Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd.

• Decision Date: 10 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-31086,18-31086
• Citation: 974 F.3d 577
• Parties: Jaylon SEWELL, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. MONROE CITY SCHOOL BOARD ; Brent Vidrine, Superintendent; Roosevelt Rankins, Dean; W R Berkley Corporation; Whitney Martin, Individually and as Former Principal of Neville High School, Incorrectly Named as Whitney Morton, Defendants—Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

974 F.3d 577

Jaylon SEWELL, Plaintiff—Appellant,

v.MONROE CITY SCHOOL BOARD ; Brent Vidrine, Superintendent; Roosevelt Rankins, Dean; W R Berkley Corporation; Whitney Martin, Individually and as Former Principal of Neville High School, Incorrectly Named as Whitney Morton, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 18-31086

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED September 10, 2020

Carol Denise Powell-Lexing, Law Office of Carol D. Powell-Lexing, Monroe, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Leo Douglas Lawrence, Attorney, Lawrence Law Firm, L.L.C., Monroe, LA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before Barksdale, Stewart, and Costa, Circuit Judges.

Gregg Costa, Circuit Judge:

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not meant to resolve disputed facts or test the merits of a lawsuit. It instead must show that, even in the plaintiff's best-case scenario, the complaint does not state a plausible case for relief. In this case, the district court dismissed a high school student's claims of discrimination. Mindful of our obligation to accept his complaint's factual allegations as true and assess whether those facts permit a reasonable inference that the school board is liable, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

Because this case is only at the pleading stage, the following comes from the plaintiff's allegations.

On the first day of school at Monroe's Neville High School, Dean of Students Roosevelt Rankins asked teachers to send students with dyed hair to his office. All the students sent to Rankins's office were African American males. One was Jaylon Sewell, who wore a "two toned" blonde hairstyle. Rankins and Principal Whitney Martin did not let Sewell attend class that day because of his hair.

Monroe City School Board's dress code prohibited "hair dyed outlandish colors." Still, many students of all races, male and female, wore dyed hair to school. Students sported blonde, purple, and red colors as well as fiery-colored hair tips. Some African American female students wore multicolored weaves in their hair. Nevertheless, Neville High did not discipline anyone other than Sewell for violating the hair policy during the 2016–17 school year.

On the second day of school, Sewell's mother, Bonnie Kirk, met first with Martin and then with superintendent Brent Vidrine. Kirk told both that she believed school administrators were discriminating against Sewell because he is an African American male.

When Sewell returned to school, Rankins "ridiculed" him "every other day" by calling him a "thug" and a "fool." At one point, Rankins asked Sewell if he "was gay with ‘that mess’ in his head." Rankins also discouraged other students from talking with Sewell.¹ Sewell became "depressed" and "sad."

In November, school officials suspended Sewell. Sewell alleges that Rankins "encouraged" a female student to "lie" and accuse him of sexual assault. Rankins told Sewell that he "wouldn't be getting in so much trouble if his hair were not that color." Martin soon recommended Sewell for expulsion. When Kirk spoke to Martin about her recommendation, Martin mentioned Sewell's hair too. School officials provided Kirk with documentation about the suspension and expulsion just two days before Sewell's expulsion hearing. Kirk filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights.

After the hearing, the board's expulsion committee voted not to expel Sewell. The committee's chair explained that it chose not to suspend Sewell because the timing of events was suspicious; school officials did not complete expulsion documentation until four days after the alleged assault and did not deliver the documentation to Kirk until ten days after that.

In the spring, media reports, including one in the New York Daily News , reported on what had happened to Sewell. The media attention led to school officials’ "ostracizing" and "ridicul[ing]" him "even more." Sewell was "distraught and traumatized."

