Shaffer v. Clinton, Civ.A. 99-K-201.

Citation54 F.Supp.2d 1014
Decision Date02 July 1999
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 99-K-201.,Civ.A. 99-K-201.
PartiesThe Honorable Bob SHAFFER, in his official capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives; Walt Mueller, a Missouri State Senator; John R. Stoeffler, a United States taxpayer; and Gregory D. Watson, a United States taxpayer and National Coordinator of the Political Movement to Ratify the 27th Amendment, Plaintiffs, v. William Jefferson CLINTON, President of the United States of America, in his official capacity; Robert E. Rubin Secretary of the Treasury, in his official capacity; Gary Sisco, Secretary of the United States Senate, in his official capacity; and Jeff Trandahl, Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, in his official capacity, defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado

Taylor T. Pensoneau, William Perry Pendley, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Denver, CO, for plaintiffs.

Jennifer E. Kaplan, Federal Programs Branch, Washington, DC, Linda A. McMahan, United States Attorney, Denver, CO, Thomas B. Griffith, Morgan J. Frankel, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel, Washington, DC, Geraldine R. Gennet, Kerry W. Kircher, Office of the General Counsel, Washington, DC, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KANE, Senior District Judge.

The complaint alleges annual cost of living adjustments (COLAs) to salaries of members of Congress violate the Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The COLAs are applied to congressional pay in accordance with the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub.L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 31(2). The Twenty-seventh Amendment provides, in its entirety: "No law varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect until an election of Representatives shall have intervened." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII. Plaintiffs contend each COLA is an independent law that violates the Constitution. Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs lack standing, this court has no jurisdiction, venue is incorrect, the defendants are improper, the case is not ripe, and plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Simultaneous with the filing of their opposition to the motions to dismiss, plaintiffs filed an Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting there is no genuine issue as to any material fact remaining in dispute and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A number of the "facts" listed by plaintiffs as not in dispute are legal conclusions and this case is appropriately disposed of at this juncture based upon the arguments in the motion to dismiss. I grant defendants' motions to dismiss and deny plaintiffs' alternative motion for summary judgment.

I. STANDING

Four plaintiffs filed the complaint. One plaintiff (Shaffer) represents Colorado in the United States House of Representatives. Another plaintiff (Mueller) is a state senator from Missouri who voted, as a member of the Missouri State Legislature, to ratify the Twenty-seventh Amendment. The remaining two plaintiffs (Watson and Stoeffler) are listed as "taxpayers." (Complaint at 2.)1

Defendants' motions to dismiss argue Mueller, Watson, and Stoeffler have no standing to sue. In order to establish standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate 1) they have suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact, 2) traceable to the defendants' act(s), and 3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision by the court. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The standing examination is "especially rigorous" when the court is asked to decide on the constitutionality of action taken by another branch of the federal government. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 2317-18, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997).

A. INJURY IN FACT
1. Taxpayer plaintiffs (Watson, Stoeffler)

Two of the plaintiffs claim standing to sue on the basis of their status as United States taxpayers. They state taxpayers have standing to sue when "congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of the constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-3, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).

Generally, a federal taxpayer who asserts generalized grievances rather than claiming "he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury," has no standing to sue. Commonwealth v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). The Flast decision carved out exceptions to the prohibition against federal taxpayer standing, allowing taxpayer challenges to congressional action under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The Court later clarified the issue of taxpayer standing by noting that taxpayers may claim standing only in cases involving acts of Congress under its taxing and spending authority when those acts implicate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (cited in Colorado Taxpayers Union v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992)).

In this case, the taxpayers have no apparent standing to sue for two reasons. First, congressional pay increases under the Ethics Reform Act have nothing to do with the Establishment Clause. Second, Congress' authority to adjust compensation of its members is derived not from the Taxing and Spending Clause, but from the Ascertainment Clause of the Constitution. Richardson v. Kennedy, 313 F.Supp. 1282, 1285-86 (W.D.Pa.1970). Plaintiffs' challenge involves matters outside the Establishment Clause under congressional Ascertainment Clause authority. The taxpayer plaintiffs have no standing to sue.

2. State legislator (Mueller)

Senator Mueller claims he has standing to sue as a taxpayer and as a member of a state legislative body that voted to ratify the Twenty-seventh Amendment. As the previous section indicates, this plaintiff has no standing to sue as a federal taxpayer. Plaintiffs argue that Senator Mueller, as a voter in congressional elections, has been denied his ability to vote based on how his representative in Congress voted on congressional pay increases. They cite no authority for their proposition that prospective voters in congressional elections have standing to sue. The generalized nature of an injury to a voter is similar to that of the taxpayer described above. As a voter, Senator Mueller does not claim a direct, particularized injury. Citizens have no standing to sue to enforce non-particularized constitutional violations. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974).

A legislator's interest in the enforcement of a law is indistinguishable from that of any other member of the public. Daughtrey v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050, 1057 (D.C.Cir.1978). Senator Mueller's vote to ratify the Twenty-seventh Amendment did not change his position with regard to standing. Once the Twenty-seventh Amendment became part of the Constitution, any failure to enforce or follow the Amendment affects Senator Mueller in the same generalized way it affects any member of the public. Because members of the public have no standing to file suit based on generalized grievances, Senator Mueller has no standing in this case.

3. U.S. Congressman (Shaffer)

Congressman Shaffer's claim is based on an assertion that his political position with his constituency is damaged by automatic annual increases to his compensation. Because automatic COLAs have a direct and specific effect on congressional salaries, a congressman's right to sue is not limited by the Frothingham and Schlesinger standards.

In a case substantially similar to the instant case, a United States congressman was held to have standing in challenging the annual COLAs to his compensation. See Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C.Cir.1994). Then-judge, now Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the court of appeals in Boehner, addressed the issue of whether it was proper for a court to rule on a congressman's contention that an increase in his pay constitutes a harm to his political position. She deferred to the congressman's opinion that his increased salary was a distinct and palpable injury. Id.

Defendant Trandahl distinguishes Boehner, arguing that Shaffer does not trace an injury to a specific COLA, while Boehner claimed that a specific COLA, the 1993 adjustment, violated the Twenty-seventh Amendment. Plaintiffs counter by claiming that three COLAs have violated the Twenty-seventh Amendment: 1992, 1993, and 1998. I note the first of these, in 1992, preceded the ratification of the Twenty-seventh Amendment.

B. EQUITABLE DISCRETION

Executive branch defendants argue I should exercise equitable discretion not to hear the case. Because Congress must approve each proposed COLA in order to modify congressional salaries, Congressman Shaffer can obtain relief through the use of the legislative process. Congressman Shaffer claims his injury arises from increases to his compensation as a member of Congress. Congressman Shaffer is free to persuade his congressional colleagues not to approve the COLAs. He has an internal remedy available through the legislative process.

Executive defendants assert, even if Congressman Shaffer has standing, I should not hear the lawsuit. "[I]f a legislator could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators through the legislative process itself, then it is an abuse of discretion for a court to entertain the legislator's action." Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee, 836 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C.Cir.1987). The D.C. Circuit echoed the same tone in 1988, but not without noting that this use of equitable discretion had not been considered by ...

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