Sewell v. Webb

Citation702 So.2d 1222
PartiesWillia Dean Lawrence SEWELL, as trustee of the Bessie Maddox Lawrence Trust v. Thomas WEBB and Weyerhaeuser Company. 2940330.
Decision Date18 August 1995
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Robert F. Prince and Silas G. Cross, Jr., of Prince, Poole & Cross, P.C., Tuscaloosa, for appellant.

John A. Owens of Owens & Carver, Tuscaloosa; Sandra C. Guin of Phelps, Jenkins, Gibson & Fowler, Tuscaloosa, for appellees.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

On November 6, 1991, Willia Dean Lawrence Sewell filed a complaint in the Lamar County Circuit Court against Thomas Webb and Weyerhaeuser Company. In her complaint, Sewell alleged that on November 10, 1990, Webb and Weyerhaeuser had unlawfully entered upon 37 acres of land she owned and cut down, destroyed, injured, and removed trees, saplings, seedlings, shrubs, bushes, and other plant life existing on that land. Sewell sought compensatory damages in the amount of $100,000, claiming that as a result of Webb and Weyerhaeuser's trespass, her land had been damaged. Sewell also sought punitive damages in the amount of $500,000, claiming that Webb and Weyerhaeuser's conduct had been willful, wanton, reckless, and/or oppressive.

The case was tried before a jury beginning on August 15, 1994. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Sewell on her trespass and conversion claims. The issues of compensatory and punitive damages were submitted to the jury, and the jury awarded Sewell $35,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages. On September 21, 1994, Sewell filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, a motion for additur, which was denied by the trial court on December 8, 1994.

Sewell appeals, raising two issues: (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion and thereby erred in denying her challenges for cause as to three prospective jurors and also in later denying her motion for a new trial; and (2) Whether the jury's verdict of punitive damages was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, was inadequate as a matter of law, and was so inadequate as to indicate prejudice, passion, or other improper motive, so that the trial court abused its discretion and erred to reversal in failing to set aside the jury's verdict and in not granting a new trial.

Sewell first argues that the trial court erred in denying her challenges for cause as to three prospective jurors, Larry Crowley, M.L. Brown, and Jackie Murphy.

Sewell's attorney began the initial questioning on voir dire by asking all the prospective jurors whether any of them worked for Weyerhaeuser. Larry Crowley, the first prospective juror in question, responded that he and his father were in the logging business, and that at the time of the trial they were doing business, under contract, with Weyerhaeuser. Upon further questioning by Sewell's attorney, Crowley stated that his business relationship with Weyerhaeuser would influence his decision in the case. Thereafter, Weyerhaeuser's attorney asked Crowley whether he could be fair and impartial in spite of his business relationship with Weyerhaeuser, to which Crowley stated that he could. However, after voir dire of all the prospective jurors, Sewell's attorney challenged Crowley for cause. Crowley was then questioned by the trial judge, in open court, and the following transpired:

"THE COURT: Mr. Crowley, would you stand up, please? When they were asking you some questions earlier, I think you had said under some questions that you might have a problem reaching a fair and impartial verdict because you did logging and I think took some logs to Weyerhaeuser; right?

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: (Nodding head.)

"THE COURT: I think later on you said maybe you could. I want you to think about this and I want you to answer this question. Based on the fact that you work with them and take them some logs, would you set that aside and could you reach a verdict solely, fairly and impartially according to the law and the facts in the case and what you do wouldn't influence you? Can you do that or not?

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I think I could.

"THE COURT: I need better than think. If you can, just--

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I could."

Thereafter, the trial judge denied Sewell's challenge for cause as to prospective juror Crowley.

Sewell's attorney also asked all the prospective jurors whether any of them knew Delmer Harris, a key witness for Webb and Weyerhaeuser. M.L. Brown, the second prospective juror in question, responded that he was related by marriage to Harris. Brown's wife was Harris's sister-in law. Upon additional questioning by Sewell's attorney, Brown further stated that he would have a tendency to believe Harris over other witnesses "because I know how truthful he is." Thereafter, Weyerhaeuser's attorney questioned Brown, asking Brown whether he could be fair and impartial in spite of the fact that Harris was his brother-in-law. Brown stated that he could render a fair and impartial decision. However, after voir dire of all the prospective jurors, Sewell's attorney also challenged Brown for cause. Brown was subsequently questioned by the trial judge, at the bench, and the following transpired:

"THE COURT: Brother-in-law. If he testifies--Of course in any kind of lawsuit we wouldn't be up here if everybody agreed, so there is two sides to them. That's very obvious. And he may testify basically better for one side than the other. And I really don't know which side. If he did that--And I think you had testified that you might believe him over the other witnesses?

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Knowing him, I would because I know what kind of person he is.

"THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you [this]. If he testified and you have a relationship with him and based on what he says, could you set that aside?

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, I could.

