Sewell v. Lainson, 48242
| Decision Date | 10 March 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 48242,48242 |
| Citation | 57 N.W.2d 556,244 Iowa 555 |
| Parties | SEWELL v. LAINSON. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Prince & Guthrie, of Webster City, for petitioner-appellant.
Robert L. Larson, Atty. Gen., and Raphael R. R. Dvorak, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Everett G. Scott, County Attorney, West Union, for respondent-appellee.
On April 23, 1952, the petitioner-appellant, an inmate of the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison, filed his petition in habeas corpus against the respondent-appellee, the warden of the prison. A writ was issued, returnable on May 2, 1952. The cause was actually reached for trial on May 6 following. At the conclusion of the case the trial court rendered judgment annulling the writ and remanding the petitioner to the custody of the respondent. From this judgment we have the present appeal.
It appears from the record that the petitioner was arrested at Chariton, Iowa, on February 8, 1951, on a warrant from Fayette county. He was returned to the latter county, and on February 10, 1951, he entered a plea of guilty to a charge of obtaining money by false pretenses in the Fayette district court, and was sentenced to confinement in the State Penitentiary for an indeterminate period not exceeding seven years. He was delivered to the charge of the respondent as warden of the penitentiary on February 12, 1951. Petitioner assigns five errors as grounds for reversal. One and two, stated together for brevity and because they are closely related, assert that the court erred in finding petitioner was not under the influence of narcotic drugs at the time of his hearing and entry of plea of guilty, and in finding his condition at that time was not such as to entitle him to relief by habeas corpus. Three and four, likewise related and therefore combined here for statement and consideration, allege that the court was in error in sustaining objections to and in striking and excluding proffered evidence petitioner had been deprived of the services of counsel by threats and coercion immediately after his hearing, plea of guilty and sentence, and in holding that such denial of counsel did not result in depriving petitioner of due process of law, entitling him to relief by habeas corpus. The fifth error assigned is an omnibus or blanket assignment, stating the court was in error in finding on the whole record that petitioner was not deprived of due process of law, then setting up several varying details of evidence which pertain, so far as material at all, to assigned errors Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. We shall consider only the first four alleged errors.
I. The claim that the petitioner was under the influence of narcotics, specifically opium, was not made in the original petition for the writ. It seems to have been an afterthought, and arose during the examination of petitioner by his counsel upon the trial of the habeas corpus action. When objection was made by the county attorney of Fayette county, as counsel for respondent, that the matter sought to be inquired into was not within the issues, petitioner's attorney, Mr. Guthrie, then asked and was granted leave to amend. Petitioner then testified he had been an opium addict for twenty-five years; his normal dose was two and one-half grains, and he took two doses a day. 'If I did not get my usual dosage, I became ill and I requested Sheriff House to obtain morphine for my use while I was in the county jail at West Union.' He also said that on the morning of February 10, 1951, about thirty or forty minutes before the hearing at which he entered his plea of guilty, the sheriff came to his cell and gave him three and one-half grains of morphine, which the witness administered to himself by hypodermic injection. The sheriff testified he gave petitioner the morphine which he obtained by prescription, but he did not know the amount.
Petitioner's counsel then asked him whether, at the time he was brought before the court for his hearing, plea, and sentence, in his opinion, he was under the influence of the morphine. To this, objection that it was an improper opinion and was immaterial was made and sustained. The next question was: 'Is the dosage of morphine which you describe sufficient to cause an effect upon yourself?' Objection that the question called for an opinion and there was no foundation laid was made and sustained.
Later, upon examination of the sheriff upon the same subject, he was asked what apparent effect the drug had upon petitioner, and over objection that there was no proper foundation laid, was permitted to answer: 'Well, it helped him; that is what it did, I would say.'
Why the sheriff was permitted to give his idea as to petitioner's condition after taking the drug, while the petitioner himself was denied the right to express his own thought on the subject, it not clear. The user should have at least as clear an idea of the effect upon himself as a casual observer. We think there would have been error in the exclusion of the testimony of the petitioner on this point, except that no offer of proof was made. 3 Am.Jur. 97, § 354. So we have no idea as to what the excluded evidence might have shown. It might have supported petitioner's case, and it might have harmed it. We cannot predicate error upon a speculation as to the answer. Counsel urges, however, that it is well known opium is a poisonous drug, and we should take judicial notice of that fact. We also take judicial notice, however, that one who is an opium addict is nerve-wracked and ill when denied the drug, and approaches normalcy only when he has access to it. We said in State v. Salmer, 181 Iowa 280, 283, 164 N.W. 620, 621:
'It is a matter of common knowledge * * * that men under the influence of liquor do not possess the same cool judgment and discretion that men possess when not under its influence.' See, also, State v. Dahnke, Iowa, 57 N.W.2d 553.
