Shaabazz v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 07 June 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:18-cv-506-MMH-JRK
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
• Parties: HASSAN W. SHAABAZZ, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

HASSAN W. SHAABAZZ,¹ Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:18-cv-506-MMH-JRK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

June 7, 2021

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Hassan W. Shaabazz, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on April 13, 2018,² by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).³ In the Petition, Shaabazz challenges a 2013 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for burglary of an occupied dwelling. He raises four grounds for relief. SeePetition at 3-13. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Answer (Response; Doc. 18). They also submitted exhibits. See Docs. 18-1 through 18-16. Shaabazz filed a brief in reply. See Reply (Doc. 24). This action is ripe for review.

II. Relevant Procedural History

On March 2, 2012, the State of Florida charged Shaabazz, by Information in case number 16-2012-CF-001355-AXXX-MA, with burglary of an occupied dwelling. See Doc. 18-1 at 19. At the conclusion of a trial on July 16, 2013, a jury found Shaabazz guilty, as charged. See Docs. 18-1 at 103-04, Verdict; 18-2 through 18-5, Transcripts of the Trial Proceedings (Tr.), at 466-67.⁴ The circuit court sentenced Shaabazz to a term of imprisonment of twenty-three years, as a habitual felony offender (HFO), with a minimum mandatory term of fifteen years imposed as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) on August 20, 2013. See Doc. 18-1 at 111-17, Judgment; 125-71, Transcript of the Nelson⁵ and Sentencing Hearing (Sentencing Tr.).

Shaabazz, with the benefit of counsel, filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) (Rule 3.800motion) on January 27, 2014. See Doc. 18-6 at 3-12. In the Rule 3.800 motion, Shaabazz asked that the court remove the PRR designation, the fifteen-year PRR minimum mandatory sentence, and the $100.00 Sheriff's Office investigative cost. On March 24, 2014, the court granted the Rule 3.800 motion as to the Sheriff's investigative cost, and denied the motion with respect to Shaabazz's assertions relating to his PRR sentence. See id. at 13-19; see also id. at 27-33, Amended Judgment.

On direct appeal, Shaabazz, with the benefit of counsel, filed an initial brief, arguing that the trial court imposed the PRR sentence in violation of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), where the facts necessary to impose such sanctions were not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and where the State's intent to seek such sanctions was not alleged in the Information. See Doc. 18-7. The State filed an answer brief, see Doc. 18-8, and Shaabazz filed a reply brief, see Doc. 18-9. On July 8, 2014, the appellate court (First DCA) affirmed Shaabazz's conviction and sentence per curiam without issuing a written opinion, see Doc. 18-10, at 1, and denied Shaabazz's motion for rehearing on August 19, 2014, see id. at 2-6. The court issued the mandate on September 4, 2014. See id. at 9.

Shaabazz filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 motion) on August 21, 2015, see Doc. 18-11 at 1-62, and a substantially similar Rule 3.850 motion on June 13, 2016, see Doc. 18-12 at 1 n.2. In his request for postconviction relief, Shaabazz asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to: attack a deficient charging document and erroneous jury instructions (ground one), see Doc. 18-11 at 5-9; suppress Shaabazz's statements to police (ground two), see id. at 9-13; properly advise Shaabazz of the benefits and disadvantages of testifying as a convicted felon (ground four), see id. at 15-17; object to the State's bolstering and character attacks at trial (ground five), see id. at 17-19; attack the sufficiency of the Information by moving for an arrest of judgment (ground six), see id. at 19-21; and present mitigation evidence relating to Shaabazz's drug addiction at sentencing (ground seven), see id. at 21-22. He also asserted that trial counsel was ineffective because he conceded Shaabazz's guilt (ground three). See id. at 13-15. On July 11, 2016, the circuit court struck grounds one, two, three, and six, and granted Shaabazz an opportunity to amend his claims. See Doc. 18-12.

Shaabazz filed a pro se amended Rule 3.850 motion on January 28, 2017. See Doc. 18-13 at 1-13. In his amended request for postconviction relief, he voluntarily withdrew grounds one, two, three, and six. See id. at 2. Additionally, he added two claims, asserting that trial counsel was ineffectivebecause he failed to: inform Shaabazz that the State offered a ten-year plea (ground eight), see id. at 2-8; and file a motion to suppress relating to an illegal search of Shaabazz's cellular phone (ground nine), see id. at 9-12. The circuit court denied grounds four, five, and seven on February 10, 2017. See Doc. 18-14 at 3-8. Additionally, the court stated that grounds eight and nine "are new claims raised outside the two-year filing period," and therefore, "are procedurally barred as untimely." Id. at 8. Alternatively, the court stated that Shaabazz was "not entitled to relief" on either ground. Id. On appeal, Shaabazz did not file a brief despite the fact that the First DCA granted him an extension of time to do so. The First DCA affirmed the circuit court's denial of Shaabazz's amended Rule 3.850 motion per curiam without issuing a written opinion on February 5, 2018, see Doc. 18-16 at 1, and issued the mandate on March 5, 2018, see id. at 3.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such ahearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can "adequately assess [Shaabazz's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'"Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has instructed:

[T]he federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, asdetermined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a "contrary to" clause and an "unreasonable application" clause. The "contrary to" clause allows for relief only "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality

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