Sewell v. Grand Lodge of Int. Ass'n of Mach. & Aero. Wkrs.

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: CLARK, Associate Justice, and GEWIN and RONEY, Circuit
• Citation: Sewell v. Grand Lodge of Int. Ass'n of Mach. & Aero. Wkrs., 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971)
• Decision Date: 07 July 1971
• Docket Number: No. 30537.,30537.
• Parties: William E. SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The GRAND LODGE OF the INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, Defendant-Appellee.

445 F.2d 545 (1971)

William E. SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The GRAND LODGE OF the INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 30537.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 7, 1971.

William G. McRae, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

J. R. Goldthwaite, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., Plato E. Papps, Bernard Dunau, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellee.

Before CLARK, Associate Justice,^* and GEWIN and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal illustrates the recurring problem of accommodating two conflicting policies: the policy that the courts should abstain from interfering with the internal management of labor unions and the policy that the courts should protect fundamental rights of individual labor union members which Congress has denominated collectively as the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations", under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1959).¹

In this action against the Grand Lodge of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Union) appellant Sewell, who was employed as a Grand Lodge Representative of the defendant Union, alleges that he was wrongfully discharged from his office by the president of the Union. He asserts that he was discharged because he exercised the rights of free speech and assembly and guaranteed to him by the Act in sections 101(a) (1) and (2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1) and (2),² and enforced through section 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 which makes it unlawful to discipline a member for the exercise of these statutory rights. He seeks (a) reinstatement of his employment as Grand Lodge Representative, (b) compensatory damages for losses sustained, (c) exemplary damages, and (d) other appropriate relief. The Union answered by filing a motion to dismiss contending, first, that the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and second, that the complaint was barred by the applicable Alabama statute of limitations of one year.³ The district court granted the Union's motion to dismiss, concluding that Sewell's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.⁴ We affirm the result reached, albeit for reasons not identical with those assigned by the district court.

The basic facts underlying the allegations of the complaint have been subject to lengthy inquiry and extensive review prior to this appeal. Concerning these facts no dispute appears to exist since they are discussed without contradiction by the parties; moreover, these facts as argued correspond essentially with the facts found by this court in the companion case, Nix v. N. L. R. B.⁵ It appears to be undisputed that Sewell was employed by the Union for more than fifteen years in various capacities.⁶ At all times he has been a member of the union in good standing. During the particular time involved in this litigation, from 1966 until January 6, 1967, Sewell was employed by the Union in the position of Grand Lodge Representative. In this capacity it was his responsibility to perform the usual functions of the union in the field; he organized and serviced problems of the local unions, handled their grievances, and negotiated their contracts. Beyond these duties it was Sewell's primary responsibility to promote and execute the policies of the Union's Executive Council and its International President, P. L. Siemiller.

On December 22, 1966, Sewell received a letter from President Siemiller which made reference to reports that he (Sewell) was actively opposing a proposal of the executive council of the Union.⁷ Since a referendum on the proposal in question was to be held in January 1967, President Siemiller in his letter requested Sewell "to report to this office if you have been advising local lodges to vote against the proposition in January; and if you have been opposing the Referendum, give the reasons for such position." Appellant responded to President Siemiller's letter that he had discussed the referendum with "many individuals in an opposing approach, not with local lodges." Following this response, on January 4, President Siemiller discharged Sewell for actively supporting the referendum and thereby refusing to carry out the decision of the Executive Council.⁸ Sewell's membership in the Union was not disturbed.⁹

Statute of Limitations

In view of the foregoing facts we consider first, the Union's contention that Sewell's claim is barred by the applicable Alabama statute of limitations.¹⁰ Initially, we note that the Act upon which the appellant relies does not contain a statute of limitations. In such circumstances federal courts must rely on the limitations period prescribed by the state in which the litigation arose; in this case, Alabama. The applicable period of limitation is that which Alabama would have enforced had an action seeking similar relief been brought in the Alabama state courts.¹¹ To resolve this question, we must first determine the "essential nature" of the claim under the federal law and then decide what statute of limitations the state courts of Alabama would hold applicable to this type or class of action.

The Union insists that Sewell's action is ex delicto, an action for injury to personal rights guaranteed by law, and, therefore, subject to the one year Alabama statute of limitations for tort actions.¹² Sewell, on the other hand, contends that his action is ex contractu and that the Alabama statute of limitations of six years should apply.¹³ In examining these contentions we must rely on Sewell's complaint¹⁴ and the undisputed facts, while adverting to the guide line of the Alabama Supreme Court in Adler v. Miller¹⁵ for testing whether a cause of action is ex contractu or ex delicto:

If the cause of action given expression in the complaint (1) arises from a breach of promise, the action is ex contractu, or (2) if that cause of action arise from a breach of duty * * * it is in form, ex delicto and case.¹⁶

Examining Sewell's complaint we note at the outset that no mention is made of a contract.¹⁷ He alleges membership in the Union and employment by it in various capacities from time to time over a period of fifteen years. However, none of the terms, conditions, or provisions of the employment arrangement are set forth¹⁸ and there does not appear to be any reliance on the terms of any particular contract. He does not allege whether the employment arrangements were oral or in writing; nor does he specify the period of employment, the specific duties to be performed, the authority of the employer, his own rights as an employee, or any other pertinent factors necessary to support an action based on contract.¹⁹ Additionally, from the facts set forth above in this opinion, which are without any material dispute, it is quite clear that the basis of Sewell's alleged grievance is the claimed denial of rights protected by federal law. In view of the undisputed facts and the allegations in Sewell's complaint, it is our conclusion that his claim is essentially in the nature of a tort for the alleged violation of rights claimed under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Accordingly, we conclude that his cause of action is governed and barred by the Alabama Statute of Limitations of one year.²⁰

Insubordination

Even if Sewell's complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations, we are of the opinion that he should be denied relief. We fully concur with his contention that each member of a labor union is guaranteed the right of free expression as well as the right to participate freely in the union's democratic processes. Disciplinary action for the exercise of such rights offends the terms of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Moreover, the rights of free expression, and assembly as well as other rights protected by the statute may be exercised fully and freely by any member of the union; the mere fact that a member is an appointed or elected official of the union does not destroy his statutory rights.²¹ This conclusion, however, does not permit an employee who accepts employment for the performance of certain specified duties to take the largesse and pay of the union, on the one hand, and, on the other, to completely subvert the purposes of his employment by engaging in activities diametrically opposed to the performance of his specified duties.²² As Judge Bell observed in Airline Maintenance Lodge 702, etc. v. Loudermilk:²³

The rights of a union member under this statute must be balanced against the right preserved to the union to make rules as to the responsibility of the member toward the union as an institution. And this balancing process must rest on the facts.

To permit an individual to accept union employment, to receive union pay, and to enjoy the prestige of a union position, while spending his employer's time opposing the plans and policies he was employed to execute, would in our judgment, be unreasonable. All employees, whether they work for a union or a large commercial company, may be required at times to subordinate personal expression to the responsibilities of their employment. An essential and elemental ingredient of all employment is basic loyalty by employees to the employer in performing the duties of the job for which they were hired.²⁴ If a conflict of interest arises between an individual's desire to oppose the plans and policies of his employer and the discharge of the duties of the position in which he is employed, fundamental considerations of fair play would require him to remove himself from such a position.²⁵

To hold that a union has no right to discharge an employee for insubordination under the facts of his case would, we believe, seriously detract from effective, cohesive union leadership. The result might well be weak, ineffective and fragmented unions which would be paralyzed in bargaining for the rights and welfare of union...