Shakur v. Warden, FCI Petersburg
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-1669 (RC) |
| Decision Date | 25 August 2023 |
| Parties | COCHISE AMARI SHAKUR, Petitioner v. WARDEN, FCI PETERSBURG, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Petitioner Cochise Amari Shakur[1] filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to vacate his 1998 conviction for first-degree murder and other charges. See Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus at 1 (“Pet.”), ECF No. 1. The Government filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional and timeliness grounds. See generally Gov't's Mot. Dismiss (“Gov't's Mot.”), ECF No. 12. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Shakur's habeas petition and grants the Government's motion to dismiss.
Mr. Shakur was arrested on December 7, 1996 on charges relating to the death of one woman and the maiming of another on October 15, 1996. See Pet'r's Mem. Supp. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (“Pet'r's Mem.”) at 3, ECF No. 2; Gov't's Mot. at 2. On June 4, 1998, a jury sitting in the District of Columbia Superior Court (“Superior Court”) returned guilty verdicts on all thirteen counts, including first-degree murder. See Pet'r's Mem. at 3. On July 27, 1998, Mr. Shakur was sentenced to fifty-eight years to life in prison. See id. at 4. Mr. Shakur directly appealed his conviction to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (“DCCA”) on August 12, 1998. See id. Thereafter, he filed two motions to vacate his convictions pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110. See Gov't's Mot. Ex. 1 (“DCCA Mem. and J.”) at 1, 4-5, ECF No. 12-1. The Superior Court denied the § 23-110 motions, Mr. Shakur appealed the denials, and the DCCA then consolidated his direct appeal and appeals of the § 23-110 denials. See generally DCCA Mem. and J. In 2007, the DCCA affirmed Mr. Shakur's convictions and the Superior Court's denials of his § 23-110 motions. See id. at 1; Pet'r's Mem. at 4. Over the next several years, Mr. Shakur filed several other motions challenging his conviction and sentence, none of which succeeded. See Pet'r's Mem. at 4; Gov't's Mot. at 5.
On July 2, 2019, Mr. Shakur filed a third § 23-110 motion. See Pet'r's Mem. at 4; Gov't's Mot. at 5. In that motion, Mr. Shakur claimed that he was actually innocent and moved to vacate his conviction because (1) the Government “failed to disclose exculpatory information and documents prior to trial” relating to a Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) investigation into Federal Bureau of Investigation forensic laboratory practices; and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to seek funding for independent forensics experts and to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence. See Gov't's Mot. Ex. 2, Pet'r's Pet. D.C. Code § 23-110 (“Pet'r's § 23-110 Pet.”) at 1-2, 6-7, ECF No. 12-2. On May 10, 2021, the Superior Court denied Mr. Shakur's motion to treat his § 23-110 motion as conceded. See Gov't's Mot. Ex. 4 at 7, ECF No. 12-4, but the § 23-110 motion itself apparently remains pending according to the docket. See Entry, May 10, 2021, D.C. Superior Court Case No. 1996 FEL 010633 ().[2]
On June 2, 2022, Mr. Shakur filed the petition for the writ of habeas corpus now before the Court.[3] See Pet. at 1. In his petition, Mr. Shakur claims that (1) he is “actually innocent” in light of “newly discovered evidence,” i.e., the OIG's investigation and memorandum[4]; (2) that his trial counsel deprived him of effective assistance of counsel by failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation, present mitigating evidence, and move the trial court for funding to hire independent forensic experts; and (3) that the Government committed prosecutorial misconduct by not disclosing exculpatory evidence before trial and by knowingly permitting false testimony. See Pet'r's Mem. at 2. On October 26, 2022, the Government filed its motion to dismiss, arguing that Mr. Shakur's petition is untimely and that the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims. See Gov't's Mot. at 2. Mr. Shakur filed a reply on February 8, 2023. See Reply Supp. Pet'r's Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 15.
“A conviction in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia is considered a state court conviction under federal habeas law, and a challenge to a Superior Court conviction is properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Reed v. Thomas, 287 F.Supp.3d 6, 9 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). “District of Columbia prisoners, however, face a unique jurisdictional hurdle in seeking habeas relief in federal court: D.C. Code § 23-110.” Id.
Enacted by Congress in 1970 as part of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act, which established a new local court system in the District of Columbia, § 23-110 created a procedure for collateral review of convictions in the Superior Court. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 375 (1977). Under § 23-110, a prisoner “in custody under sentence of the Superior Court . . . may move the court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence” if, as relevant here, “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 23-110(a).
D.C. Code § 23-110(g). Section 23-110(g) thus “largely divests the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction.” Head, 792 F.3d at 105; see also Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (). The Supreme Court interpreted § 23-110(g) as an “unequivocal statutory command to federal courts not to entertain an application for habeas corpus after the applicant has been denied collateral relief in the Superior Court.” Swain, 430 U.S. at 377.
The sole exception to this restriction on federal jurisdiction occurs when a petitioner's § 23-110 motion is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention”-the so-called “safety valve” or “savings clause.”[5] D.C. Code § 23-110(g); Head, 792 F.3d at 105. In the related context of evaluating identical wording in the statute governing motions to vacate under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, the Supreme Court recently explained that the savings clause “preserves recourse to [the writ of habeas corpus] in cases where unusual circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing court, as well as for challenges to detention other than collateral attacks on a sentence.” Jones v. Hendrix, 143 S.Ct. 1857, 1868 (2023). The savings clause “is concerned with the adequacy or effectiveness of the remedial vehicle (‘the remedy by motion'), not any court's asserted errors of law.” Id. at 1870 (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2255(e)).
It is the petitioner's burden to establish that the remedy under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to challenge his detention.[6] See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 183 F.Supp.3d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2016) (); Void-El v. Haynes, 440 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2006) . This burden cannot be met merely by showing that efforts to obtain collateral relief in Superior Court or the DCCA were unsuccessful. See Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (); see also Lyons v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 05-802, 2005 WL 3211417, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2005) (); Pinkney v. United States, 802 F.Supp.2d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (“In short, [Petitioner] cannot avail himself of this federal forum merely because his prior attempts to challenge his conviction and sentence in the District of Columbia courts have not been successful.”). Where a petitioner fails to demonstrate that a § 23-110 remedy is inadequate or ineffective, a federal court lacks jurisdiction over his habeas petition. See Morrison v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 68 F.Supp.3d 92, 96 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[B]ecause § 23-110 provides an adequate remedy for [Petitioner] to challenge the legality of his conviction and sentence, the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of his claims.”); Rahim v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 77 F.Supp.3d 140, 146 (D.D.C. 2015) ( a habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction where the petitioner did “not even attempt[] to make [a] showing” of the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of a § 23-110 remedy).
Mr Shakur makes three arguments as to why he is entitled to habeas relief. Because...
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