Shahi v. Madden

• Decision Date: 07 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-412.,06-412.
• Parties: Kaveh SHAHI and Leslie Shahi v. Daniel MADDEN.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

949 A.2d 1022

2008 VT 25

Kaveh SHAHI and Leslie Shahi v. Daniel MADDEN.

No. 06-412.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

March 7, 2008.

Kaveh S. Shahi of Cleary Shahi & Aicher, P.C., Rutland, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

David W. Reeves of Wright, Reeves & Vollers, P.L.C., Woodstock, for Defendant-Appellant.

Present: DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ., and PEARSON, Supr. J., Specially Assigned.

SKOGLUND, J.

¶ 1. In this case, the jury found that plaintiffs, Kaveh and Leslie Shahi and their children, had been the victims of a vicious campaign of harassment at the hands of defendant, their neighbor. The evidence was uncontested that, after plaintiffs refused defendant's demand to remove an approximately 100-year-old tree located on their shared property line, defendant waged an offensive of intimidation and vandalism that took a large personal and financial toll on plaintiffs. Defendant, Daniel Madden, appeals from a judgment awarding plaintiffs more than $1,800,000 in damages. Defendant argues that the court erred when it: (1) granted plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint on the eve of trial, (2) denied defendant's motion for a view of the premises by the jury, (3) precluded the admission of evidence of defendant's financial status, (4) incorrectly calculated damages, and (5) denied defendant's motion for a new trial or to remit as excessive a portion of the damages. We affirm the judgment below in all respects.

¶ 2. The facts that follow are uncontested. In 2002, defendant acquired a ten-acre parcel of land abutting the plaintiffs' residence in Woodstock, Vermont. That fall, defendant demanded that plaintiffs give him permission to remove an approximately 100-year-old tree located on the shared property line. In July 2003, after plaintiffs had refused to give defendant permission to do so, and while plaintiffs were out of town, defendant cut down the tree. Plaintiffs brought a law suit against defendant and his spouse for the unlawful cutting of the tree; defendant and his spouse resisted discovery and settled for $5,000 in October 2004. Shortly after the settlement, plaintiffs discovered a mature tree — located on their property near where the first tree had been cut — that had been "girdled." According to plaintiffs' expert, girdling is making a "penetrating cut through (or remov[ing] ...) the bark from the circumference of a tree," and is "[a]n accepted forestry practice to kill an unwanted tree." In November 2004, plaintiffs filed suit against defendant seeking punitive and other damages, interest and costs for timber trespass, unlawful trespass and unjust enrichment. This second suit would eventually become the subject of this appeal.

¶ 3. Defendant's campaign of vandalism did not stop there. In September 2005, plaintiffs discovered that one of their trees had been cut and was lying across the driveway, blocking access to their house. On the same day, plaintiffs discovered two additional mature, girdled trees along the boundary line with defendant's property. Plaintiffs contacted the State Police; subsequent investigations turned up a number of other similarly damaged trees on plaintiffs' property. In October 2005, defendant was arrested for vandalism of plaintiffs' property. Within a few days of defendant's arrest and release, plaintiffs discovered more girdled trees on their property. Defendant was arraigned on felony and misdemeanor charges (felony unlawful mischief in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3701(a) and unlawful trespass in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3705(a)), and, one week later, plaintiffs' family dog exhibited symptoms of poisoning and died. In November 2005, plaintiffs' bird feeder was vandalized, and plaintiffs learned from a neighbor that defendant had earlier stated that he disliked plaintiffs because he perceived them as non-Christians and that he wanted plaintiffs to relocate. He also told this neighbor that he intended to shoot plaintiffs' dog. Among other things, garbage, sharp objects and bullets were placed on plaintiffs' driveway and in their yard, plaintiffs' vehicle was "keyed," and plaintiffs were subjected to loud noises. Plaintiff Leslie Shahi testified that her family had been living in an atmosphere of terror since the fall of 2005.

