Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo

• Decision Date: 19 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 99-11842NG.,CIV.A. 99-11842NG.
• Citation: 138 F.Supp.2d 99
• Parties: Azuzallah SHAHEED-MUHAMMAD Plaintiff, v. Paul DIPAOLO, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

138 F.Supp.2d 99

Azuzallah SHAHEED-MUHAMMAD Plaintiff, v. Paul DIPAOLO, et al., Defendants

No. CIV.A. 99-11842NG.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

March 19, 2001.

Azuzallah Shaheed-Muhammad, Florence, AZ, Pro se.

Richard C. McFarland, Elizabeth K. Hayes, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GERTNER, District Judge.

Azuzallah Shaheed-Muhammad ("Muhammad") brings this action pro se against the defendants, employees of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections ("DOC"). Muhammad alleges a deprivation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under related Massachusetts constitutional and statutory provisions in connection with his incarceration at the Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center ("SBCC") maximum security prison in Shirley, Massachusetts.

Muhammad's claims center around what he describes as a violation of his right to practice his Muslim religion. He states that between April 29, 1999, and June 23, 1999, the defendants¹ failed to provide him with vegetarian meals in accordance with his religious practices, denied him access to a newspaper published by followers of the Nation of Islam, confiscated a medallion of religious significance, and transferred him to the Southeastern Correctional Center ("SECC") in Bridgewater, Massachusetts, in retaliation for his assertion of constitutionally protected religious freedoms. Muhammad seeks injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages.

The core of the dispute concerns the scope of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C.1997 § e(e), an act intended to limit access to the federal courts for certain prisoner claims, namely those for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical harm. I conclude that the provision does not cover the claims alleged by Muhammad because the harms proscribed by the First Amendment, Due Process, or Equal Protection are assaults on individual freedom and personal liberty, even on spiritual autonomy, and not on physical well-being. Intangible rights like these are abridged the moment a state silences free speech or prevents a citizen from following the precepts of his religion. While the violation may be accompanied by psychological or even physical injury, the severity of incursion is not necessarily measured in those terms.

The defendants move for Judgment on the Pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) alleging that, (1) the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is moot because he is no longer in the custody of the Massachusetts DOC; (2) the plaintiff's claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred by PLRA, 42 U.S.C.1997 § e(e), because the defendant fails to allege physical injuries as a direct result of the alleged violations; and, (3) this Court should exercise its discretion and dismiss the plaintiff's pendent state law claims.

Muhammad has filed an Opposition to the Defendants' Motion on the grounds that, (1) his claim for injunctive relief is not moot because, as a felon serving a life sentence, he is likely to be transferred back to the maximum security institutions in Massachusetts where the alleged violations originally occurred; (2) he did suffer physical injuries as a direct result of the defendants' actions; and, (3) because his federal claims are properly before this Court, his pendent state law claims should be considered in tandem.

I agree with the defendants that Muhammad's transfer to a correctional facility outside the jurisdiction of Massachusetts renders his claims for injunctive relief against the Massachusetts DOC moot. However, the plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate violations of the First Amendment, Equal Protection, or Due Process under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act are not barred. The defendants' Motion For Judgment on The Pleadings [docket entry # 18] is therefore GRANTED as to the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and DENIED as to the plaintiff's claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under Massachusetts law.

I. FACTS

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) allows a party, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, [to] move for judgment on the pleadings." Because the purpose of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is to dispose only of patently meritless cases, a court accepts the factual averments of the non-moving party as true and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir.1988).

Furthermore, I construe a handwritten pro se complaint liberally. As the Supreme Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652, (1972), a pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 520-521, 92 S.Ct. 594, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80, (1957). Against this backdrop, I recite the averments of the complaint.

