Shaiban v. Koumans
| Decision Date | 05 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. 3:18-cv-00153-FDW-DCK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Saleh Shaiban and Fatima Muthana, Plaintiffs, v. Mark Koumans, Kevin K. McAleenan, Department of Homeland Security, Defendants. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition. (Doc. No. 55). Defendants seek dismissal of all claims except for the Administrative Procedure Act claim (Count II). Id. at p. 5. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 55) is before this Court after more than two years of litigation. Given the complex history of this case, the Court will briefly set forth the facts as described in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition. (Doc. No. 53). Plaintiffs Saleh Shaiban ("Mr. Shaiban") and Fatima Muthana ("Ms. Muthana") are married Yemeni immigrants who filed their Second Amended Petition on May 5, 2020 (Doc. No. 53). In 2000, Mr. Shaiban filed an I-589 Application for Asylum which was granted in 2006. Id. at p. 4. Two years later, in 2008, Mr. Shaiban submitted an I-485 Application for Permanent Residence. Id. at p. 5. After approximately ten years, Defendants issued a Notice of Intent to Deny and subsequently denied Mr. Shaiban's application in 2019 on the grounds that he was a member of a terrorist organization.1 Id. Plaintiffs allege that these two inconsistent decisions—the initial grant of asylum in 2006 and the denial of permanent residence in 2019—are the result of a "discriminatory and unlawful adjudicatory scheme specifically and solely for immigrant applicants of Yemeni descent." Id. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that, because Mr. Shaiban was granted asylum in 2006, he cannot be a member of a terrorist organization because such membership is grounds for the mandatory denial of an asylum application pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(1). (Doc. No. 53, p. 4); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3)(B) (2018) (). Moreover, Plaintiffs allege by way of example—but without providing specific facts—that Defendants have "improperly raised evidentiary standards . . . illegally mandate[ed] DNA evidence, require[d] in-person interviews in bad faith [and] subject[ed] petitioners" to duplicative and unnecessary evidentiary requests and security checks. (Doc. No. 54, pp. 5-6).
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants2 and ask this Court to find the denial of Mr. Shaiban's I-485 Application a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, and the 5th and 9th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. No. 53, p. 20). Plaintiffs also petition this Court for a writ of mandamus, directing Defendants to "render[] a proper and complete decision" regarding Mr. Shaiban's I-485 Application.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56).
At the outset, this Court addresses Defendants' argument that Ms. Muthana should be dismissed from the case in its entirety for lack of standing. (Doc. No. 55, p. 4). It is well-established that any plaintiff must have standing to file suit. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). Standing requires that a plaintiff have "sufficient personal stake in the outcome of [the] dispute to render judicial resolution of it appropriate." Friends of Ferrell Parkway, LLC v. Stasko, 282 F. 3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). As with other jurisdictional requirements, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing. Id. (citations omitted).
To demonstrate standing, Ms. Muthana must satisfy the "irreducible constitutional minimum" that (1) she has suffered an injury in fact, that is, "an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) it is likely, and not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, Ms. Muthana has not satisfied her burden of establishing standing. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition makes no effort to differentiate the harms suffered by Mr. Shaiban from those suffered by Ms. Muthana. (See Doc. No. 53). The lack of clarity with respect to the harms suffered by each Plaintiff reveals the absence of any concrete harm particularized to Ms. Muthana. Yet assuming arguendo that Ms. Muthana has suffered particularized harms with respect to each claim against Defendants, the Second Amended Petition fails to sufficiently plead such harms. For example, Plaintiffs allege the improper denial of Mr. Shaiban's I-485 has deprived them of their constitutionally protected right to "make family choices, [which] cause[es] extreme financial and emotional hardship and stress." (Doc. No. 53, p. 17). However, Mr. Shaiban retains his status as an asylee and remains in the United States with his family and Plaintiffs have not allegedotherwise.3 (See Doc. No. 15; Doc. No. 55, p. 1). Without specific factual allegations as to the concrete harms suffered specifically by Ms. Muthana, this Court must conclude that Ms. Muthana does not have standing in this litigation. Accordingly, Ms. Muthana is hereby DISMISSED from this case for lack of standing.
"[D]istrict courts are granted . . . original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Hopewell v. Schweiker, 666 F.2d 34, 43 (4th Cir. 1981). Mandamus relief is typically "only available to compel the performance of a 'ministerial duty'; it is not available to 'direct the judgment or discretion in a particular way.'" Johnson v. Sessions, 2017 WL 1207537 at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2017) (quoting Wilbur v. U.S. ex rel Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218, 50 S. Ct. 320, 324, 74 L.Ed. 809 (1930)).
Here, Plaintiff appears to be petitioning this Court for a Writ of Mandamus directing Defendants Wolf and Koumans to "discharge their statutory duties owed to Plaintiffs by rendering a proper and complete decision" on Mr. Shaiban's I-485 Application. (Doc. No. 53, p. 10). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the denial of his I-485 Application warrants mandamus. Defendants had—and satisfied—a ministerial duty to render a decision on Plaintiff's I-485 Application, but Plaintiff takes issue with Defendants' discretionary decision to deny the Application. As such, the Court declines to exercise its mandamus relief powers, and Count I of the Second Amended Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
To establish a procedural due process claim under the 5th Amendment, a litigant must show that the government deprived him of a liberty or property interest without providing notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed. 2d 18 (1976). Here, even assuming Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected interest in having his I-485 Application approved, he has made no allegations that Defendants deprived him of his right to notice or a hearing.4 Accordingly, Plaintiff's procedural due process claim is hereby DISMISSED.
Equal protection claims against the federal government are asserted pursuant to the 5th Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Stop Reckless Econ. Instability Caused by Democrats v. Federal Election Com'n, 814 F.3d 221, 233 (4th Cir. 2016). "The equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments [are] indistinguishable." Id. (citation and quotation omitted). "To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the...
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