Shaffer v. A.W. Chesterton Co.

• Decision Date: 09 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18CA011440,18CA011440
• Citation: 2019 Ohio 5022,150 N.E.3d 463
• Parties: Diane SHAFFER, Individually, and as Executrix of the Estate of Edward Shaffer, Deceased, Appellant v. A.W. CHESTERTON CO., et al., Defendants and United States Steel Corporation, Appellee
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

150 N.E.3d 463

2019 Ohio 5022

Diane SHAFFER, Individually, and as Executrix of the Estate of Edward Shaffer, Deceased, Appellant

v. A.W. CHESTERTON CO., et al., DefendantsandUnited States Steel Corporation, Appellee

No. 18CA011440

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District, Lorain County.

Dated: December 9, 2019

CHARLES P. STERN and GIBBS C. HENDERSON, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.

JOSH P. GRUNDA, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

THOMAS I. MICHALS, MATTHEW M. MENDOZA, JENNIFER WHITT, and LINDSEY E. SACHER, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

CALLAHAN, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Appellant, Diane Shaffer, individually and as the executrix of the estate of Edward Shaffer, appeals from the judgment of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, United States Steel Corporation, as to the federal claims. For the reasons set forth below, this Court reverses.

I.

{¶2} Between 1960 and 1961, Mr. Shaffer served as a merchant marine employed by the Pittsburgh Steamship Division of United States Steel Corporation. Mr. Shaffer worked on various vessels owned and operated by United States Steel Corporation ("U.S. Steel") that sailed on the Great Lakes. Mr. Shaffer mainly worked in the engine room and the boiler room of the vessels. His job duties included, but were not limited to, repairing, removing, replacing, and cleaning up thermal insulation materials on pipes; removing and replacing packing and gasket materials on steam wenches and valves; and removing and cleaning cement off old bricks and sealing the cleaned bricks in the boiler. Mr. Shaffer alleged that he was exposed to asbestos while working on U.S. Steel's ships. In 2016, Mr. Shaffer was diagnosed with mesothelioma

.

{¶3} The Shaffers filed a complaint against twenty-three entities alleging state claims of asbestos-related personal injury, products liability, intentional tort, and loss of consortium. The complaint also set forth federal claims under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness under general maritime law against only some of the parties. The complaint was amended three times to add and remove parties and to modify the claims.

{¶4} U.S. Steel filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the third amended complaint addressing the federal claims. The Shaffers filed a brief in opposition to U.S. Steel's summary judgment motion, and U.S. Steel filed a reply brief. After conducting an oral hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of U.S. Steel on the federal claims, but did not include Civ.R. 54(B) certification on the order. Other parties and claims remained pending in the case.

{¶5} The Shaffers filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on grounds not argued by U.S. Steel and the trial court incorrectly applied state law to federal claims. U.S. Steel opposed the motion for reconsideration arguing that the Shaffers had a meaningful opportunity to respond. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.

{¶6} Mr. Shaffer died on June 29, 2018, while the case was still pending. Mrs. Shaffer was appointed as the executrix of Mr. Shaffer's estate, and the complaint was amended a fourth time to reflect the appropriate plaintiff, to remove defendants, and to add a wrongful death claim.

{¶7} Thereafter, Mrs. Shaffer requested, and the trial court issued, an order adding Civ.R. 54(B) certification to the judgment in favor of U.S. Steel as to the Shaffers' federal claims. Mrs. Shaffer, on behalf of herself and Mr. Shaffer's estate, has timely appealed,¹ asserting three assignments of error.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY APPLYING OHIO STATE LAW, RATHER THAN FEDERAL MARITIME LAW, TO [THE SHAFFERS'] JONES ACT AND UNSEAWORTHINESS CLAIMS IN ASSESSING THE SUFFICIENCY OF [THE SHAFFERS'] CAUSATION EVIDENCE.

{¶8} In the first assignment of error, Mrs. Shaffer argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded "that Ohio substantive law * * * appl[ied] and that [the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in] Schwartz [v. Honeywell Internatl., Inc. , 153 Ohio St.3d 175, 2018-Ohio-474, 102 N.E.3d 477 ] is controlling[ ]" as to the federal maritime claims of unseaworthiness and the Jones Act. This Court agrees.

