Seymour v. Warren
| Decision Date | 03 June 1904 |
| Citation | 71 N.E. 260,179 N.Y. 1 |
| Parties | SEYMOUR v. WARREN et al. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
Action by Cornelia Seymour against Walter H. Warren and others. From the judgment of the Appellate Division (83 N. Y. Supp. 871) affirming a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Edmund L. Mooney and Frederick A. Card, for appellant.
James J. Allen, for respondents.
This action was, in form, one for the breach of a contract made between the plaintiff and the defendants, and the relief sought was the recovery of damages for the breach. The business of the defendants was real estate agents and brokers, and, at the time of the making of the note or memorandum hereafter referred to, the plaintiff was the owner of the premises therein described, but, it seems, had never been in the actual possession of the same. On the 26th day of Arch, 1897, the defendants signed and addressed a letter to the plaintiff, which contained in the body thereof the following stipulation: It will be seen that the stipulation covered a period of time beyond one year from the time of the making thereof, and therefore the contract, if any was made, was not to be performed within one year. The defendants interposed the statute of frauds as a defense to the action, and succeeded at the trial. The complaint was dismissed and the judgment for the defendants was affirmed in the court below.
The question presented is whether there was a sufficient note or memorandum in writing, signed by the parties to be charged, to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. There was a writing signed by the defendants in their firm name, and addressed to the plaintiff by name, so that the parties are sufficiently described and identified. It is also quite clear that the defendants agreed to do certain things mentioned in the letter. They were to pay ‘all expenses until May 1, 1900’; that is to say, for more than three years after the date of the letter. They were to pay $75 per month to the plaintiff, ‘beginning May 1, 1897’; that is to say, for three years. But it is said that the note or memorandum does not contain or express the whole agreement of the parties, in that it is silent with respect to the plaintiff's undertaking, and fails to state the consideration moving from her to the defendants. In other words, the objection is that, while the defendants' promises are full and explicit enough, the plaintiff's obligation is not stated or expressed at all. No particular form of words is necessary to be used for expressing the consideration. It is enough if, from the whole instrument, the consideration appears in express terms or by fair or necessary inference. As a general rule, the statute is satisfied when the memorandum shows with reasonable clearnessthat the defendants' promise is designed to procure something to be done, forborne, or permitted by the party to whom it is made, either to or for the promisor or a third party. Union Bank v. Coster's Executors, 3 N. Y. 203, 53 Am. Dec. 280;Miller v. Cook, 23 N. Y. 495; Browne on Statute of Frauds, §s 405; Union Nat. Bank v. Leary, 77 App. Div. 332,79 N. Y. Supp. 217;Church v. Brown, 21 N. Y. 315. Where the language of the instrument is such as to warrant the inference that the consideration rests upon mutual promises, the writing satisfies all the requirements of the statute. In the light of these rules, an analysis of the language employed in the writing will, I think disclose by reasonable inference a sufficient consideration on the part of the plaintiff for the defendants' promise. A written agreement is deemed to contain and embrace not only the things expressed therin, but the things that are to be implied from reasonable inferences. What, then, is the true meaning and construction of the letter addressed by a firm of real estate brokers or agents to the owner of the premises described therein? The last sentence throws much light on all that precedes it: ‘If at the expiration of this agreement the rent of said property shall have advanced, and if said agreement shall be renewed, we will increase the monthly payment to you in proportion to the advance in rent.’ Since the defendants stipulated that they would pay the plaintiff $75 per month, and more in case the rental of the property advanced, the implication is plain that the consideration for the promise is the consent or permission of the plaintiff that the defendants should have the right...
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Gordon v. Vincent Youmans, Inc.
...to indicate their intent. See Town of Pelham v. City of Mount Vernon, 304 N.Y. 15, 23, 105 N.E. 2d 604, 608 (1952); Seymour v. Warren, 179 N.Y. 1, 6, 71 N.E. 260, 261 (1904) ("There is no better way of ascertaining the meaning and construction of a written contract than to look at the acts ......
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Feld Motor Sports, Inc. v. Traxxas, LP.
...parties may be used to indicate their intent.” 358 F.2d at 264. Traxxas seems to rely upon the case for its citation of Seymour v. Warren , 179 N.Y. 1, 71 N.E. 260 (1904), which states, “[t]here is no better way of ascertaining the meaning and construction of a written contract than to look......
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Robar Corp. v. Kingham
...the memorandum must express a consideration. Drake v. Seaman, 97 N.Y. 230; Barney v. Forbes, (N. Y.) 23 N.E. 890; Seymour v. Warren, (N. Y.) 71 N.E. 260. The Colorado statute is similar to that of Wyoming. In case of Mueller Furnace Company v. Stove Supply Company, 246 P. 272, it was held t......
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Johnson & Higgins v. Harper Transp. Co.
...furnished by it. Certainly a statement of such consideration is very easily discovered by the New York courts. Seamore v. Warren, 179 N.Y. 1, 71 N.E. 260. The law of Massachusetts is, of course, different from of New York on the point under discussion. Browne on Statute of Frauds (5th Ed.) ......
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Chapter 2 CONSIDERATION
...Co. 2004); Richman v. Brookhaven Servicing Corp., 80 Misc. 2d 563, 363 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Dist. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1975).[1279] Seymour v. Warren, 179 N.Y. 1 (1904).[1280] Corbin on Contracts Revised, § 5.27 (citing Barco Urban Renewal Corp. v. Hous. Auth. of City of Atlantic City, 674 F.2d 1001 (......