Seyler v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.99-2342-KHV.,CIV.A.99-2342-KHV.
• Citation: 121 F.Supp.2d 1352
• Parties: Jacquline SEYLER, Plaintiff, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE CORPORATION, Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company, and National Railroad Passenger Corporation D/B/A Amtrak, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

121 F.Supp.2d 1352

Jacquline SEYLER, Plaintiff, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE CORPORATION, Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company, and National Railroad Passenger Corporation D/B/A Amtrak, Defendants.

No. CIV.A.99-2342-KHV.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

November 17, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Daniel D. Owen, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Overland Park, KS, P. John Brady, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.

Douglas R. Richmond, Michael L. Matula, Der5ek E. Feagans, Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VRATIL, District Judge.

On August 9, 1997, Jacquline Seyler sustained injuries in a passenger train derailment near Kingman, Arizona. She filed suit against the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), which operated the train, and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF),¹ which owns and maintains the railroad track and bridge on which the train was traveling at the time of the derailment. On May 31, 2000, the Court sustained defendants' motions for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages. At trial, defendants did not contest liability for plaintiff's injuries. On June 12, 2000, a jury returned a $295,772.00 verdict in plaintiff's favor. The matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion For New Trial (Doc. # 155) filed June 28, 2000; plaintiff's Motion To Alter Or Amend (Doc. # 157) filed June 28, 2000; and plaintiff's Motion For Extension Of Time For Appeal (Doc. # 166) filed August 9, 2000. For reasons set forth below, the Court overrules plaintiff's motions.

Regrettably, the Court must first analyze whether plaintiff timely filed her post-trial motions. In opposing plaintiff's motions to alter or amend and for a new trial, and her further motion for an extension of time to file an appeal, defendants argue that the post-trial motions are untimely and that the Court should deny the request to extend the time to appeal. Plaintiff has not filed a reply brief which addresses the issue of timeliness. Although reply briefs are not required, plaintiff has elected to ignore important procedural issues and authorities which defendants have cited.

I. Timeliness Of Plaintiff's Motions To Alter Or Amend And For New Trial

A. Plaintiff's Motion To Alter Or Amend

On May 31, 2000, the Court sustained defendants' motions for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages, as well as several motions in limine. See Memorandum And Order (Doc. # 123). The Court's rulings on May 31, 2000 were non-dispositive, in that they did not fully resolve the case and could be challenged by a timely motion under Rule 7.3(b), D. Kan. On June 12, 2000, after trial on the remaining issues, the Clerk entered judgment. Accordingly, the previous interlocutory rulings on punitive damages and motions in limine merged into the final judgment. See Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 527 (10th Cir.1992) (interlocutory rulings merge into final judgment and become appealable once final judgment is entered); West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 781 (2d Cir.1999) (earlier grant of partial summary judgment merges into final judgment). After judgment had been entered, plaintiff was required to bring any challenge to the Court's rulings on punitive damages and motions in limine under Rule 59(e). In fact, plaintiff stated in her motion to alter or amend that it was filed pursuant to Rule 59(e). A motion under Rule 59(e) must be filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). "The requirement that post-trial motions be filed within the relevant ten day period after entry of judgment is jurisdictional, and may not be extended by a waiver of the parties or by a rule of the district court." U.S. Leather, Inc. v. H & W Partnership, 60 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1995); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) (district court cannot extend deadline to file Rule 59 motion). Here, the Clerk entered judgment on June 12, 2000. After excluding intervening Saturdays and Sundays, motions to alter or amend were due on June 26, 2000. Plaintiff did not file her motion until June 28, 2000. Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend is untimely under Rule 59(e). The Court will therefore construe plaintiff's motion as one under Rule 60(b), which is not governed by the same ten-day time limitation found in Rule 59.

B. Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial

Plaintiff's motion for new trial is also time-barred. Any motion for a new trial must be filed no later than ten days after entry of judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(b). The Court cannot extend the deadline to file a new trial motion. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 6(b). Plaintiff filed her motion for new trial on June 28, 2000, twelve days after judgment had been entered. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for new trial is untimely.²

II. Plaintiff's Motion For Extension Of Time To Appeal

As explained above, plaintiff did not timely file a post-trial motion under Rule 59, Fed.R.Civ.P. Accordingly, she was required to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the date of judgment. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The deadline to appeal the judgment was July 12, 2000. On August 9, 2000, plaintiff asked the Court for an extension of time to file her appeal in the event that the Court found that her post-trial motions were untimely. When a party aggrieved by a judgment fails to file a timely notice of appeal, a district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if the moving party shows that her failure was the result of "excusable neglect." See Fed.R.App. P. 4(a)(5).³

The equitable determination of excusable neglect involves all relevant factors including "the danger of prejudice to the [non-movant], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).

Here, defendants have not shown any prejudice from the delay. In addition, the length of the delay will not significantly disrupt judicial proceedings and defendants have not shown that plaintiff acted in bad faith. The third factor, i.e. the reason for the delay, however, strongly weighs in favor of defendants. The Tenth Circuit has noted that "fault in the delay remains a very important factor — perhaps the most important single factor — in determining whether neglect is excusable." City of Chanute, Kan. v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied., 513 U.S. 1191, 115 S.Ct. 1254, 131 L.Ed.2d 135 (1995). Although the Supreme Court has noted that "excusable neglect" may encompass some situations in which the failure to comply with a deadline is attributable to negligence, Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 394, 113 S.Ct. 1489, "inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute `excusable' neglect," id. at 392, 113 S.Ct. 1489. Accordingly, even absent prejudice to the opposing party or disruption of judicial proceedings, a party's failure to read and follow the plain terms of the federal rules does not constitute excusable neglect. See Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 469-70 (5th Cir.1998); Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 999 (11th Cir.1997); Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir.1996); Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 931-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 867, 115 S.Ct. 185, 130 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994); Weinstock v. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 16 F.3d 501, 503 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 806 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018, 107 S.Ct. 1898, 95 L.Ed.2d 505 (1987).

In Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 214 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir.2000), the district court sustained plaintiff's motion to extend the time to file Rule 59(e) motions until 24 days after judgment had been entered. See id. at 1178. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Tenth Circuit should consider her untimely appeal because of "unique circumstances" justifying the delay. Plaintiff maintained that the ten day time limit for Rule 59(e) motions should be extended because counsel relied on the extension granted by the district court. See id. at 1178-79. The Tenth Circuit noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly preclude a district court from extending the ten day time limit for Rule 59(e) motions. See id. at 1180; Fed. R.Civ.P. 6(b). Accordingly, counsel's reliance on the extension granted by the district court was not reasonable. See id. at 1179-80. The Tenth Circuit noted that even a passing reference to the rules reveals that a district court cannot extend the deadline for Rule 59(e) motions. See id. at 1180.

Based on the reasoning of Weitz and after considering the Pioneer factors, the Court finds that in failing to file a timely notice of appeal, counsel could not reasonably have relied on the Court's order which extended the time for plaintiff to file "motions to modify" — an order which counsel for plaintiff prepared. Moreover, such reliance could not result from "excusable neglect." Therefore, plaintiff's motion to extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal is overruled.

III. Plaintiff's Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment

A. Legal Standards

As explained above, the Court construes plaintiff's motion to alter or amend as one for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6), Fed.R.Civ.P.⁴ Relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances. Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir.1999); Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., Inc., 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir.1990). A Rule 60(b) motion is not intended to be a substitute for a direct appeal. See Cashner v. Freedom Stores,...