{¶9} This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. See Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. , 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 24, citing Doe v. Shaffer , 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390, 738 N.E.2d 1243 (2000). When a trial court elects to reconsider its interlocutory summary judgment ruling, this Court applies the same standard of review that is applicable to review a summary judgment decision. Carter v. Gerbec , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27712, 2016-Ohio-4666, 2016 WL 3541230, ¶ 39, quoting Hull v. Astro Shapes, Inc. , 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 26, 2011-Ohio-1656, 2011 WL 1258706, ¶ 28, quoting Klocinski v. Am. States Ins. Co. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1353, 2004-Ohio-6657, 2004 WL 2849054, ¶ 12. Accordingly, we apply a de novo review to the trial court's reconsideration decision of its grant of summary judgment. Carter at ¶ 39.

{¶10} Summary judgment is proper under Civ.R. 56(C) when: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only reach one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Civ.R. 56(C) ; Temple v. Wean United, Inc. , 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

{¶11} Summary judgment consists of a burden-shifting framework. The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact concerning the essential elements of the nonmoving party's case.

Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). Specifically, the moving party must support the motion by pointing to some evidence in the record of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264. Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party has a "reciprocal burden" to " ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264, quoting Civ.R. 56(E).

{¶12} Federal law permits a plaintiff to file a Jones Act claim and an unseaworthiness claim in either state or federal court. See 28 U.S.C. 1333(1) ; Garrett v. Moore–McCormack Co., Inc. , 317 U.S. 239, 245, 63 S.Ct. 246, 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942) ("[S]tate courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to try actions either under the Merchant Marine Act or in personam[.]"); Powell v. Offshore Navigation, Inc. , 644 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir.1981) (unseaworthiness is an in personam claim that may be filed in state or federal court).

{¶13} The Jones Act, which incorporates the Federal Employers' Liability Act, supersedes all state laws as to the liability for vessel owners for injuries to seamen and requires uniform application of federal law. Lindgren v. United States , 281 U.S. 38, 46-47, 50 S.Ct. 207, 74 L.Ed. 686 (1930). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has "held that the Jones Act is to have uniform application throughout the country unaffected by ‘local views of common law rules.’ " Garrett at 244, 63 S.Ct. 246, quoting Panama RR. Co. v. Johnson , 264 U.S. 375, 392, 44 S.Ct. 391, 68 L.Ed. 748 (1924).

{¶14} Similarly, an unseaworthiness claim is governed by federal maritime law as to all substantive matters, but applies state law as to procedural matters. Lloyd v. Victory Carriers, Inc. , 402 Pa. 484, 486, 167 A.2d 689 (1960) ; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn , 346 U.S. 406, 409-410, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953). See Jones v. Erie RR. Co. , 106 Ohio St. 408, 412, 140 N.E. 366 (1922) ("The substantive law relates to rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action. ‘Procedure’ is the machinery for carrying on the suit."). However, the state procedural law will not be applied if it interferes with the parties' substantive rights. Lloyd at 486, 167 A.2d 689.

{¶15} It has been recognized that state law may be applied to federal maritime cases when there is no admiralty law on point. Byrd v. Byrd , 657 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir.1981). Also, state law may be used to supplement federal maritime law, but only when there are no conflicts between the two systems of law and the need for uniformity does not bar the state action. See Pope & Talbot at 409-410, 74 S.Ct. 202 ; Powell , 644 F.2d at 1066, fn. 5 ; Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller , 510 U.S. 443, 447, 114 S.Ct. 981, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994).

{¶16} Accordingly, "[w]hen a state court hears an admiralty case, that court occupies essentially the same position occupied by a federal court sitting in diversity: the state court must apply substantive federal maritime law but follow state procedure." Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis , 971 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex.1998) (Texas Supreme Court applied federal law to Jones Act claim filed in state court). See Brown v. L.A. Wells Constr. Co. , 143 Ohio St. 580, 586, 56 N.E.2d 451 (1944) (Ohio Supreme Court held that it was "bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States with reference to [the] application and construction[ ]" of a Jones Act claim filed in state court.); Garrett , 317 U.S. at 240, 245, 63 S.Ct. 246 (Jones Act claim filed in Pennsylvania state court required application of federal substantive law). See also Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique , 358 U.S. 625, 627-628, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959) (recognizing admiralty law applies to unseaworthiness and negligence claims filed in state court); Am. Dredging Co. at 456, 114 S.Ct. 981 (state court must apply uniform federal laws to Jones Act claims); Lloyd at 486, 167 A.2d 689 (recognizing an unseaworthiness claim filed in Pennsylvania state court is governed by federal maritime law as to substantive matters). Thus, in this matter, the state trial court...