Shafer v. State
| Decision Date | 15 July 1964 |
| Parties | Harry Corbett SHAFER, Thomas Gus Sterger, Joseph Frances Newman and Forrest Delton Cason, Plaintiffs in Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant in Error. 18 McCanless 416, 214 Tenn. 416, 381 S.W.2d 254 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Grover N. McCormick, Memphis, for Harry Corbett Shafter and Joseph Frances Newman.
William Gerber and Hall Gerber, Memphis, for Thomas Gus Sterger.
Hal Gerber, Memphis, and Sam Anderson, Hot Springs, Ark., for Forrest Delton Cason.
George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., and Edgar P. Calhoun, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The parties will be referred to according to their status in the Trial Court. The defendants were jointly indicted in a two count indictment for carrying burglarious instruments, in violation of T.C.A. Sec. 39-908, and for the possession of explosive for burglarious purposes, in violation of T.C.A. Sec. 39-909. The defendants Shafer and Sterger were also each indicted for carrying a pistol. All of the defendants were found guilty under the first count of the joint indictment. The jury fixed the punishment of the defendants Shafer and Newman at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for not more than 10 years, the punishment of the defendant Sterger at not more than 5 years, and the defendant Cason at not more than 2 years. The defendant Shafer was found guilty of carrying a pistol with the intent to go armed and was sentenced to serve 11 months and 29 days in the Shelby County Penal Farm. The defendant Sterger was acquitted of the charge of carrying a pistol. Motions for a new trial were seasonably filed by all of the defendants. They were overruled by the Trial Judge. Each defendant has perfected his appeal and assigned errors in this Court.
Each defendant asserts that the principal evidence relied upon by the State to obtain a conviction was obtained as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee.
The record shows this question arose at the outset of the trial. The jury was excused from the courtroom and for one full day the Trial Judge heard proof and arguments as to the legality of the search. In the absence of the jury four police officers and the defendant Shafer testified before the Trial Judge. At the conclusion of this testimony the Trial Judge made an analysis of the evidence which had been offered and held that the search and seizure made at the time of the arrest of the defendants Shafer and Sterger was legal and that the evidence obtained in this search was competent. He further ruled that certain evidence obtained at the time of the arrest of the defendants Newman and Cason was illegally obtained and, therefore, not competent. After these rulings, the trial proceeded before the jury and the State introduced all of its evidence, including testimony relating to the search which had been held legal by the Trial Judge. The defendants Shafer and Newman rested their case without introducing any evidence before the jury. The defendants Sterger and Cason testified before the jury.
The evidence offered by the State on the question of the legality of the search and the arrest of the defendants Shafer and Sterger is in substance as follows:
Shortly after two o'clock on the afternoon of December 29, 1961 the Manager of the Holiday Inn on Third Street, in Memphis, called the Police Department of Memphis and advised that the night before a woman who had been drinking came into the office of the inn and told the night clerk that four men had tried to pull her into a room at the inn. Two police officers were sent to the inn to investigate this matter. They met the Manager, who advised them that he had four men there who were 'staying in pretty close during the day and out all during the night', and that he thought the matter of the complaint made by the woman during the preceding night should be investigated. The police did not obtain a search warrant or warrant for the arrest of anyone.
The officers, who were in plain clothes and wearing topcoats, proceeded toward the room in which Shafer was registered. The defendant Shafer at that time was standing beside his car, in front of this room, with a brief case in his hand. The officers approached Shafer, identified themselves as police officers, introduced themselves, and told him that they were investigating a complaint about some men trying to pull a woman into their room in the motel the night before. Shafer denied any knowledge of any such occurrence. One of the officers, Lieutenant McGee, testified it was a cold day and the defendant Shafer did not have on any topcoat, that, as they were asking him questions about the woman, he invited the officers to come into the room and continue their conversation there. The other officer, Lieutenant Sinclair, testified that, while they were talking to the defendant Shafer, he invited the officers into the room, stating that his friend was in there who would vouch for his statement that they knew nothing of an incident about a woman at the motel.
These officers testified that they followed the defendant Shafer into the motel room, that Mr. Shafer and Lieutenant McGee sat and Lieutenant Sinclair remained standing. When they entered the room the defendant Sterger was in the bathroom taking a shower. Shortly after they entered the room, and while they were asking questions about the alleged incident of the night before, the defendant Sterger came out of the bathroom in his underwear shorts. Shortly thereafter Lieutenant Sinclair noticed a tool box on the floor in the room. It was locked with a padlock. When asked what it was, the defendant Shafer stated it was his tool box and then said he was carrying it to a friend of his. Lieutenant Sinclair then asked if he had a key to it and he responded that he did, and, when asked if he would mind opening the box up, Mr. Shafer unlocked the box and opened it. When this was done, the officers saw a drill and a sledge hammer with a short handle in the box. There were some rags, or towels, in the top of the box. One of the police officers asked the other, 'Do you see what I see?'
Thereupon, Lieutenant McGee reached in the box and discovered there were two loaded pistols wrapped in the rags, or towels, in the top of the box. Under these was a leather purse containing nitroglycerin and other explosives. The officers testified they then immediately put the defendants Shafer and Sterger under arrest and called for additional police officers to come to the scene.
Following the arrest, a complete search was made of the room. A crowbar was found in a paper sack in one of the dresser drawers, and a deputy sheriff's badge was found in the defendant Sterger's coat pocket. The box also contained one pair of handcuffs, 85 Ford automobile keys, 4 flashlights, adhesive tape, chisels, pliers, an assortment of some 12 drills, and various other tools commonly used in burglarizing safes.
After the arrest of these defendants the automobile of the defendant Shafer was searched and, in the trunk of the car, there was found a suitcase containing an oxygen tank, acetylene tank, hoses, gauges for use on the tanks, goggles, gloves and other equipment. Following the search of the room and automobile, the defendants Shafer and Sterger were taken to Police Headquarters. A still watch was set up in the motel room. About nine o'clock on the night of December 29, 1961 the defendants Newman and Cason parked an automobile in front of the room. Cason got out of the car and knocked on the door. The police officers in the room immediately arrested him and then arrested the defendant Newman, who remained seated in the car. These defendants and Cason's automobile were then searched. The Trial Judge ruled that this search was not incident to a legal arrest and, therefore, the evidence obtained by this search was incompetent. Following their arrest, these defendants were taken to Police Headquarters.
In support of their contention that the evidence obtained as a result of the search of the room and the defendant Shafer's automobile following the arrest of the defendants Shafer and Sterger, the defendants strongly rely upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, in which it was held that evidence obtained by a search and seizure in violation of the United States Constitution is inadmissible in the State Court. The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is the same as that afforded by the Tennessee Constitution, Article 1, Section 7. In Tennessee, Such illegally obtained evidence has always been inadmissible.
In Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009, this Court summarized the rule as to the admissibility of evidence obtained by a search incident to an arrest, as follows:
'It will be seen from the foregoing that in declaring the authority of the arresting officer to search and seize, the authority is always limited to (1) offensive weapons and tools of escape and (2) evidence of guilt of the offense for which the lawful arrest has been made.' 210 of 173 Tenn., 116 S.W.2d p. 1012.
In Ellis v. State, 211 Tenn. 321, 364 S.W.2d 925, this Court, speaking through the present Chief Justice, had occasion to discuss fully the effect of the decision in the Mapp case. Prior to Mapp, it had been held that Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution did not afford protection from unreasonable searches and seizures beyond the limits of this State. In the Ellis case, it was held that under the rule of the Mapp case such protection was afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Tennessee Constitution defines 'unreasonable searches and seizures'.
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