Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook Cty.

• Citation: 481 F. Supp. 1315
• Decision Date: 24 September 1979
• Docket Number: No. 69 C 2145.,69 C 2145.
• Parties: Michael L. SHAKMAN and Paul M. Lurie et al., Plaintiffs, v. The DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF COOK COUNTY; Democratic County Central Committee of Cook County and all its members; George W. Dunne, Individually and as President of the Board of County Commissioners of Cook County, as President of the Board of Commissioners of the Forest Preserve District of Cook County, and as Chairman of the Democratic County Central Committee of Cook County; City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation; Jane R. Byrne, Mayor of the City of Chicago; Morgan M. Finley, Individually and as Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County; Edward J. Rosewell, Individually and as Treasurer of Cook County, Stanley J. Kusper, Jr., Individually and as Clerk of Cook County; Thomas C. Hynes, Individually and as Assessor of Cook County; Forest Preserve District of Cook County, a Municipal Corporation; Richard J. Elrod, Individually and as Sheriff of Cook County; the Chicago Park District, a Municipal Corporation; et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

481 F. Supp. 1315

Michael L. SHAKMAN and Paul M. Lurie et al., Plaintiffs, v. The DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF COOK COUNTY; Democratic County Central Committee of Cook County and all its members; George W. Dunne, Individually and as President of the Board of County Commissioners of Cook County, as President of the Board of Commissioners of the Forest Preserve District of Cook County, and as Chairman of the Democratic County Central Committee of Cook County; City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation; Jane R. Byrne, Mayor of the City of Chicago; Morgan M. Finley, Individually and as Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County; Edward J. Rosewell, Individually and as Treasurer of Cook County, Stanley J. Kusper, Jr., Individually and as Clerk of Cook County; Thomas C. Hynes, Individually and as Assessor of Cook County; Forest Preserve District of Cook County, a Municipal Corporation; Richard J. Elrod, Individually and as Sheriff of Cook County; the Chicago Park District, a Municipal Corporation; et al., Defendants.

No. 69 C 2145.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

September 24, 1979.

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C. Richard Johnson, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

William R. Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, Foran, Wiss & Schultz, John A. Dienner, Asst. State's Atty., Peter Fitzpatrick, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

OPINION

BUA, District Judge.

This is a class action brought under the first amendment, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, challenging the patronage practices of the regular Democratic and Republican Party organizations in most of the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs are independent candidates, voters, and taxpayers. The defendants include various government officers at the state and local levels, local government entities, and local organizations and officials of the two major political parties. Plaintiffs' principal theory is that the use of state and local government patronage power to coerce political support for the regular Party organizations and their candidates violates independents' rights to fair and equal participation in the electoral process. By way of redress, plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief.

This case has a long history in this court. A 1969 dismissal of this action by Judge Marovitz was reversed by the Seventh Circuit in 1970. Following that reversal, plaintiffs entered into a consent decree with many of the Democratic and Republican defendants. The consent decree resolved most of the issues as to those defendants. Stipulations of fact were then filed as to (1) the remaining issues between plaintiffs and the Democratic defendants who are parties to the consent decree, and (2) all issues between plaintiffs and the Democratic defendants who are not parties to the consent decree. These matters are now before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Shakman is a resident of the City of Chicago and the County of Cook. Running in his home district, Shakman was an independent candidate in the November, 1969, election for delegates to the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention. At the time of that election, plaintiff Lurie was a resident of the same district. Lurie was one of those voters who supported Shakman's candidacy. In October, 1969, the plaintiffs filed the original complaint in this action, attacking the patronage practices of the regular Democratic Party organization in Chicago and Cook County. Those named as defendants included the City and its Mayor, various County officers, the Democratic County Central Committee, and the Democratic Organization of Cook County.

