Sewell v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | 11 Civ. 4236 (ALC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
| Parties | RICHARD L. SEWELL, Plaintiff, v. LINCOLN LIFE & ANNUITY COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Defendant. |
Defendant Lincoln Life & Annuity Company ("Lincoln" or "Defendant") seeks summary judgment in its favor and against Richard Sewell ("Sewell" or "Plaintiff") to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint seeking reversal of the administrative decision to end his Total Disability payments he received from his employer's insurance policy. Defendant also alleges that the opposition and cross-motion should not even be considered because it was filed beyond the extended due date.1 For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 21) is denied and remanded for further administrative review. Plaintiff's cross-motion (Dkt. No. 32) is also denied.
On May 4, 2011, Sewell filed his complaint in New York Supreme Court (See Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 3-4). On June 22, 2011, Lincoln removed the case to this Court. (Dkt. No. 1). On December 8, 2011, Sewell filed an Amended Complaint alleging Lincoln's arbitrary and capricious review and denial of Sewell's long-term disability benefits. Lincoln filed its answer the following day.
On October 28, 2011, the Honorable Judge Laura Swain issued a pre-trial scheduling order, requiring, inter alia, that any dispositive motions be filed by June 29. 2012 (Dkt. No. 11). On June 29, 2012, Lincoln filed a motion for summary judgment. Sewell filed his "Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment" (Dkt. No. 32) and Memorandum of Law in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 35) on August 7.
Although not set forth in Sewell's Amended Complaint, this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, based on Sewell's claim pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Program (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. ).
As an initial procedural matter, in addition to substantive disagreements with Sewell's motion in opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment, Lincoln's reply brief (Dkt. No. 39) also argues that the cross-motion should not even be considered because it was filed beyond the extended due date. Sewell's cross-motion seeks a ruling that, if the Court finds that Lincoln's determination was arbitrary and capricious, re-review by Lincoln is unnecessary. Rather, the court should reverse the denial of benefits and determine the amount owing to Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 35, at 17).
On August 8, 2012, Magistrate Judge Fox granted Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time after time had already run on the other extension (Dkt. No. 36). Specifically, on July 13, 2012, following a telephone conference Judge Fox ordered plaintiff to "serve and file his response to the defendant's summary judgment motion" on or before August 3, 2012 (Dkt. No. 26). Plaintiff's counsel did not file an opposition on August 3. He did not request an extension until August 6, 2012 and did not file until August 7.2 Plaintiff counsel's affidavit does not state a basis for his motion to extend the time but given that it was filed after the date of the last extension expired, it should be reviewed as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) ()
None of the cases cited by Lincoln take into account the unique situation here, where the motion for extension of time was granted by a magistrate judge. Congress provided that a district court judge could designate a magistrate to "hear and determine" any pretrial matter pending before the court, except certain "dispositive" motions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). While a motion for summary judgment is dispositive, the underlying motion for extension of time to reply is not. Thus, it was proper for Magistrate Judge Fox to hear the motion.
On non-dispositive matters, the orders of magistrate judges are afforded "substantial deference." McAllan v. Von Essen, 517 F.Supp.2d 672, 678 (S.D.N.Y.2007). Indeed, when considering a magistrate judge's ruling on anon-dispositive matter, a district judge will modifyor set aside any portion of the magistrate's order found to be "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); U. S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2411 (1980); Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2010); Botta v. Barnhart, 475 F. Supp. 2d 174, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 72(a).
A finding is clearly erroneous if "the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Botta, 475 F.Supp. 2d at 185 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); United States v. Isiofla, 370 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 2004)). An order is contrary to law "when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure." Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entrn't Corp., 206 F.R.D. 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted).
To be sure, the Second Circuit sets a high bar for excusable neglect concluding that failure to follow the clear dictates of a court rule will generally not constitute such excusable neglect. See Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Canfleld v. Van Atta Buick/GMC Trucking 127 F.3d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1997)).
However, even in the wake of such decisions, courts still recognize that granting an extension under 6(b)(1) is a matter of discretion for the district court and a finding of excusable neglect is sometimes possible even where the movant is not entirely blameless. See, e.g., Hill v. Washburn, No. 08-CV-6285-CJS, 2013 WL 142706, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013) (); Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chemical Co., Ltd., 769 F. Supp. 2d 269, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) () (citing LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995)); Green ex rel. Estate of Green v. Advanced Cardiovascular Imaging, No. 07 Civ. 3141(JCF), 2009 WL 3154317, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) ()
On the one hand, the underestimation of time needed to fully brief an opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment as "grossly overly optimistic" is hardly convincing as an excusable reason for neglect. However, the motion also contends that each statement of material fact required an examination of complex medical records (Dkt. No. 29, Moskovitz Decl. ¶ 8) and that Defendant had omitted certain medical records that should be a part of the administrative record (Moskovitz Decl. ¶ 9), which then had to be isolate included as exhibits to plaintiff's motion (Moskovitz Decl. ¶ 10). Based on these rationalizations and given the "interest of justice" to hear "significant a motion" (Moskovitz Decl. ¶ 14), it was not clearly erroneous for Judge Fox to grant the extension to file an opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Nor was it contrary to law. Lincoln was not severely prejudiced by the delay. The delay of three days did not have any impact on their ability to file their reply memorandum. In fact, Lincoln requested and received additional time to reply: Lincoln had sixteen days to reply rather than the seven days it was given under the original order. There were no pending trial dates and the delay did not affect any pre-trial scheduling. Finally, it does not appear that Plaintiff or his counsel acted in bad faith in filing the opposition days after the extension expired. Thus, Judge Fox's decision to grant an extension to file the opposition motion to summary judgment should not be disturbed.
Given that Sewell's cross-motion does not add much in the way of substantive argument from his opposition, we will also consider it.
On March 26, 2006, Sewell started his employment at Lehr Construction Company ("Lehr") as a Project Executive. Lehr sponsored and maintained a program of employee benefits, including long-term disability insurance, for its employees ("Lehr plan"). (See Rule 56.1 Stmt ¶1).3 Effective January 1, 2007, Lehr purchased a contract of group long-term disability insurance from Jefferson Pilot LifeAmerica Insurance Company, No. 999919985314 ("Policy"), which later merged with Lincoln. (See Rule 56.1 Stmt ¶ 2).
Lehr delegated discretionary authority to Lincoln to determine whether claimants are eligible for LTD plan benefits, to interpret plan terms and to find necessary facts as part of the claim determination process. .
The Policy provides a Total Disability Monthly Benefit to Insured Employees who become Totally Disabled equal to 60% of their Basic Monthly Earnings minus other received...
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