Sewell v. Sharp

• Decision Date: 25 March 1958
• Docket Number: No. 8794,8794
• Citation: 102 So.2d 259
• Parties: Etta M. SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas W. SHARP, Acting Administrator of the Division of Employment Security of the Department of Labor of the State of Louisiana et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 259

102 So.2d 259

Etta M. SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas W. SHARP, Acting Administrator of the Division of Employment Security of the Department of Labor of the State of Louisiana et al. Defendants-Appellees.

No. 8794.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

March 25, 1958.

Rehearing Denied April 22, 1958.

Melvin L. Bellar, Shreveport, for appellant.

Lewis D. Dunbar, Marion Weimer, Baton Rouge, Cook, Clark, Egan, Yancey & King, Shreveport, for appellees.

AYRES, Judge.

This is an appeal taken by Etta M. Sewell pursuant to the provisions of LSA-R.S. 23:1634 of the Louisiana Employment Security Law to review a judgment of the District Court and the findings and decision of the Louisiana Board of Review, an agency of the Department of Labor of the State of Louisiana, which denied her unemployment compensation benefits.

The defense is that plaintiff is disqualified for the statutory benefits in that (1) she voluntarily left her employment without good cause connected with her work and (2) that she was discharged by the employer for misconduct connected with her employment. These defenses, obviously inconsistent, were sustained by the trial court in upholding the findings and conclusions of the Board of Review.

The facts are that claimant was employed as a charwoman by the Commercial National Bank in Shreveport, Louisiana, where, and in which capacity, she had worked for a period exceeding two years. Her contract of employment, as one of the conditions thereof, provided for an annual two weeks' vacation with pay, which vacation for 1957 was scheduled to begin June 30, 1957, on which date, or the day prior thereto, she was informed by her foreman that her vacation was canceled. A postponement of her vacation was requested because of the continued illness of other employees in the same department. Plaintiff insisted upon taking her vacation as scheduled because of the serious illness of her daughter, who needed her services and personal attention. She was not informed that if she insisted upon her vacation she would be discharged.

The obligations in an employment contract are reciprocal--services are rendered for a remuneration, and additional covenants or promises by either of the parties thereto constitute a part of the moving consideration or inducement for the making of the contract. Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Service, 221 La. 677, 60 So.2d 83. In a contract of employment providing for a vacation with pay, such stipulation is, in effect, a stipulation for additional wages; that is, that the benefits so provided constitute a portion of the benefits accruing to the employee in compensation for services rendered. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, State of California v. Sampsell, 9 Cir., 172 F.2d 400; In re Public Ledger, Inc., 3 Cir., 161 F.2d 761; In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 2 Cir., 111 F.2d 429; Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, v. Williamsport Textile Corp., D.C., 136 F.Supp. 407; Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537, 120 A.2d 442.

Such a provision in an employment contract is a reasonable arrangement to secure the well-being of the employees and the continuance of harmonious relations between the employer and the employees. It has been heretofore observed by this court that the Louisiana Employment Security Act comes within a class of social and economic legislation, remedial in its nature, and, as such, should be so interpreted by the courts as to extend its benefits as far as possible, within the bounds imposed by expressed legislative restrictions. Lacombe v. Sharp, La.App., 99 So.2d 387.

The question is, do the facts establish misconduct upon the part of the plaintiff within the intent of the statute? 'Misconduct' is a word of general usage and is not defined in the statute itself. Resort, must, therefore, be made to the generally accepted definitions, such as wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose. Misconduct, within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act, excluding from its benefits an employee discharged for misconduct, must be an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer's interests, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules, and a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees. 48 Am.Jur., p. 541, 'Social Security, Unemployment Insurance and Retirement Funds', § 38; 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 162, pp. 245--247. In determining, however, what constitutes misconduct, the standard to be applied is that of the employment contract, expressed or implied, which fixes the worker's duties in connection with his work, viewed in the light of the employer's duties, responsibilities, and obligations to the employee. Without question loyalty, consideration and cooperation are due by the employee to the employer--the laborer should be worthy of his hire. This is not, however, an entirely unilateral proposition; the employee is likewise due some degree of reciprocation. The employer's needs for the employee's services, under the circumstances, were predicated upon the illness of certain other employees. Plaintiff's desire and need for her vacation at the time scheduled were...