Shackelford v. Rice
| Decision Date | 10 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 41A04-9506-CV-240,41A04-9506-CV-240 |
| Citation | 659 N.E.2d 1142 |
| Parties | Steven SHACKELFORD, Appellant-Defendant, v. Ronald D. RICE and Susan R. Rice, and First National Bank, Appellees-Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Steven Shackelford appeals the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment entered in favor of Ronald and Susan Rice (the Rices), which determined that a mechanic's lien Shackelford claimed on certain real property was invalid.
We reverse.
The facts most favorable to Shackelford, the nonmoving party, are that on November 11, 1992, the Rices contracted with J. Lindsey Builders (J. Lindsey) for the construction of a single family dwelling in Greenwood. The Rices paid $33,900 along with a $1,000 deposit to the builders, who allegedly paid that amount to Robert J. Lane for the purchase of the real property. 1 Legal title to the property was transferred from Lane to J. Lindsey on December 30, 1992, which allowed J. Lindsey to obtain a construction loan to build the Rices' home.
In January, 1993, First National Bank (the Bank) made a construction loan to J. Lindsey for $150,000, and in return, took a mortgage on the property. J. Lindsey defaulted on the construction loan and the Bank sought to foreclose all interests in the property including a number of mechanic's liens filed by various subcontractors. Shackelford was one of the suppliers who had furnished labor and materials for masonry improvements to the property in July, 1993. Shackelford never received payment for his work. Shackelford gave timely pre-lien notice only to J. Lindsey (owner of record), inasmuch as he did not know of the Rices' involvement.
While the Rices were scheduled to "close" on the real property and take title on August 24, 1993, they could not do so in light of the mechanic's liens that were filed. The bank instituted foreclosure proceedings against the Rices, Shackelford, and other mechanic's lienholders on November 3, 1993. Shackelford maintained that his mechanic's lien was valid and requested that his lien be foreclosed, the real property sold, and that his interest be deemed superior, or on parity with, the interests of all other parties to the real estate.
The Rices sought to quiet title against the bank and Shackelford, and eventually moved for summary judgment. On January 25, 1995, the trial court granted the Rices' motion and entered the following order on January 30:
"This cause came for hearing on the Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed June 23, 1994 by the Defendants/Counter-Claimants, Ronald D. Rice and Susan Rice ('Rices'), and the Court having heard the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the supporting and opposing affidavits, memoranda of law, and specific references to evidentiary material relied upon in support of an [sic] in opposition to the motion, now finds and concludes as follows:
1. The following facts are without substantial controversy:
(a) On November 11, 1992, the Rices entered into a written agreement with defendant, Jerry L. Lindsey d/b/a J. Lindsey Builders ('Lindsey'), for the construction of a residence on Lot 5, Oak Meadows Subdivision, Section 1, in Johnson County, Indiana. The Rices had already made a deposit of $1,000.00 on the lot to Robert J. Lane, Inc. ('Lane') and pursuant to the agreement, the lot was to be placed in the name of Lindsey so that a construction loan could be obtained. The Rices paid the balance of the lot price of $33,900.00 to Lindsey by December 15, 1992 and Lindsey obtained a deed from Lane on or about December 30, 1992.
(b) A construction loan was obtained by Lindsey from the plaintiff, First National Bank ('Bank'), on or about January 28, 1993. Pursuant to the agreement, Lindsey was to begin construction of the home with Rices to pay the balance of the sales price at the time of closing. The Rices had financing approved and were prepared to close on or about August 24, 1993. On August 30, 1993, the Rices moved into the home and have resided there ever since.
(c) During the period from January 28, 1993, and continuing through August 24, 1993, the following defendants allege they have provided materials and labor to Lindsey for the construction of the home:
. . . . .
ii. Steven Shackelford, who recorded his notice of intention of [sic] hold a mechanic's lien on August 17, 1993.
. . . . .
(d) At no time did any of these defendant mechanic's lien claimants ever furnish Rices written notice of any delivery of labor and the existence of lien rights.