"THE COURT: Could you hear the case no matter what he said--Would it be possible for you to be impartial if you believe him more than the other witnesses? That's the question. And it's just human nature. We're not putting you on the spot, but we need to know.

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: If he spoke, I'd believe him, but still I'd weigh the evidence both sides. I'd make a decision myself.

"THE COURT: Could you say that--If the other side of the story was different, is it your testimony that you would believe Delmer more than the other side? Have you already got a--

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: It would depend on what I heard, the evidence, what was spoke. I can't make that decision because I don't really know. I hadn't heard both sides. I believe Delmer is an honest person but just because of that--I still weigh both sides before I made a decision.

"THE COURT: You wouldn't give him more believability than any other witness in this case?

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, sir."

The trial judge then denied Sewell's challenge for cause as to prospective juror Brown.

The third prospective juror in question, Jackie Murphy, also responded that he knew Harris. Murphy stated that he was Harris's nephew; Harris's wife and Murphy's mother were sisters. Upon additional questioning by Sewell's attorney, Murphy stated that his relationship to Harris could possibly influence his decision. Like Crowley and Brown, Murphy was also asked by Weyerhaeuser's attorney whether he could be fair and impartial in spite of the fact that Harris was his uncle, to which Murphy responded that he could. However, after voir dire of all the prospective jurors, Sewell's attorney also challenged Brown for cause. Thereafter, Brown was questioned by the trial judge, at the bench, and the following transpired:

"THE COURT: And I believe that they may have asked you whether you would believe him over any other witness.

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Of course in a lawsuit the fact that we're up here and because there is two sides to every story.

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Right.

"THE COURT: What he says may not be what the other witnesses said.

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: What I'm asking you is could you put that aside and not, you know--Are you going to believe him regardless of what the other witnesses say or can you put that out of your mind?

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: And listen to both sides and make a judgment purely on the evidence and on the law?

"PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, sir."

The trial judge then denied Sewell's challenge for cause as to prospective juror Murphy.

The general grounds for which a prospective juror may be challenged for cause are set forth in § 12-16-150, Ala.Code 1975. Other common law grounds for challenge for cause exist that are not inconsistent with the statute. Wood v. Woodham, 561 So.2d 224 (Ala.1989). In Knop v. McCain, 561 So.2d 229, 232 (Ala.1989), our supreme court summarized the law on challenges for cause as follows:

"In challenging a juror for cause, the test to be applied is that of probable prejudice. Alabama Power Co. v. Henderson, 342 So.2d 323, 327 (Ala.1976). While probable prejudice for any reason will serve to disqualify a prospective juror, qualification of a juror is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Id.; Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So.2d 1249, 1255-56 (Ala.1986); Village Toyota Co. v. Stewart, 433 So.2d 1150, 1156 (Ala.1983). This Court must look to the questions propounded to, and the answers given by, the prospective juror to see if this discretion was properly exercised. Id. A reversal is not appropriate absent abuse of this discretion. Alabama Power Co. v. Henderson, 342 So.2d at 327; Grandquest v. Williams, 273 Ala. 140, 135 So.2d 391 (1961); Mutual Building & Loan Ass'n v. Watson, 226 Ala. 526, 147 So. 817 (1933); Brown v. Woolverton, 219 Ala. 112, 115, 121 So. 404 (1928); see Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 1287 (Ala.Crim.App.1983).

"Ultimately, the test to be applied is whether the juror can set aside her opinions and try the case fairly and impartially,...

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6 cases
  • Ex parte Moebes
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 14 Noviembre 1997
    ...the trial court erred when it failed to set aside the jury's punitive damages verdict and denied her a new trial. See Sewell v. Webb, 702 So.2d 1222 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (reviewed sub nom. Ex parte Weyerhaeuser Co.). The Court of Civil Appeals held that the trial court had abused its discreti......
  • Ex parte Weyerhaeuser Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 22 Noviembre 1996
    ...that the trial court had abused its discretion by not granting Sewell's motions to strike the three jurors for cause. Sewell v. Webb, 702 So.2d 1222 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). We granted the defendants' petition for certiorari Before this Court can address the issue of the challenged jurors, it mu......
  • Flowers v. Dean, No. 2070344 (Ala. Civ. App. 5/1/2009)
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 1 Mayo 2009
    ...made an attempt to relate that argument to the issue of the purported inadequacy of the damages awards. See Sewell v. Webb, 702 So. 2d 1222 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), rev'd, Ex parte Weyerhauser, supra. In this case, in an apparent attempt to relate their argument to the inadequacy of the damag......
  • FLOWERS v. DEAN
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 10 Julio 2009
    ...made an attempt to relate that argument to the issue of the purported inadequacy of the damages awards. See Sewell v. Webb, 702 So.2d 1222 (Ala. Civ.App.1995), rev'd, Ex parte Weyerhaeuser, supra. In this case, in an apparent attempt to relate their argument to the inadequacy of the damages......
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