Sewell v. Walker
| Decision Date | 28 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-FM-186 |
| Citation | 278 A.3d 1175 |
| Parties | Kellie SEWELL, Appellant, v. Curtis WALKER, Jr., Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Johnny M. Riddick, Washington, for appellant.
Ronald A. Colbert, Washington, for appellee.
Before Beckwith and McLeese, Associate Judges, and Thompson,* Senior Judge.
Appellant Kellie Sewell challenges an order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction her motion to modify a child-support order. Although we uphold the trial court's ruling in part, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings to determine whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction.
Except as noted, the following facts appear to be undisputed. Ms. Sewell and appellee Curtis Walker, Jr. have one child together. The parties were awarded shared custody of the child, and Mr. Walker was ordered to pay child support.
Ms. Sewell moved to modify the support order in 2018. At the time of the motion, Ms. Sewell and the child resided in Maryland. Mr. Walker moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that he had resided in Maryland since 2012. See D.C. Code § 46-352.05(a)(1) (). In support of that claim, Mr. Walker submitted an affidavit, a 2015 lease for a residence in Maryland, and a Maryland driver's license obtained in 2017.
Ms. Sewell opposed the motion to dismiss, making four arguments. First, Ms. Sewell argued that the Superior Court had jurisdiction even if Mr. Walker lived in Maryland, because Mr. Walker had consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the District of Columbia courts in 2016, in connection with an earlier motion to modify child support. See D.C. Code § 46-352.05(a)(2) (). Second, Ms. Sewell argued that Mr. Walker was equitably estopped from denying that he was a D.C. resident, because Mr. Walker had repeatedly claimed to be a D.C. resident. In support of that argument, Ms. Sewell submitted a 2014 D.C. driver's license bearing a D.C. address for Mr. Walker; a 2018 D.C. vehicle registration in Mr. Walker's name, also bearing a D.C. address; and 2018 D.C. public-school registration forms for the child, bearing Mr. Walker's name and a D.C. address. Third, Ms. Sewell argued that Mr. Walker in fact maintained a residence in D.C. Finally, Ms. Sewell argued that the Superior Court had continuing jurisdiction to modify the order even if the requirements of D.C. Code § 46-352.05(a) were not met.
At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Walker testified that he was a resident of Maryland. After the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The trial court concluded that Mr. Walker's consent to D.C. jurisdiction in connection with the 2016 motion to modify did not constitute consent to D.C. jurisdiction in connection with the 2018 motion to modify. The trial court declined to consider Ms. Sewell's estoppel argument, reasoning that the parties could not confer jurisdiction on the court through their conduct. On the underlying factual issue, the trial court found that Mr. Walker was not a D.C. resident. Finally, the trial court concluded that the Superior Court's continuing jurisdiction to modify child-support orders was limited to that provided in D.C. Code § 46-352.05(a).
On appeal, Ms. Sewell does not directly challenge the trial court's factual determination that Mr. Walker was not a D.C. resident. Ms. Sewell also does not argue on appeal that the Superior Court had continuing jurisdiction over the motion to modify even if the requirements of § 46-352.05(a) were not met. Ms. Sewell does raise an additional argument for the first time on appeal: that the trial court dismissed the case without permitting jurisdictional discovery. We decline to address that argument. Ms. Sewell did not request jurisdictional discovery at any point in the trial court. "We ordinarily do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal." Nwaneri v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan , 250 A.3d 1079, 1082 (D.C. 2021) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We see no exceptional circumstances warranting a departure from that practice in this case. We therefore turn to the two arguments that Ms. Sewell raised in the trial court and presses in this court.
As noted, § 46-352.06(a)(2) allows the D.C. courts to retain jurisdiction to modify a child-support order, even if the child and both parents are not D.C. residents, if the parties consent. Ms. Sewell points out that during the 2016 modification proceeding, at a time when Mr. Walker now claims to have been living in Maryland, Mr. Walker consented to the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction. Ms. Sewell argues that Mr. Walker's consent to jurisdiction in the 2016 modification proceeding should bind Mr. Walker in all subsequent modification proceedings. We decide that question of statutory interpretation de novo. E.g. , In re G.D.L. , 223 A.3d 100, 104 (D.C. 2020).
We agree with the trial court that Mr. Walker's prior consent in 2016 did not carry forward to this 2018 modification proceeding. Section 46-352.05(a)(2) refers to "consent" in the present tense, suggesting that the parties must consent to Superior Court jurisdiction in each particular modification proceeding. See generally, e.g. , Gundy v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2127, 204 L.Ed.2d 522 (2019) (" Court has often looked to Congress’[s] choice of verb tense to ascertain a statute's temporal reach ....") (internal quotation marks omitted). We need not decide that question, however. Even assuming that a party in one proceeding could give binding consent to D.C.’s future exercise of authority to modify a child-support order in later proceedings, we see no indication that Mr. Walker did that in 2016. Rather, in the 2016 consent agreement, Mr. Walker consented to the modification then at issue and acknowledged that parties could jointly modify the agreement. The agreement says nothing about the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to modify child support in the future. We therefore hold that Mr. Walker did not consent to the Superior Court's exercise of jurisdiction to modify the child-support order in 2018.
Ms. Sewell raises the concern that parents could evade their duty to pay child support by simply moving out of the state that issued the child-support order. That concern is unwarranted. The Superior Court retains jurisdiction to enforce child-support orders it has issued, even if all relevant parties no longer live in D.C. D.C. Code § 42-352.06 (2022 Supp.). The issue in the present case is instead whether the Superior Court has authority to modify its child-support order.
As noted, the trial court declined to consider Ms. Sewell's...
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