Plaintiff describes himself as a devout Muslim who adheres to the beliefs and teachings of Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam.² In accordance with his religious beliefs, plaintiff adheres to a strictly vegetarian diet, which he qualifies as comestibles that do not contain "cattle, hog, bird, fish, and any other living organism that has the ability to flee man if he pursues it."³

In a letter dated April 29, 1999, Muhammad, while confined at SBCC, initiated his request to defendant Bassma for access to a special diet in accordance with the plaintiff's religious needs. On May 6, 1999, Bassma acknowledged his receipt of Muhammad's letter, but informed the plaintiff that he was unable to gratify the request for a special diet. Instead, Bassma informed Muhammad of his intention to refer the issue to Anthony Mendonsa, the Director of Treatment at SBCC.

Muhammad followed up this conversation with a letter dated May 6, 1999, to defendant Mendonsa, a letter dated May 24, 1999, to defendant Dipaolo, and a letter dated June 17, 1999, to defendant Hughes renewing in each his request for a special diet consistent with his religious beliefs. Yet, despite Muhammad's repeated efforts, officials at SBCC never granted his request for special diet by the time of his transfer to SECC on June 24, 1999.

Muhammad asserts a second, related pattern of constitutional infraction in which the defendants are alleged to have denied the plaintiff access to certain religious publications. On May 4, 1999, Muhammad placed an order for two newspaper issues published by the Allah Youth Center In Mecca ("AYCIM") in New York City, an organization founded and run by members of the Nation of Islam.⁴ The order was approved by Unit Manager Eilene Simas on May 5, 1999, and executed after appropriate costs were withdrawn from Muhammad's prison account.

On May 25, 1999, Muhammad received a "Notice of Non-delivery of Mail" form signed by SBCC Mailroom Officer Leabman. The notice stated that the newspaper sought from the AYCIM, The Five-Fercenter newspaper, was deemed contraband by Inner Perimeter Security ("IPS") and designated for return to the AYCIM on May 26, 1999.

Muhammad immediately appealed Leabman's decision to Superintendent Dipaolo.⁵ In addition, by letter dated June 19, 1999, Muhammad requested that the AYCIM file an appeal on Muhammad's behalf to Leabman. However, there is no indication in the complaint or in any of the pleadings that Dipaolo or other officials in the Massachusetts DOC responded to Muhammad's appeal.

Muhammad contends that these actions by the DOC violated his constitutional rights under the free exercise provision of the First Amendment. He believes the leaders of the AYCIM to be the "Poor Righteous Teachers of the Nation of Islam," entrusted by God with the task of civilizing and incorporating Black youth into the "reality and oneness of Allah."⁶ As Muhammad considers the guidance and teaching provided by these "Righteous Teachers" in their newspaper publications a "significant aspect of [his] religion,"⁷ he claims that the DOC's interception of the publications interfered with his ability to practice his faith meaningfully.

Finally, Muhammad alleges that his rights were violated when defendant Cabino confiscated the plaintiff's plastic crescent-moon medallion on April 19, 1999.⁸ While incarcerated at MCI-Cedar Junction in Walpole, Massachusetts, Muhammad wore a medallion consisting of the Sun, Moon, and Star of Islam, which, according to Muhammad, represents dhikr, or "remembrance," taqwa, or "God-consciousness," and protection against shaitanir rajim, or an "outcasted devil."⁹

On April 18 of either 1998 or 1999, defendant Cabino allegedly approached Muhammad while exiting the dining hall and inquired about the medallion adorning Muhammad's neck. Muhammad claims that despite explaining to Cabino the religious significance of the talisman, Cabino ordered Muhammad to yield the medallion or "cuff up and go to the hole."¹⁰ Muhammad then turned over the medallion, and Cabino, designating it contraband, sent it to the property department.

On August 24, 1999, Muhammad brought this action against the defendants, asserting four claims for relief under Massachusetts law and four claims for relief under Federal law. Sometime after filing the complaint, Muhammad was transferred to the Arizona Prison Complex in Florence, Arizona.¹¹

Specifically, Muhammad asserts the following claims under Massachusetts law: (1) Violations of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations (Count I);¹² (2) violations of Mass. Gen. L. c. 127 §§ 87 and 88 and Mass. Gen. L. c. 12 §§ 11H and 11I (Count II);¹³ violation of the plaintiff's religious freedoms under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, Articles 1, 2, 18, and 46 (Count III); and malicious...