Sewell v. State
| Decision Date | 29 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2183,2183 |
| Parties | KELVIN SEWELL v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Motion to Dismiss > Prosecutorial Misconduct > Evidentiary Hearing
To warrant an evidentiary hearing on a defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must present some evidence, in the form of verifiable facts, that raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecutor's motive. See McNeil v. State, 112 Md. App 434, 465 (1996).
Criminal Law > Common-Law Misdemeanors > Official Misconduct
Although it is a singular offense, the crime of official misconduct covers three modes of behavior: (1) misfeasance, (2) malfeasance, and (3) nonfeasance. State v. Carter, 200 Md. 255, 262-63 (1952).
Criminal Law > Common-Law Misdemeanors > Official Misconduct > Mens Rea
Regardless what type of act (or omission) forms the basis of a charge of official misconduct, the State must prove that the public officer acted "willfully, fraudulently, or corruptly." Friend v. Hammill, 34 Md. 298, 304 (1871); see also Hiss v. State, 24 Md. 556, 561 (1866) (). This is because official misconduct covers only "corrupt behavior by a public officer" in the exercise of his or her duties. Duncan, 282 Md. 282 Md. 385, 387 (1978).
Criminal Law > Common-Law Misdemeanors > Official Misconduct > Mens Rea
In the case of malfeasance, the conduct in question falls outside of the official's discretion and authority, and, if done willfully, is corrupt on its face. The fact-finder can therefore infer the element of corruption without direct evidence of the official's intent to act corruptly because "wil[l]fulness and bad intent" are "necessary or probable accompaniments" of malfeasance. See State v. Carter, 200 Md. 255, 263 (1952). In the case of misfeasance, however, because the conduct normally falls within the official's discretion and authority, the State must present evidence that the official intended to act corruptly—with a "sense of depravity, perversion, or taint." Rollin M. Perkins & Roland N. Boyce, Criminal Law 542 (3d ed. 1982).
Criminal Law > Common-Law Misdemeanors > Official Misconduct > Mens Rea
The measure of what constitutes official misconduct is an imbricating continuum of proof that runs from evidence of conduct squarely within an officer's discretion undertaken with corrupt intent (misfeasance)—to evidence of conduct clearly exceeding an official's scope of authority such that corrupt intent can be assumed (malfeasance).
Criminal Law > Common-Law Misdemeanors > Official Misconduct > Mens Rea
The question of corrupt intent in a case for misconduct in office is a question for the trier of fact. See People v. Hardrick, 671 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
Criminal Law > Sufficiency of the Evidence > Specific Intent > Proof of Motive
A defendant's membership in an organization alone, without more, is not competent to prove that the defendant intended to act corruptly in furtherance of that organization's aims. The State must offer admissible evidence specific to the case that tends to establish that the defendant's common membership motivated the defendant to act criminally.
Criminal Law > Sufficiency of the Evidence > Specific Intent > Proof of Motive
It is a long-established principle that "[t]he absence of evidence suggesting a motive for the commission of the crime charged is a circumstance in favor of the accused, to be given such weight as the jury deems proper; but proof of motive is never indispensable to conviction." Pointer v. U.S., 151 U.S. 396, 414 (1894).
Criminal Law > Admissibility of Evidence > Expert Testimony > Relevance
When a criminal defendant in Maryland seeks to admit expert testimony, we begin with the baseline that "[t]he criminal defendant is generally permitted to introduce any evidence relevant to the asserted defense." Simmons, 313 Md. at 41
Criminal Law > Admissibility of Evidence > Expert Testimony > Relevance
A defendant's proffered expert testimony is relevant if it tends to make more probable an element of the defense.
Criminal Law > Admissibility of Evidence > Expert Testimony > Relevance > Appreciable Help
Although lay jurors may have first-hand experience interacting with police officers during a traffic stop, they are unlikely to "be aware of the policies and procedures" that a police department has in place regarding the internal handling of investigations, or the broad discretion the officers enjoy in assigning personnel and handling cases.
Circuit Court for Worcester County
Case No. 23-K-16-000289
REPORTED
Opinion by Leahy, J.
* Judge Matthew J. Fader did not participate in the Court's decision to designate this opinion for publication pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1.
Kelvin Sewell was Chief of the Pocomoke City Police Department (the "Department") from December 2011 to July 2015. Sewell1 alleged that Pocomoke City terminated him in 2015 for refusing to fire Officer Franklin Savage and Lieutenant Lynell Green. Sewell's termination occurred in the same year that he and Savage filed a series of complaints with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging various forms of racial discrimination against the Department and, eventually, the Worcester County Sheriff's Department and the State's Attorney for Worcester County.2
Following Sewell's termination from the Department, and while his complaints were pending before the EEOC, the State Prosecutor began investigating Sewell's conduct as Police Chief based, in part, on information provided by the State's Attorney for Worcester County. The State Prosecutor looked specifically at Sewell and Green's handling of the investigation into a 2014 traffic incident in which Douglas Matthews, driving home from a meeting at the Prince Hall Masonic Lodge, hit and damaged two unoccupied parked cars. The State alleged that Sewell, a Mason, conspired with Green, also a Mason, to commit the common-law misdemeanor of official misconduct by directingtheir subordinates to resolve the incident without charging or citing Matthews because of their "membership in the Mason brotherhood." On July 16, 2016, a Worcester County grand jury indicted Sewell for corruptly committing misconduct in office and conspiring to commit the misconduct with Green.
To rebut the charge that he acted corruptly, Sewell maintained that his handling of the investigation was reasonable under the circumstances and consistent with the routine discretion that a small-town police chief exercises. He offered two expert witnesses who would have testified, among other things, to the considerations and objectives that impact a police chief's exercise of discretion during an investigation. The circuit court, however, granted the State's motion to exclude Sewell's experts' testimony, deciding that such testimony would not assist the fact-finder.
At trial, the alleged association between Sewell and Matthews through their membership in the Prince Hall Masonic Lodge did not emerge from the evidence. The State focused, instead, on eliciting testimony that described Sewell's conduct as "unusual" and out of the ordinary. The jury convicted Sewell of misconduct in office but acquitted him of conspiring with Green.
On appeal, Sewell raises five issues that drive at the fairness of the proceedings below:
Sewell asks this Court to dismiss the case against him with prejudice or, alternatively, remand for a new trial. We will grant the alternative relief.
Although the State failed to show that Sewell's membership in the Prince Hall Masonic Lodge motivated his actions or had any relevance to the crimes charged, we (the majority) conclude that the balance of the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was enough to surmount the legal sufficiency hurdle. Still, the trial court erred by excluding Sewell's expert witnesses. The trial judge failed to appreciate that the proffered testimony was relevant and would have shed light on issues that are "beyond the ken" of the average layperson. This error prejudiced Sewell, especially given that the State's case rested on circumstantial proof of corrupt intent provided by subordinate officers who worked for the Department that Chief Sewell alleged had discriminated against him and fired him retaliatorily. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny Sewell's motion to dismiss for government misconduct without a hearing. In light of these holdings, we do not reach Sewell's final issue on appeal.
The right to a fair trial is enshrined in our laws. Under the circumstances presented in this case, the risk of unfairness is intolerably high. We remand for a new trial.
Around 11:30 at night on November 21, 2014, a phone call woke Gayle Conrad as she slept in her home on Cedar Street in the "north sector" of Pocomoke City. It was a neighbor calling to let her know that a vehicle had struck her husband's truck, which was parked on the street in front of the Conrad house, and that the vehicle had left the scene. She went outside and saw that her grandson's vehicle, which was parked behind her husband's truck, was also damaged. Then,...
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