Seward v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.
Decision Date | 03 April 1913 |
Citation | 131 P. 980,17 N.M. 557 |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Parties | SEWARD ET AL.v.DENVER & R. G. R. CO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
The legislative branch of the government has the right to regulate rates and compel the performance of other duties on the part of the public service corporations; but such rates so established, or requirements made, must be reasonable, both to the carrier or public service corporation and to the public.
While the fixing of rates, or the determination of the facilities to be afforded, in the first instance, is a legislative question, the determination of the reasonableness and lawfulness of the rate or other requirement is a judicial function.
Sections 7 and 8 of article 11 of the state Constitution construed.
(a) Held: That said sections provide for a review by the Supreme Court of the reasonableness and lawfulness of an order made by the State Corporation Commission, upon the evidence adduced before the Commission; that such sections do not deny due process because on such review additional evidence is not allowed, and because the court must act on the evidence already taken; the court not being bound by the findings of the Commission, and the party affected having the right, on the original hearing, to introduce evidence as to all material points.
(b) Held, further, that where the cause is removed to the Supreme Court by the Commission, upon failure to comply with the order, within the time limited, by the public service corporation, additional evidence cannot be introduced.
(c) Where, however, the cause is removed by one of the parties, and a showing is made that new evidence has been discovered, which the party by the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have presented at the original hearing, the cause may be remanded to the Commission for the taking of such further evidence.
(d) Where the cause is removed to the Supreme Court by one of the parties within the time limited, the court may, of its own motion, remand the same to the Commission for the taking of further evidence.
(e) The Supreme Court, under the constitutional provisions, upon the evidence, determines the reasonableness and lawfulness of the order made by the Commission; if it finds such order to be reasonable and lawful it enforces it; if, on the other hand, it finds such order to be unreasonable or unlawful, it refuses to enforce the same.
(f) The direction in section 7 that the Supreme Court shall “decide such cases on their merits” means that the court shall decide such cases on a consideration of their substance and the legal right involved in opposition to a decision based upon mere defects of procedure or the technicalities thereof; that the court shall do justice irrespective of informal, technical, or dilatory objections.
(g) The court decides, upon the merits, the question of the reasonableness and lawfulness of the order made by the Commission, and whether the defendant shall be compelled to comply therewith.
(h) The defendant in such cases, under the Constitution, is not entitled to a trial by jury, and a denial of such right does not violate either the federal or state Constitution.
(i) The railroad company, by its general appearance before the Commission, without objection, waived all irregularities preceding such hearing (citing 5 Words and Phrases, 4493 et seq.).
While it is proper for the Commission to make findings of fact, such findings have no force or effect in the Supreme Court, as this court is required to pass upon the merits of the case, without indulging in any presumptions, and the court forms its own independent judgment, as to each requirement of the order, upon the evidence.
Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a duty calling for the exercise of judgment and discretion on the part of the person at whose hands the performance is required; therefore the order made by the Commission should be definite and certain.
Under the Constitution the Commission is authorized “to require railway companies to maintain adequate depots, stock pens, station buildings, agents and facilities for the accommodation of passengers and for receiving and delivering freight and express,” and such as may be reasonable and just. Held that, in determining what are “adequate facilities,” the court must take into consideration the volume of business, the revenue derived by the railroad therefrom, the number of people to be accommodated, the present facilities, and all the facts and circumstances, considering on the one hand the rights of the stockholders of the railroad, and on the other the rights of the public.
A railroad company is chartered for the purpose of transporting freight and passengers, and so long as it continues to exercise its rights, under such charter, and does not elect to surrender up its franchise, the performance of the duty for which it was called into existence and given its being may be enforced, even though such performance may entail a pecuniary loss.
While it is the absolute duty of a railroad company to transport freight and passengers, it is not its prime duty to provide depots, waiting rooms, station agents, telephone and telegraph facilities.
When a railroad company is called upon to perform an absolute duty, the question of expense is not to be considered; but when the duty sought to be enforced is only an incident to the main duty, the question of expense is to be taken into consideration in connection with the public necessities.
The Constitution does not confer upon the Corporation Commission the right to arbitrarily establish a station or to require a station agent, regardless of the expense entailed upon the company, or the benefit to be derived by the public.
The facilities afforded at any station to the general public must, in a measure, be commensurate with the patronage and receipts from that portion of the public to whom the service is rendered.
It is not reasonable to require the installation of telegraph service for the purpose of bulletining trains, where the cost of such service is out of proportion to the revenue derived from that portion of the traveling public benefited thereby.
Petition by Edwin B. Seward and others against the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company. Defendant neglected to comply with an order of the Corporation Commission, and the Commission removes the cause to the Supreme Court. Remanded to the Corporation Commission.
While it is the absolute duty of a railroad company to transport freight and passengers, it is not its prime duty to provide waiting rooms, station agents, and telegraph and telephone facilities.
On the 7th day of May, 1912, certain residents of Tres Piedras, a small town in Taos county, N. M., about one-half mile distant from a station on the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad, bearing the same name, petitioned the Railroad Commission to require said railroad company “to maintain adequate station facilities for the accommodation of passengers and for receiving and delivering freight and express at its station of Tres Piedras,” and further asked that said railroad company be required to maintain an agent at said station through whom the patrons of said railroad “may transact business with such railway company.”
Upon the filing of said petition or complaint, the Commission had more or less correspondence with the officials of such railroad company in an endeavor to secure the facilities requested “by mediation,” as required by section 2 of chapter 78, S. L. 1912; but failing to come to an agreement therefor, on July 30, 1912, a notice of hearing was served upon the railroad company, together with a copy of the order of the Commission requiring such hearing, which order was as follows:
Upon the date fixed, the cause was heard, upon the evidence of Edwin B. Seward, for the complainants, and W. D. Shea, for the railroad company. From the evidence adduced it appears that Tres Piedras was established as a station on the Denver & Rio Grande Railway in 1880 and had been continuously maintained until December, 1910, with waiting room, freight room, and the usual station accommodations, including an agent, who was also a telegraph operator, and who, in conjunction with some arrangement by the railroad with the Western Union Telegraph Company, received and transmitted commercial messages. In December, 1910, the railroad company withdrew the agent from said station, and thereafter maintained no facilities for passengers at said place, but did stop its trains there and take on and let off passengers. Freight was received and delivered at said station, but, having no agent,...
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