Seymour v. Miller

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:21-cv-313
• Decision Date: 10 January 2022
• Citation: Seymour v. Miller, Civil Action 2:21-cv-313 (S.D. Ohio Jan 10, 2022)
• Parties: JAMES SEYMOUR, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT CHRISTOPHER MILLER, et al., Defendants.

1

JAMES SEYMOUR, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT CHRISTOPHER MILLER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-313

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

January 10, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. With the consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 16), 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 14. For the reasons that follow Defendants' Motion, ECF No. 14, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this case on January 23, 2021, asserting ten causes of action against Defendants Scott Christopher Miller (“Miller”) and the Village of Coolville, Ohio (the “Village of Coolville”). (ECF No. 1.) On March 11, 2021, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 6.) On April 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed the subject First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (“FAC”), generally re-asserting the same ten causes of action against Defendants as follows:

(1) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment - Excessive Force), against Defendant Miller in his individual and official capacities;

(2) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment - Unlawful Seizure and False Imprisonment), against Defendant Miller in his individual and official capacities;

(3) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell Liability), against Defendant Village of Coolville;

(4) Ohio Revised Code (“O.R.C.”) § 2307.60 claim for violation of O.R.C. § 2921.45 et seq. (Interfering with Civil Rights), against Defendant Miller in his individual and official capacities;

(5) O.R.C. § 2307.60 claim for violation of O.R.C. § 2921.45 et seq (Dereliction of Duty), against Defendant Miller in his individual and official capacities;

(6) O.R.C. § 2307.60 claim for violation of O.R.C. § 2921.45 et seq (Sham Legal Process), against Defendant Miller in his individual and official capacities;

(7) Gross Negligence, against Defendant Miller;

(8) Battery, against Defendant Miller;

(9) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, against Defendant Miller; and

(10) Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision, against Defendant Village of Coolville.

(ECF No. 13 at PAGEID ## 84-94.)

On May 10, 2021, Defendants filed the subject Motion, seeking to dismiss most of the FAC. (ECF No. 14 (the “Motion”).) On June 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition.

(ECF No. 15 (the “Opposition”).) On June 15, 2021, Defendants filed a reply brief. (ECF No. 16 (the “Reply”).^[1] The Motion is thus ripe for judicial review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,' . . . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, '” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Thus, while a court is to afford plaintiff every inference, the pleading must still contain facts sufficient to “provide a plausible basis for the claims in the complaint”; a recitation of facts intimating the “mere possibility of misconduct” will not suffice. Flex Homes, Inc. v. Ritz-Craft Corp of Mich., Inc., 491 F. App'x. 628, 632 (6th Cir. 2012); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

III. ANALYSIS

In their Motion, Defendants raise various arguments as to why each of the ten causes of action should be dismissed, either in whole or in part. (ECF No. 14.) Generally speaking, Defendants assert that Counts 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 are barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, insofar as Plaintiff's claims are based on events which occurred prior to January 23, 2020; Counts 1, 2, 3 fail to state a claim against Defendant Miller in his official capacity; Counts 4, 5, 6 fail to state a claim under Ohio law; and Ohio law shields Defendant Miller in his official capacity and the Village of Coolville from liability under Counts 7 and 10, respectively. (See generally id.) In his Opposition, Plaintiff generally rejects each of Defendants' arguments, but “does not contest the dismissal of Count 10.” (See generally ECF No. 15.) In their Reply, Defendants generally responded to Plaintiff's arguments and reasserted their own arguments from the subject Motion. (See generally ECF No. 16.)

The Court will address each of Defendants' arguments in turn.

A. Statute of Limitations (Counts 4, 5, 6, 8, 9)

First, Defendants argue that Counts 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, insofar as Plaintiff's claims are based on an incident which allegedly occurred in or around August 2019. (ECF No. 14 at PAGEID ## 102-104.) In his Opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that a one-year statute of limitations applies to Counts 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9, but instead insists that “[t]he gravamen of Plaintiff's . . . counts are events that occurred on May 30, 2020, less than one year before the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint.” (ECF No. 15 at PAGEID # 117) Plaintiff also argues that while “the May 30, 2020 incident can be viewed independently from the August[] 2019 incident[, ] [t]his Court could also apply the continuing tort doctrine” given the nature of the conduct alleged. (Id.) In their Reply, Defendants clarify that the subject Motion “clearly set forth that the statute of limitations argument only applies to acts that occurred prior to January 23, 2020, ” and argue that Plaintiff's response regarding the continuing tort doctrine is meritless. (ECF No. 16 at PAGEID ## 125-126.)

The causes of action at issue - Counts 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 - can be broken into three categories: Counts 4, 5, and 6 are brought pursuant to O.R.C. § 2307.60, and Counts 8 and 9 are separate common law claims. As the parties appear to agree however, each set of claims is subject to a one-year statute of limitations. First, it is well settled that claims under O.R.C. § 2307.60 (including Counts 4, 5, and 6) are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Brack v. Budish, No. 1:19-CV-1436, 2021 WL 1960330, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 17, 2021) (“Both the Northern District of Ohio and Southern District of Ohio apply a one-year statute of limitations to claims under Section 2307.60.”) (collecting cases). Next, Plaintiff's common law battery claim (Count 8) arises under O.R.C. § 2305.111, which expressly provides a one-year statute of limitations. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.111(B) (“Except as provided in section 2305.115 of the Revised Code and subject to division (C) of this section, an action for assault or battery shall be brought within one year after the cause of the action accrues.”). Finally, Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count 9) is governed by the applicable statute of limitations for the tort(s) underlying the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Triplett-Fazzone v. City of Columbus Div. of Police, No. 2:12-CV-00331, 2013 WL 1718026, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2013) (“[W]hen the acts underlying the claim would support another tort, the statute of limitations for that other tort governs the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, Count 9 is grounded in allegations of false imprisonment, assault, and battery. Accordingly, Count 9 also is subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Ruckman v. Riebel, No. 2:11-CV-874, 2012 WL 4057409, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2012) (“[A]n action for false arrest/imprisonment is...