Sexton v. Lumpkin
| Decision Date | 03 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:20-CV-1036-O |
| Parties | WALTER BYRON SEXTON, Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director, TDCJ-CID, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner, Walter Byron Sexton, a state prisoner confined in the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, against Bobby Lumpkin, director of that division, Respondent. After considering the pleadings and relief sought by Petitioner, the Court has concluded that the petition should be denied.
In January 2018, in Palo Pinto County, Texas, Case No. 16617, Petitioner was indicted on one count of possession of methamphetamine in an amount of less than one gram. Clerk's R. 8-9, ECF No. 12-9. The indictment also alleged that Petitioner had been previously convicted of two sequential felony convictions for sexual assault of a child and failure to register as a sex offender. Id. A jury found him guilty of the offense, Petitioner pleaded true to the enhancement allegations, and the jury assessed his punishment at 20 years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. Id. at 116. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his petition for discretionary review. Electronic R., ECF No. 12-8. Petitioner also sought postconviction state habeas-corpus relief by filing a state habeas application challenging his conviction, which was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals without written order on the findings of the trial court and the court's independent review of the record. SHR1 4-19, ECF No. 12-24; Action Taken, 12-25.
At trial, the evidence showed that on the night of April 8, 2017, DPS trooper Juan Gutierrez discovered Petitioner's truck pulled to the side of a narrow road in rural Palo Pinto County, Texas, with his hazard lights on. The trooper stopped to conduct a "motorist assist" in the event the driver needed help. The trooper's interaction with Petitioner and his female passenger ultimately led to a search of the Petitioner's truck and the discovery of methamphetamine and other contraband. A video camera inside the trooper's car and a microphone attached to the trooper's clothing recorded the encounter and photographs of the methamphetamine and other contraband were taken, however prior to trial all the contraband, including the methamphetamine, were destroyed by the lab after analysis of the methamphetamine had been completed. It was stipulated at trial that the methamphetamine was not destroyed in bad faith and that "[t]here wasn't any effort to deprive [Petitioner] or his counsel the availability of any evidence or testing of that evidence."
In four grounds for relief, Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:
Respondent believes that the petition is neither successive nor barred by the statute of limitations and that the claims have been exhausted in state court. Resp't's Ans. 5, ECF No. 9.
A § 2254 habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of review provided for in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the Act, a writ of habeas corpus should be granted only if a state court arrives at a decision that is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as established by the Supreme Court or that is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). This standard is difficult to meet and "stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings." Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.
Additionally, the statute requires that federal courts give great deference to a state court's factual findings. Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). Section 2254(e)(1) provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct. The presumption of correctness applies to both express and implied factual findings. Young v. Dretke, 356 F. 3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001). Absent express findings, a federal court may imply fact findings consistent with the state court's disposition. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314 (1963); Pondexter v. Dretke, 346 F.3d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 2003); Catalan v. Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 493 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002). It is the petitioner'sburden to rebut the presumption of correctness through clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Furthermore, when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's highest criminal court, denies relief without written order, typically it is an adjudication on the merits, which is likewise entitled to this presumption. Richter, 562 U.S. at 100; Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In such a situation, a federal court "should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision providing" particular reasons, both legal and factual, "presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning," and give appropriate deference to that decision. Wilson v. Sellers, --- U.S. ---, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191-92 (2018). If there is no related state-court decision providing the court's reasoning, a federal court assumes that the state court applied the proper clearly established federal law to the facts of the case and then determines whether its decision was contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of that law. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1); Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 604 (5th Cir. 2006).
Under his first ground, Petitioner claims that the state appellate court abused its discretion by allowing his court-appointed appellate counsel to file a meritless brief—i.e., an Anders brief. Pet. 6, ECF No. 1. According to Petitioner, he was constructively denied assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel filed a brief which did not assert any arguable error. Pet'r's Mem. 3-7, ECF No. 4.
As a general rule, indigent defendants have a right to counsel on a first appeal as of right, however "this right does not include the right to bring a frivolous appeal and, concomitantly, does not include the right to counsel for bringing a frivolous appeal." Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278(2000). In Anders v. California, the Supreme Court recognized that appellate counsel could withdraw from representation without denying an appellant fair representation where certain safeguards were followed. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Specifically, under Anders, counsel must conduct a "conscientious examination" of the case and request permission to withdraw. Id. That request must be accompanied by a brief to the appellate court "referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal." Id. The appellate court must then conduct a "full examination of all the proceeding[s] to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous." Id. The states are free to craft their own frameworks for ensuring adequate appellate review subject to these minimum requirements. Smith, 528 U.S. at 273.
Relying on Anders and the state law procedure, the appellate court addressed the issue as follows:
In this case, appellate counsel filed a sufficient brief as required by Anders after thorough review of the entire record. The 27-page Anders brief included a procedural history, statement of facts, consideration of specific issues with full analysis that included proper citation to the...
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