If we are permitted to know what everyone else knows concerning liquor and its effects, we see no reason why we cannot likewise take notice of the reaction of drug addicts to the adsence or presence of their particular brand of self-destruction. It may well have been if the opium had not been furnished to petitioner he would have been before us, and with much more cause, complaining that his plea of guilty was entered when he was not mentally competent to realize what he was doing because of the nervous and other physical sufferings occasioned by deprival of his habitual narcotic.
This is not to say he might not be entitled to show, if he can, upon a retrial, that his condition was affected at the time of his plea. We hold only that because of the lack of any offer of proof he has failed to make any showing of error upon the matter of his condition as affected by the dosage of morphine. He says he requested the trial court to send him to a hospital instead of to the penitentiary, but fails to say he gave the court any reason for this request. The court's record shows no reason appeared why sentence should not be pronounced, and we presume the regularity of actions of officials and courts unless the contrary is made to appear. Burtch v. Zeuch, 200 Iowa 49, 55, 202 N.W. 542, 39 A.L.R. 1349. Moreover, the petitioner testifies he had agreed to plead guilty on the previous day, that he knew the charge and the penalty, and he does not claim there was any variation in the proceedings or penalty from what he had been advised would be incurred. His testimony as to what happened in the courtroom is reasonably clear, and does not indicate he was in any way affected by the drug. We find no error of the court under assignments Nos. 1 and 2.
II. Assigned errors Nos. 3 and 4 relate to matters occurring after the imposition of sentence. Since these are important to the proper determination of this cause, we set out the proceedings relating thereto before the Lee district court in some detail. The record shows this from the direct examination of petitioner:
'Mr. Scott: I object to this question for the reason that it is entirely irrelevant and incompetent as to whether or not the defendant had any conversation with anyone after he was convicted.
'The Court: Sustained.
'Mr. Guthrie: If the Court please, it is our attempt to show that the plaintiff desired counsel immediately subsequent to his hearing and that at that time there were material steps that could have been taken by such counsel on his behalf which might have assisted him in obtaining a fair hearing before the Court.
'By Mr. Guthrie:
'Mr. Scott: Same objection: The question is objected to for the reason that it calls for a matter which is irrelevant and immaterial to any issues in this case.
'The Court: Objection sustained.
'The Court: Sustained.
'Mr. Scott: --after the conviction is irrelevant and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Com. ex rel. Stevens v. Myers
...287 (1958) (habeas corpus); Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or. 283, 251 P.2d 87, 253 P.2d 289 (1952) (habeas corpus); Sewell v. Lainson, 244 Iowa 555, 57 N.W.2d 556 (1953) (habeas corpus); In re Horner, 19 Wash.2d 51, 141 P.2d 151 (1943) (habeas corpus). See also Hunt v. Warden, 335 F.2d 936 (4t......
-
State v. Mulqueen
...was confined to a judicially expanded concept of habeas corpus. See Ely v. Haugh, 172 N.W.2d 144, 146--148 (Iowa); Sewell v. Lainson, 244 Iowa 555, 567, 57 N.W.2d 556. See also The Code 1971, chapter 663; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465--466, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023--1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461; 3......
-
Adoption of Cheney, In re
...and we must presume it acted in accordance with law. Burtch v. Zeuch, 200 Iowa 49, 202 N.W. 542, 39 A.L.R. 1349; Sewell v. Lainson, Iowa, 57 N.W.2d 556, 559. The purpose of the statutes and of adoption proceedings generally have here been served. A home suited to the orphan child has been f......
-
State v. Hall, 52075
...Iowa ---, 134 N.W.2d 922, 926; Kramer v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 255 Iowa 633, 639, 123 N.W.2d 572, 575, and citations; Sewell v. Lainson, 244 Iowa 555, 559, 57 N.W.2d 556, 559; State v. Evenson, 237 Iowa 1214, 1218, 1219, 24 N.W.2d 762, 765; State v. Billberg, 229 Iowa 1208, 1218, 296 N.W. 39......