Shaffer v. Lohr
| Decision Date | 09 February 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 195,195 |
| Citation | 264 Md. 397,287 A.2d 42 |
| Parties | Blanche Cullers SHAFFER v. Marie Cullers LOHR. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Peter R. Hartogensis, Silver Spring (Wheeler, Korpeck & Nadonley, Silver Spring, on the brief), for appellant.
George E. Krouse, Rockville (William M. Canby and Miller, Miller & Canby, Rockville, on the brief), for appellee.
Argued before HAMMOND, C. J., and McWILLIAMS, FINAN, SINGLEY and SMITH, JJ.
This dispute between two sisters over the ownership of funds withdrawn from the savings account of their deceased mother will naturally lead to a review of the Maryland cases which have developed a distinction between rights which may be asserted by a co-owner or surviving owner of a savings account in two names. The critical issue in most of these cases is whether or not there was evidence of an intention by the depositor to bring a trust relationship into being or to make a perfected inter vivos gift.
A summary of the material facts which underlay the controversy will lend understanding to our consideration of the applicable law. Blanche Cullers Shaffer (Mrs. Shaffer) and Marie Cullers Lohr (Mrs. Lohr) are the daughters of Sena G. Cullers, who died testate, domiciled in Garrett County, Maryland, on 18 December 1969. Mrs. Cullers' will named Mrs. Shaffer and Mrs. Lohr as executrices and as residuary legatees of her estate, in equal shares.
At the date of Mrs. Cullers' death there was $22,689.54 on deposit in a joint savings account which had been opened by her on 8 October 1965 at The Garrett National Bank (the Bank), Oakland, Maryland. The passbook was in the names of 'Mrs. Sena G. Cullers or Mrs. Blanche Shaffer,' the names having been handwritten in ink. Below the names appeared the phrase, 'Either or the survivor' which had been imprinted with a rubber stamp. There was printed on the passbook the legend, 'No payments can be made or money withdrawn without presentation of this book.'
On deposition, Mrs. Shaffer testified that the savings account was opened in October 1965. The initial deposit was $4,360.00, which Mrs. Shaffer believed to have been the proceeds of the sale of farm implements or cattle, sold by her mother. Mrs. Shaffer said she was not present when the account was opened, but signed a signature card which was sent to her by mail. She thought that a deposit of.$17,821.97 made in 1966 represented her mother's share of the proceeds of the sale of a farm which had been owned by her father at the time of his death. She admitted that she had made no deposits of withdrawals during her mother's lifetime, and had never had possession of the passbook.
Mrs. Cullers kept the passbook until her death, when it was found among her personal effects by Mrs. Lohr and Mrs. Shaffer. While Mrs. Cullers' will was admitted to probate by the Orphans' Court for Garrett County on 8 January 1970, it would seem that the will was filed for the limited purpose of transferring title to an automobile sold to Mr. Shaffer for $375.00 apparently in an effort to comply with Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.) Art. 93, § 5-608, and that there had been no other administration of her estate. On 13 January 1970, Mrs. Shaffer made two withdrawals from the savings account, one in the amount of $21.86 and another in the amount of $200.00, and on 10 February 1970, withdrew the balance of $22,769.34. 1 From the funds withdrawn and the proceeds of sale of the automobile she said she had paid a funeral bill of some $1,500.00, some bills owed by her mother aggregatinb about $200.00 and a legacy of $100.00 to her brother, Paul W. Cullers, which was provided for in the will.
On 9 March 1970, Mrs. Lohr instituted an action in equity in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, against Mrs. Shaffer for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that Mrs. Shaffer had closed the account; had refused to regard the fund as an asset of Mrs. Cullers' estate, and had declined to make distribution in accordance with the terms of the will. The bill of complaint and an amended bill of complaint failed to survive Mrs. Shaffer's demurrers. Ultimately, a second amended bill of complaint was filed, containing an expanded statement of the facts which gave rise to the controversy, which sought a declaration of the rights of the parties, the imposition of a trust on the funds withdrawn and an accounting by Mrs. Shaffer. When the case was at issue on bill and answer, Mrs. Lohr's motion for summary judgment was granted, and a decree was entered declaring that the funds on deposit in the savings account were assets of the estate of Mrs. Cullers, and ordering that the estate be reopened; that a trust be imposed on the funds, and that Mrs. Shaffer be required to account for the funds which she had withdrawn from the bank. It is from the order granting the summary judgment and the relief prayed that this appeal has been taken.
Mrs. Shaffer challenges the result reached below on four grounds:
(i) That the lower court was in error in determining that there was no dispute of a material fact and that the granting of the motion for summary judgment was therefore not warranted;
(ii) That Mrs. Cullers' intent was a crucial issue in the case to be determined by the trier of fact;
(iii) That there was sufficient delivery to constitute a valid inter vivos gift; and,
(iv) That the case was made moot by Mrs. Shaffer's withdrawal of the balance in the account.
We shall consider these contentions seriatim.
The lower court was in error in determining that there was no dispute of a material fact and that the granting of the motion for summary judgment was therefore not warranted.
The principal thrust of Mrs. Shaffer's argument is that the material fact in dispute was the intention of Mrs. Cullers in opening the account. While intention is an element in the resolution of a dispute involving the ownership of a bank account, Jones, Adm. v. Hamilton Adm., 211 Md. 371, 380, 127 A.2d 519 (1956), it is only one of the criteria, the others being the identify of the original owner of the money on deposit and the mechanics employed to give effect to the depositor's intent.
The affidavit filed by Mrs. Lohr in support of her motion for summary judgment was essentially a repetition of the undisputed facts which we have recited, to which was added a flat statement that Mrs. Shaffer had promised to divide the fund with her. The affidavit filed by Mrs. Shaffer in support of her opposition to the granting of the motion for summary judgment was discursive and in the main unresponsive. Its important paragraphs were these:
'2. Plaintiff is incorrect when she states Defendant never knew of the passbook prior to her mother's death. Defendant in fact knew of the existence of the account from its inception and necessarily had to know in order to sign signature cards. On several occasions decedent made remarks and took actions making it apparent she intended the account to pass to the survivor upon her death.
'3. Acting under her belief and the advice of her attorneys that the joint bank account in question was not an asset of the estate, there being less than $1,000.00 in other assets of the decedent, she settled the final affairs of decedent under the Small Estate procedure in Maryland, whereby no executor was appointed and the Will was not admitted to probate. 2
Court of Garrett County. Defendant herself has not petitioned for the appointment for reasons above-mentioned. She knows of no reason why the Plaintiff herself could not petition for the appointment.
'5. She is not, as Plaintiff and her attorneys imply, a 'passive executrix' refusing to bring an action on behalf of an estate or an executrix at all; there is no executrix and there is no estate, none having been established.
'6. She removed the funds from the bank in Garrett County before there was any litigation pending. Her reason for doing so was that she believed and it is the advice of her attorneys that she was and still is the sole owner of these funds, being survivor under a joint account with right of survivorship.
'7. She never promised to divide the funds equally with Plaintiff.
It is curious here that there was no proffer of records of the Bank or of testimony of any circumstances which may have surrounded the opening of the account. The affidavit filed by Mrs. Shaffer is wholly lacking in the specificity required in our summary judgment procedure. In Lipscomb v. Hess, 255 Md. 109, 257 A.2d 178 (1969), we had occasion to review summary judgment procedure under Maryland Rule 610. There we said:
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