2. The Court adopts and incorporates the facts listed above which are without substantial controversy.
3. Upon execution of the agreement with Lindsey, Rices became the 'owners' of Lot 5 and entitled to written notice of the delivery of materials of furnishing of labor and the existence of lien rights with[in] sixty (60) days from the date of this first delivery under Indiana Code 32-8-3-1. See Mid America Homes, Inc. v. Horn, (1979), 272 Ind. 171, 396 N.E.2d 879.
4. Since the furnishing of such notice is a condition precedent to the right to acquire a lien on the real estate or upon the improvement construction thereon, the mechanic's liens claimed by the defendants are void and invalid.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED BY THE COURT that the Motion For Partial Summary Judgment filed June 23, 1994, by the Defendants/Counter-Claimants, Ronald D. Rice and Susan Rice, is hereby granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs that final judgment be entered as to the claims of the foregoing mechanic's lien claimants."
Shackelford appeals and presents the following issue:
Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it determined that Shackelford's mechanic's lien was invalid?
In reviewing an appeal from a grant of a motion for partial summary judgment as to the issue of whether a developer holds a valid mechanic's lien, this court faces the same issues that were before the trial court and follows the same process as the trial court. Premier Investments v. Suites of America (1994), Ind., 644 N.E.2d 124. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence designated to the trial court demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 56(C); see also Premier Investments, supra. In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, all doubts must be resolved against the moving party and facts properly designated by the party opposing the motion must be accepted as true. Timothy F. Kelly and Assoc. v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., (1994), Ind.App., 640 N.E.2d 82; Jarvis Drilling, Inc. v. Midwest Oil Producing Co. (1993) Ind.App., 626 N.E.2d 821, trans. denied. Once the movant establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the party opposing summary judgment must set forth specific facts indicating that there is a genuine issue in dispute. Pierce v. Bank One-Franklin, NA (1993), Ind.App., 618 N.E.2d 16, trans. denied. Even if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate if conflicting inferences arise. Pitcock v. Worldwide Recycling, Inc. (1991), Ind.App., 582 N.E.2d 412; ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Union Bank and Trust (1988), Ind.App., 528 N.E.2d 1149.
A mechanic's lien was a remedy unknown at common law and is purely a statutory creation. Premier Investments, supra; Potter Mfg. Co. v. A.B. Meyer & Co. (1909), 171 Ind. 513, 86 N.E. 837. Provisions relating to the creation, existence or persons entitled to claim a mechanic's lien are to be narrowly construed since the lien rights created are in derogation of common law. Puritan Eng'g Corp. v. Robinson (1934), 207 Ind. 58, 191 N.E. 141. The burden is on the party asserting the lien to bring itself clearly within the strictures of the statute. Premier Investments, supra; Puritan Eng'g Corp., supra.
When Shackelford filed his "Notice of Intent to Hold Mechanic's Lien," the following statute was in effect:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dana Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Com'rs
...(Ind.1991). In addition, all facts properly designated by the party opposing the motion must be accepted as true. Shackelford v. Rice, 659 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Where there is no genuine issue of material fact, the Court's task is to apply the law to those fact......
-
Willis v. Warren Tp. Fire Dept.
...party opposing summary judgment must set forth specific facts indicating that there is a genuine issue in dispute. Shackelford v. Rice, 659 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), transfer denied. A grant of summary judgment must be affirmed where the final result is correct, even if the judgm......
-
Ford v. Culp Custom Homes, Inc., 46A03-0002-CV-39.
...without recompense. Id. A mechanic's lien, being a remedy unknown at common law, is purely a statutory creation. Shackelford v. Rice, 659 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Because the Indiana mechanic's lien statutes are in derogation of the common law, their provisions mu......
-
Trowbridge v. Torabi
...omitted). In addition, all facts properly designated by the party opposing the motion must be accepted as true. Shackelford v. Rice, 659 N.E.2d 1142 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. Using the above standard, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Torabi......