¶ 4. On January 3, 2006, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint by adding defendant's wife as a defendant, to apply their original causes of action against defendant ((1) timber trespass, (2) unlawful trespass and (3) unjust enrichment) with regard to twenty-four trees, and to allege additional causes of action against defendant, seeking punitive and other damages as well as injunctive relief, attorney's fees, interest and costs for (4) "intimidation ... threat ... and harassment... intended to ... deprive and discourage plaintiffs from access to ... [c]ourt and the ability to pursue their legal rights," (5) unlawful mischief in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3701, (6) unlawful removal and/or alteration of boundary stakes in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3834, (7) commission of hate crimes in violation of 13 V.S.A. §§ 1455-1457, (8) stalking and aggravated stalking in violation of 13 V.S.A. §§ 1062-1063, and (9) extortion in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1701.¹ During a status conference on January 9, 2006, the court declined to rule on the motion to amend until such time as defendant's spouse could be deposed. To safeguard defendant's Fifth Amendment right, the court precluded defendant from being deposed while the criminal charges were pending. It was agreed that this case would be tried after the conclusion of the criminal trial. The court approved a discovery schedule and alerted the parties that they would be required to go forward with the trial by June 15. Discovery proceeded, including expert disclosures and a site inspection by defendant's expert of all the damaged trees. In June 2006, defendant entered a no-contest plea to a misdemeanor in the criminal case. At a pretrial conference in this case on July 5, 2006, plaintiffs withdrew their motion to add defendant's spouse as a defendant, and the court granted plaintiffs' motion to amend with respect to all claims made against defendant in plaintiffs' amended complaint.

¶ 5. A jury trial was held on July 12 and 13, 2006 at which defendant chose not to appear. At trial, defense counsel did not deny liability but attempted to mitigate damages by eliciting testimony from an expert witness and by cross-examining plaintiffs' witnesses. The jury found defendant liable on all counts charged and awarded $100,000 in damages for timber trespass, $255 for common law trespass, $5,000 for unlawful mischief, $1,000 for unlawful removal of survey stakes, $500,000 for invasion of privacy and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. The court trebled the timber-trespass damages to $300,000 pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 3606. Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial or for remittance of that part of the award corresponding to invasion of privacy and punitive damages as excessive. That motion was denied, and this appeal ensued.

I. Motion to Amend

¶ 6. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it granted plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint on July 5, 2006. We review a trial court's decision to grant a motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion. Lillicrap v. Martin, 156 Vt. 165, 170, 591 A.2d 41, 44 (1989). The trial court did not abuse its discretion here.

¶ 7. Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure instructs the trial courts that "leave shall be freely given" to amend pleadings "when justice so requires." V.R.C.P. 15(a). We have recently directed trial courts to allow amendments to pleadings "when there is no prejudice to the objecting party, and when the proposed amendment is not obviously frivolous nor made as a dilatory maneuver in bad faith." Hunters, Anglers & Trappers Ass'n of Vt., Inc. v. Winooski Valley Park Dist., 2006 VT 82, ¶ 17, 181 Vt. 12, 913 A.2d 391 (quotation omitted). Defendant does not claim that plaintiffs' long-standing motion to amend the complaint was frivolous or dilatory. Rather, the crux of defendant's argument is that he was unfairly prejudiced by the trial court's granting of the motion one week before trial was scheduled to have taken place. We disagree. Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint was made more than six months before trial and was sufficiently detailed to have put defendant on notice as to plaintiffs' new factual averments and legal arguments. In addition, the record reveals that both parties proceeded with discovery and pretrial motion practice as if the amendments would be granted in due course. For example, defendant propounded supplemental interrogatories and requests for production referencing the amended complaint. Finally, we note that defendant failed to move for a continuance once the court granted plaintiffs' motion to amend. See Perkins v. Windsor Hosp. Corp., 142 Vt. 305, 314, 455 A.2d 810, 816 (1982) ("Any surprise engendered by allowance of the proposed amendment could have been eliminated by requesting a continuance of the trial."). There was no abuse of discretion here.

II. Motion for a View of the Premises

¶ 8. Defendant's second assignment of error was that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a view of the premises by the jury. Trial courts may allow the jury to view premises where necessary in actions for damages to real estate. 12 V.S.A. § 1948. And "we are bound to indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the [trial court's ruling], bearing in mind that the trial court was in a better position to determine the question" of necessity. Viens v. Lanctot, 120 Vt. 443, 448, 144 A.2d 711, 715 (1958). The trial court denied defendant's pretrial motion for a view on the grounds that it would not be helpful to the jury. When the defendant renewed the motion in open court, the court again denied the request and explained to the jury that the court had decided against it for...