Shadduck v. Christopher J. Kaclik, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1998
• Citation: 713 A.2d 635
• Parties: Richard K. SHADDUCK, M.D. and Shirley R. Shadduck, Husband and Wife, Appellees, v. CHRISTOPHER J. KACLIK, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 635

713 A.2d 635

Richard K. SHADDUCK, M.D. and Shirley R. Shadduck, Husband and Wife, Appellees, v. CHRISTOPHER J. KACLIK, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 4, 1998.

Filed May 20, 1998.

William K. Herrington, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Wendelynne J. Newton, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before JOHNSON and HUDOCK, JJ., and CERCONE, President Judge Emeritus.

HUDOCK, Judge:

On June 29, 1994, Richard and Shirley Shadduck (Owners) entered into a building contract with Christopher J. Kaclik, Inc. (Builder) for the construction of a residence in Fox Chapel, Pennsylvania. Included in the contract was a provision which mandated that the parties submit all disputes and grievances arising out of the contract to the American Arbitration Association for final, binding arbitration.

On January 31, 1997, Owners initiated the instant action by filing a praecipe for a writ of summons in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. In their subsequently-filed complaint, Owners alleged that Builder made false representations regarding its ability, or willingness, to construct Owners' home in a workmanlike fashion. Owners also claimed that Builder engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practice before, during and after the construction of their house. Consequently, Owners' complaint included one count each of fraudulent misrepresentation and violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.

At about the same time, on February 3, 1997, Owners filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. Therein, Owners alleged that, due to its faulty construction of Owners' home, Builder had breached the terms of the parties' contract and warranty obligations.

On April 10, 1997, Builder filed preliminary objections to Owners' complaint in the nature of a motion to compel arbitration. In support of its motion, Builder argued that the parties' agreement contemplated arbitration of all disputes and claims, whether sounding in tort or contract. Builder, therefore, requested that the court dismiss Owners' complaint. In the alternative, Builder requested that the court stay the proceedings pending resolution of the ongoing arbitration dispute. Finally, asserting that Owners failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted, Builder filed a general demurrer to both tort counts.

By order dated May 15, 1997, the Honorable S. Louis Farino denied Builder's preliminary objections in their entirety and ordered Builder to file a responsive pleading within twenty days. On June 11, 1997, Builder complied with the court's order by filing an answer with new matter to Owners' complaint. On the following day, Builder filed the instant appeal from the court's order denying its preliminary objections.

At the outset, we must determine whether Builder's appeal is properly before our Court for review. As a general rule, an order denying a party's preliminary objections is interlocutory and, thus, not appealable as of right. See, e.g., Grimme Combustion, Inc. v. Mergentime Corp., 385 Pa.Super. 260, 560 A.2d 793 (1989). There exists, however, a narrow exception to this oft-stated rule for cases in which the appeal is taken from an order denying a petition to compel arbitration. See, e.g., Hazleton Area School Dist. v. Bosak, 671 A.2d 277, 281, n. 8 (Pa.Commw.1996); Hallo v. Flore, 386 Pa.Super. 178, 562 A.2d 856, 857 (1989).

We will, therefore, review the merits of that portion of the court's order denying Builder's motion to compel arbitration. We note, however, that Builder's objections in the form of general demurrers to the tort counts in the underlying complaint are not ripe for this Court's review. Grimme, supra. Our discussion will, therefore, be limited to the arbitration issue.

In this regard, Builder argues that the arbitration agreement at issue was broadly worded and, by its plain language, contemplated that all disputes, whether styled in tort or contract language, be submitted to arbitration. Conversely, Owners aver that the parties' agreement to arbitrate was limited to causes of action sounding in contract and that they were permitted, therefore, to file the instant tort claims in the court of common pleas.

It is well-settled that the issue of whether a particular dispute falls within a contractual arbitration provision is a matter of law for the court to decide. See, e.g., Wolf v. Baltimore, 250 Pa.Super. 230, 378 A.2d 911 (1977). In so doing, the court must carefully review the contractual language and determine whether the disagreement falls within the provision's scope.

Since our holding will, therefore, hinge upon the wording of the parties' contract, we will reproduce the applicable provision in full:

DISPUTES/ARBITRATION

10. In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and Owner, as to the meaning or interpretation of any of the provisions of this Contract or any of the plans or specifications or as to payment, the following rules apply:

A. The Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Lot is located.

B. All claims or disputes between the Contractor and the Owner arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach thereof shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed in writing with the other party to this Contract and with the American Arbitration Association and shall be made within a reasonable time after the dispute has arisen. The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with the applicable law in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.

C. The arbitrators shall be limited to interpretation of this Contract and exhibits and addenda hereto and disputes arising out of this Contract and such exhibits and addenda.

D. The agreement herein among the parties to this Contract and any other written agreement to arbitrate referred to herein shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law.

E. Each party shall pay for one-half of the costs of the arbitration.

Building Contract, 6/29/94, at 3 (emphasis added).

Our interpretation of the arbitration provision as a whole and, in particular, the highlighted portions above, convinces us that the parties intended to submit all of their grievances to arbitration, regardless of whether the claims sounded in tort or contract. There is no limiting language of the type that would lead one to believe that only contract claims fall within the purview of the agreement. Indeed, given the agreement's expansive terms, the only reasonable conclusion is that a claim's substance, not its styling, is to control whether the complaining party must proceed to arbitration or may file in the court of common...