presumption that the that the person [in] whose name the vehicle is registered was the operator of the vehicle at the time the alleged violation was committed." Id. If the vehicle owner alleges that he was not operating the vehicle at the time of the violation, he "has the responsibility through sworn statement to prove that someone else ... was driving the vehicle at the time the violation occurred." Id. § 36-310. Finally, the ATSE provides that the camera equipment owner may submit an affidavit containing certain information relating to the circumstances of the violation for consideration in a court proceeding. Id. § 36-312. Such an affidavit "is prima facie evidence of the alleged violation." Id.

Plaintiffs have pleaded a broad-ranging case under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They allege that aspects of the ATSE violate the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution. The named plaintiffs seek to represent a class of automobile owners who received notices of violation under the ATSE. They putative class members fall into four groups: (1) individuals who received a notice of violation and paid the fine; (2) individuals who received a notice of violation and requested a hearing to contest their liability, but who have not yet attended the hearing; (3) individuals who received a notice of violation and have neither paid a fine nor contested their liability; and (4) individuals who contested their liability and were found liable.

The Court previously ruled on the defendants' motions to dismiss and found that the plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims and that the individuals who voluntarily paid the fines are not collaterally estopped from contesting their liability. See R. Doc. 68. Defendants have now filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, motions for summary judgment. R. Docs. 90, 96. These motions challenge the merits of plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The plaintiffs have filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. R. Doc. 101. The Court addresses the parties' arguments as follows.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Because the parties' motions present matters outside the pleadings, the Court will treat them as motions for summary judgment. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(d). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir.1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994).

III. STATE LAW CLAIMS

The Court turns first to the plaintiffs' state law claims. The plaintiffs originally sought to assert several independent state law claims under the Court's supplemental jurisdiction. The Court dismissed those claims on December 16, 2008, 2008 WL 5273718, finding that "the interests of comity and judicial economy are better served if all of the plaintiffs' state law claims are heard in state court." R. Doc. 68 at 14. As the Court noted at that time, however, the plaintiffs also pleaded a number of "state law" claims as violations of section 1983. See, e.g., Second Amended Compl., R. Doc. 24 at ¶ 26 (alleging that the ATSE conflicts with articles 1232 and 1234 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure "in a manner that violates plaintiffs' civil and constitutional rights, as enforced by the defendants while acting under color of state law, in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983"). The Court suggested that those claims "appear[ed] to be facially defective," R. Doc. 68 at 10, but it did not dismiss them at the time because the issue had not been squarely presented.

The defendants have now asked the Court to dismiss the state law-based section 1983 claims on the ground that section 1983 does not provide a remedy for deprivations of state-created rights. The plaintiffs do not appear to dispute the defendants' legal conclusion. See R. Doc. 94-1 (recognizing that "[a] state's violation of its own laws does not automatically give rise to a [section] 1983 claim"). Indeed, it is well-settled that "a violation of a state statute alone is not cognizable under [section] 1983 because [section] 1983 is only a remedy for violations of federal statutory and constitutional rights." Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 353 (5th Cir.2005); see also Rector v. City and County of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 947 (10th Cir.2003) ("It is well-established ... that a state's violation of its own laws does not create a claim under § 1983."). The purpose of section 1983 is to guarantee federal rights, not to give parties a right to air their state-law grievances in federal court. The defendants' motions for summary judgment must therefore be granted as to the plaintiffs' state law-based section 1983 claims. Second Amended Compl., R. Doc. 24 at ¶¶ 20-29.

In apparent recognition of the infirmity of their state law-based section 1983 claims, the plaintiffs have used their summary judgment briefs as an opportunity to recast five of those claims as allegations that the defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mem. in Opp. to Parish's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. Doc. 94 at 6-16 (arguing that enforcement of the ATSE violates the Due Process Clause because, inter alia, the ordinance authorizes service of the Notice of Violation in a manner that allegedly conflicts with the service provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure). Plaintiffs have not filed a motion to amend their complaint to reflect this new theory. In any case, their due process arguments fail as well, for reasons described below. See infra.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS—THRESHOLD ISSUES

A. Criminal Penalty versus Civil Violation

The parties...