Kirk filed this lawsuit in November 2017; Sewell has since turned 18 and has been substituted as the plaintiff. The amended complaint alleges claims under Title VI, Title IX, section 1983, section 1981, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), as well as claims under Louisiana law. It names as defendants the Monroe City School Board, Superintendent Vidrine, Dean Rankins, Principal Martin, and the school board's insurer. Attached and incorporated by reference is the Department of Education report detailing its investigation of Kirk's complaint. See Ferrer v. Chevron Corp. , 484 F.3d 776, 778 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a complaint can incorporate exhibits by reference) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) ).

The defendants responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court, adopting a recommendation of the magistrate judge, granted the motion on all claims.

II.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim concerns the "formal sufficiency of the statement of the claim for relief," not a lawsuit's merits. Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist. , 81 F.3d 1395, 1401 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds , 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997). So when reviewing such a motion, we assume that the facts the complaint alleges are true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The complaint survives if it "contain[s] sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Although this framework is one-sided, the issue "is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims." Doe , 81 F.3d at 1401. The other side will have its say later.

III.

While there were numerous claims before the district court, this appeal concerns just a few. Sewell does not appeal the dismissal of his FERPA and Louisiana state law claims. And although his briefs mention the claims under sections 1981 and 1983, the barebones page of his opening brief devoted to those claims is not enough to prosecute an appeal. United States v. Green , 964 F.2d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 1992). In addition, Sewell appeals the dismissal of his Title VI and IX claims only as to the Monroe City School Board. That makes sense as claims under those statutes may be brought only against the institution receiving federal funds, not employees of those institutions. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm. , 555 U.S. 246, 257, 129 S.Ct. 788, 172 L.Ed.2d 582 (2009).

Title VI and Title IX seek to stamp out discrimination in programs receiving federal funds and ensure that federal resources do not support discriminatory practices. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist. , 524 U.S. 274, 286, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998). Part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI prohibits race discrimination in all programs receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Enacted eight years later, Title IX was modeled after Title VI and bans sex discrimination in educational programs receiving federal funds. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). We interpret these kindred statutes in the same fashion. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi. , 441 U.S. 677, 696, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

Sewell brings claims under both statutes because he thinks school officials mistreated him not just because he is African American or male, but because he is both. The district court interpreted his complaint to raise three theories of liability: intentional discrimination, harassment or hostile environment discrimination, and retaliation. Because the school board does not contest that characterization of Sewell's claims, we follow the district court's lead.

A.

We start with intentional discrimination. This classic claim is the most straightforward: the school board, as a federal funding recipient, cannot intentionally treat students differently on the basis of race or sex. Sewell's claim is of the selective enforcement variety. See Plummer v. Univ. of Houston , 860 F.3d 767, 777 (5th Cir. 2017). He says he was punished for dying his hair while female students and students of other races were not.

A threshold issue stops his claim in its tracks—it was untimely. Title VI and Title IX are subject to state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions. King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist. , 803 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2015) ; Griffin v. Round Rock Indep. Sch. Dist. , 82 F.3d 414, 1996 WL 166999, at *1 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished per curiam). In Louisiana, the relevant prescription period is one year. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN . art. 3492 ; cf. Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll. , 850 F.3d 731, 739 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying the Louisiana law to section 1983 claim).

Sewell's mother filed suit on his behalf on November 8, 2017. So his action was timely for claims that accrued on or after November 8, 2016. A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury giving rise to the claim. King-White , 803 F.3d at 762. Sewell's complaint alleges three injuries: missing class on the first day of school, suffering verbal abuse from Rankins throughout the school year, and getting suspended. The second injury goes to his harassment claim. The third, he says, was retaliation for complaining about school officials’ discriminatory conduct. Only the first represents the kind of discrete adverse action characteristic of an intentional discrimination claim. Because that injury occurred on August 15, 2016, it lies outside the prescription period. Sewell's intentional discrimination claim cannot make it out of the starting gate.

B.

By contrast, Sewell's harassment claim has some legs. As the district court recognized, it does not trip over a statute-of-limitations problem. That is because of the continuing violation doctrine. Whereas an intentional discrimination claim focuses on a specific...