Shafer v. Sanchez

• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:22-CV-00049
• Decision Date: 07 August 2023
• Parties: RICHARD SCOTT SHAFER, Plaintiff, v. JERRY SANCHEZ, et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

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RICHARD SCOTT SHAFER, Plaintiff,
v.
JERRY SANCHEZ, et al, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:22-CV-00049

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Corpus Christi Division

August 7, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Julie K. Hampton, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Richard Scott Shafer, a Texas inmate appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to reconsider the denial of his motion for preliminary injunctions, which is construed as his renewed motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (D.E. 106). On July 20, 2023, the undersigned conducted an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff's motion. For the following reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's renewed motion for preliminary injunctive relief be GRANTED.

I. JURISDICTION

The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.

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II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID). Plaintiff's claims and allegations in this action arise in connection with his current assignment to the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas.

In his Second Amended Complaint, which is currently the operative pleading in this case, Plaintiff sues the following defendants: (1) former McConnell Unit Warden Jerry Sanchez; (2) TDCJ Director Bobby Lumpkin; (3) Captain Andrew Nino; (4) Sergeant Samuel Reyes; (5) Officer Antonio Gamez; (6) Officer Lara; (7) UGI Ashley Johnson; (8) Officer Benjamin Garner; and (9) Officer Jonathan Montoya. (D.E. 56, pp. 1, 4). Plaintiff sues Sanchez and Lumpkin in their official capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff sues Nino, Reyes, Gamez, Lara, Johnson, Garner, and Montoya in their individual and official capacities for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. (Id.). To date, the parties have been unable to identify Defendant Lara. (See D.E. 86).

Plaintiff generally claims that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his health in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to: (1) excessive heat conditions in the summers of 2020 and 2021; and (2) infestations of rodents and cockroaches that carry disease. (Id. at 4-9). In addition to monetary and declaratory relief, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of compelling Defendants to install air conditioning units in all areas of the McConnell Unit such as inmate housing areas. (Id. at 9-10).

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At the time he filed his original complaint, Plaintiff moved the Court for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief by seeking, among other requests, immediate placement in air-conditioned housing with allowances to conduct his normal routines. (D.E. 2). In a Memorandum and Recommendation issued on April 19, 2022 (April 19, 2022 M&R), the undersigned recommended that Plaintiff's motion be denied, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to satisfy each of the four required elements for preliminary injunctive relief. (D.E. 13, pp. 4-9). District Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos adopted the April 19, 2022 M&R. (D.E. 74, pp. 2-6).

III. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

On June 20, 2023, the Court received Plaintiff's motion to reconsider the denial of his motion for preliminary injunction. (D.E. 106). The undersigned notes that the South Texas area, including the city of Beeville where the McConnell Unit is located, has and is enduring an extensive heat wave during the summer months. Plaintiff's motion is construed as a renewed motion for preliminary injunctive relief based on the current heat conditions at the McConnell Unit. Plaintiff states the following in his motion:

• Plaintiff has been suffering in the recent days from various heat-related illnesses, including dizziness, nausea lack of sweating, muscle cramps, and fainting

• Excessive heat conditions are present in the McConnell Unit's housing areas, chow hall, and other areas not air-conditioned.

• Respite areas or cold showers have not been made available to Plaintiff the last few days.

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• Officers are not conducting wellness checks and are not carrying heat restriction lists with them.

• Plaintiff has requested during this period to go to a respite area at least three times a day and has been denied by staff each time.

• Staff has informed Plaintiff each time on these occasions that respite areas are full.

• Staff also has refused to allow Plaintiff to seek medical attention for heat-syncope and other heat-related illnesses.

• Since March 5, 2023, five inmates have died because their medical conditions “were compromised by the heat.”

• Plaintiff also suffers from medical conditions making him susceptible to heat.

• Plaintiff takes medications which greatly affect his body's ability to cool itself.

(D.E. 106, pp. 1-3). Plaintiff requests that he be placed in an air-conditioned cell while this case remains pending. (Id. at 3).

On July 20, 2023, the undersigned conducted an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (D.E. 121). The parties presented the following evidence at the hearing:

• Plaintiff's testimony (id. at 11-37);

• Testimony of Dr. Jane Leonardson (“Dr. Leonardson”) (id. at 38-55);

• Testimony of TDCJ Regional Director Jerry Sanchez (“Director Sanchez”) (id. at 55-68);

• Testimony of Dr. Isaac Kwarteng (“Dr. Kwarteng”) (id. at 69-91);

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• Testimony of Warden Elbert Holmes (“Warden Holmes”)^[1] (id. at 92 114); and

• Defendants' Exhibits consisting of:

Exh. 1 AD-10.64 (D.E. 115-1);

Exh. 2 Heat Scoring Sheet (D.E. 115-2);

Exh. 3 Respite Tracking Form (D.E. 115-3);

Exh. 4 Plaintiff's Step 1 grievances (D.E. 115-4);

Exh. 5 Plaintiff's List of Medical Conditions (D.E. 115-5); and

Exh. 6 Plaintiff's Medical Records (D.E. 115-6).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Governing Legal Standard

A federal court may grant a preliminary injunction “to preserve the status quo and thus prevent irreparable harm until the respective rights of the parties can be ascertained during a trial on the merits.” City of Dallas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 847 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 2017) (restating and agreeing with the district court's framework in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction). A court should grant a preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) if the movant establishes the following: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Robinson v. Hunt Cnty., Texas, 921 F.3d 440, 451 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Speaks v. Kruse, 445 F.3d 396, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2006)).

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The Fifth Circuit has cautioned that granting a preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, not to be granted routinely, but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2013); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The decision to grant a preliminary injunction is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule.”).

In cases involving prisoners, courts are particularly reluctant to grant requests for a preliminary injunction, as “judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.” Wagner v. Campuzano, No. 1:12-CV-205-C, 2013 WL 12147778, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2013) (citing Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995)). The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) even instructs that “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

B. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiff first must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to his Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. Robinson, 921 F.3d at 451. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “The Constitution does not mandate

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comfortable prisons . . . but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted)). Prison officials must provide humane conditions of confinement and ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Conditions that result in “unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs” or “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1992).

Extreme temperatures in prison can violate the Eighth Amendment. Yates v. Collier, 868...