Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel. Co.
Decision Date | 25 February 1913 |
Citation | 86 A. 451,84 N.J.L. 85 |
Parties | SEXTON v. NEWARK DISTRICT TELEGRAPH CO. |
Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Certiorari to Court of Common Pleas, Essex County.
Proceedings by Lizzie Alida Sexton on behalf of herself and next of kin against the Newark District Telegraph Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings certiorari. Affirmed.
Argued November term, 1912, before TRENCHARD, PARKER, and MINTURN, JJ.
George W. Hubbell, of New York City, for the prosecutor. Harry V. Osborne, of Newark, for defendant in certiorari.
Frank H. Sommer and Kinsley Twining, both of Newark, for Employer's Liability Commission.
This writ brings up for review a judgment of the Essex county common pleas court against the prosecutor in an action under the Employer's Liability Act, approved April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 134), and the supplement thereto approved May 2, 1911 (P. L p. 763).
The act of April 4, 1911 (the main act) is divided into three sections. The first six paragraphs are included within section 1, which is entitled "Compensation by Action at Law." These paragraphs, so far as they are pertinent to this case, are as follows:
Paragraphs 7 to 22, inclusive, are included within section 2, which is entitled "Elective Compensation," and, so far as pertinent, are as follows:
Paragraph 11 sets forth the schedule of compensation for injury. Paragraph 12 provides a basis of compensation in case of death.
"(18) In case of a dispute over, or failure to agree upon, a claim for compensation between employer and employé, or the dependents of the employé, either party may submit the claim, both as to questions of fact, the nature and effect of the injuries, and the amount of compensation therefor according to the schedule herein provided, to the judge of the court of common pleas of such county as would have jurisdiction in a civil case, or where there is more than one judge of said court, then to either or any of said judges of such court, which judge is hereby authorized to hear and determine such disputes in a summary manner, and his decision as to all questions of fact shall be conclusive and binding. * * *"
The remaining paragraphs are included within section 3, which is entitled "General Provisions," and, so far as pertinent, are:
The act was approved April 4, 15)11.
The supplement of May 2, 1911, is as follows:
This act was approved May 2, 1911.
In the present case, a dispute arose as to the liability of the prosecutor, the employer of Floyd Sexton, to make compensation for the death of Sexton. A claim, made by his widow on behalf of herself and the next of kin, was presented to the judge of the court of common pleas of the county of Essex, as allowed by paragraph 18 of the act. The claim was based upon the theory that there had been an implied acceptance by the employer of the provisions of section 2 of the act. A judgment in favor of the claimant, and against the prosecutor, was entered, computed upon the basis allowed by the act, and the employer sued out this writ. The learned trial judge made certain findings of fact from which it appears that on July 4, 1911, at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Floyd Sexton, the husband of the claimant, while employed by the prosecutor, met his death "by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment," without any negligence whatsoever on his part.
The first reason assigned for reversal is "because the facts were not presented in such a way at the hearing as to give a ground for verdict for the plaintiff in certiorari."
We assume that this reason is intended to raise the question whether the evidence before the trial judge was sufficient to warrant his findings of fact. As stated above, paragraph 18 of the act made the common pleas judge's "decision as to all questions of fact * * * conclusive and binding." Furthermore, paragraph 20 of the act, which relates to procedure in all cases of dispute, expressly provides that, after the entry of judgment, "subsequent proceedings thereon shall only be for the recovery of moneys thereby determined to be due, provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed as limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review questions of law by certiorari."
Hence, when the judgment of the common pleas court is removed by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the function of the writ is that of a writ of error. In such case the Supreme Court accepts the findings of the common pleas court upon the facts if there be any legal evidence to warrant them. Ryer v. Turkel, 75 N. J. Law, 677, 70 Atl. 68. In the present case there was ample legal evidence to support such findings.
Other reasons for reversal aver that the main act of April 4, 1911, violates the "due process of law" and ...
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