The primary factual allegations of the original complaint may be summarized as follows. The regular Democratic Party organization has long enjoyed a position of strong dominance in Chicago and in Cook County as a whole. This position has allegedly given the Democratic County Central Committee and the Democratic Organization of Cook County a great deal of control over the various offices, departments, and agencies of the City, the County, and many of the suburban political entities located within the County. These government offices, departments, and agencies employ thousands of persons who are not selected on a merit basis and are not protected by statute from arbitrary discharge. Many are even employed on "temporary" terms which require that their employment be renewed every several months. At the time the complaint was filed, most of these non-protected employees were required, in order to obtain their government jobs, and in order to keep those jobs or to avoid some form of job-related discipline, to have the "sponsorship" of some appropriate individual connected with the Democratic Party organization. These employees are referred to as "patronage employees." In order to secure and maintain the necessary sponsorship, patronage employees were allegedly required to contribute or promise to contribute and to do or promise to do political work for the Democratic organization and/or its candidates. According to the complaint, patronage employees were often required to do involuntary political work on public time, or to take time off their government jobs to do such work.

Thus, using governmental power and, directly or indirectly, public funds, the defendants allegedly control by coercion the political behavior of patronage employees. This enables the defendants to generate a massive political effort in favor of their organization and its candidates. The end result, plaintiffs claim, is a substantial electoral advantage for regular Democratic Party candidates, with a corresponding disadvantage to opposing candidates and voters.

Defendants' patronage practices were alleged to infringe, inter alia, (1) the rights of plaintiff Shakman, as an independent candidate, to associate with actual and potential supporters and to be free from invidious discrimination, (2) the rights of both plaintiffs, as independent voters, to associate and to cast their votes effectively in an electoral process free from substantial partisan interference, (3) the rights of both plaintiffs, as taxpayers, to be free from coerced political contributions to the Democratic Party organization and its candidates, and (4) the rights of the patronage employees to speak, vote, and associate. In addition to other relief, plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction in effect forbidding the use of any political considerations in employment practices of the government defendants.

The original complaint consisted of six counts. Counts I and IV sought relief on behalf of plaintiff Shakman and all other independent candidates similarly situated, including those in future elections. Counts II and V sought relief on behalf of both plaintiffs and all other independent voters similarly situated. Counts III and VI sought relief on behalf of both plaintiffs and all similarly situated taxpayers. Counts I, II, and III alleged the direct liability of each of the defendants for every wrong of which plaintiffs complained. Counts IV, V, and VI were corresponding counts alleging conspiracy liability.

Shortly after the complaint was filed, all of the defendants moved to dismiss it, raising a variety of arguments. Judge Marovitz granted these motions. Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 310 F.Supp. 1398 (N.D.Ill.1969). Judge Marovitz's dismissal was based on the twin grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that the allegations of the complaint were conclusory. Regarding standing, the court found that plaintiffs as candidates, voters, and taxpayers, could not assert the constitutional rights of patronage employees. 310 F.Supp. at 1401. Turning to the allegations that plaintiffs' own rights have been violated, the court reasoned that any violations of plaintiffs' own rights were merely derivative of the alleged violations of the rights of patronage employees. Id. In view of this disposition, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether plaintiffs' claims presented non-justiciable political questions. 310 F.Supp. at 1400.

On appeal from the dismissal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970). While plaintiffs' appeal from Judge Marovitz's order was pending, the November, 1969, delegate election took place. Shakman was defeated by 623 votes. A regular Democrat and an independent were elected delegates in the 24th senatorial district. After observing that these circumstances did not moot the case, the court of appeals examined and rejected the grounds for dismissal relied upon by the district court. As to standing, the court found no need to decide whether plaintiffs could assert the rights of patronage employees, or whether plaintiffs' interests as taxpayers would alone be sufficient to confer standing. Instead, the court simply stated that insofar as plaintiffs sought redress for injuries to their own interests as candidates and voters and the interests of others similarly situated, standing, per se, was no obstacle. 435 F.2d at 269.¹ Also, while agreeing that some parts of the complaint were conclusory and reflected questionable legal analysis, the court concluded that "the averments concerning the operation of the patronage system and the disadvantage it causes to candidates and voters who attempt to use the election process to change the direction of government are factual and give adequate fair notice of the claim asserted." 435 F.2d at 270.

The court then addressed two remaining questions of crucial importance: whether the alleged disadvantages to the interests of independent candidates and voters constituted a deprivation of any right or rights secured by the constitution, and whether the case was for any reason non-justiciable. In considering the status of plaintiffs'...